25 Years IWH

Jana Ohls

Jana Ohls
Current Position

since 2/14

Junior Research Affiliate

Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association

since 2010

Deutsche Bundesbank (Financial Stability Department, Macroprudential Analyses)

Research Interests

  • Financial Stability
  • Sovereign bank nexus
  • Finanzsystem

In 2014, Jana Ohls joined the IWH as a Junior Research Affiliate in the Financial Markets department. Her research focuses on the sovereign bank nexus and systemic risks. Since 2010, she works for the Deutsche Bundesbank in the Financial Stability Department, Macroprudential Analyses.

Jana Ohls studied International Economics in Tübingen and Buenos Aires. On this website, publications resulting from cooperation with the IWH are listed. A complete list of publications is available on the author's website.

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Publications

Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View

Claudia M. Buch Michael Koetter Jana Ohls

in: Journal of Financial Stability , 2016

Abstract

We investigate the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of German banks and the implications of such holdings for bank risk. We use granular information on all German banks and all sovereign debt exposures in the years 2005–2013. As regards the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of banks, we find that these are larger for weakly capitalized banks, banks that are active on capital markets, and for large banks. Yet, only around two thirds of all German banks hold sovereign bonds. Macroeconomic fundamentals were significant drivers of sovereign bond holdings only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. With the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, German banks reallocated their portfolios toward sovereigns with lower debt ratios and bonds with lower yields. With regard to the implications for bank risk, we find that low-risk government bonds decreased the risk of German banks, especially for savings and cooperative banks. Holdings of high-risk government bonds, in turn, increased the risk of commercial banks during the sovereign debt crisis.

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International Banking and Cross-Border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany

Jana Ohls Markus Pramor Lena Tonzer

in: International Journal of Central Banking , 2017

Abstract

We analyze the inward and outward transmission of regulatory changes through German banks’ (international) loan portfolio. Overall, our results provide evidence for international spillovers of prudential instruments. These spillovers are, however, quite heterogeneous between types of banks and can only be observed for some instruments. For instance, domestic affiliates of foreign-owned global banks reduce their loan growth to the German economy in response to a tightening of sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements, and loan-to-value ratios in their home country. Furthermore, from the point of view of foreign countries, tightening reserve requirements is effective in reducing lending inflows from German banks. Finally, we find that business and financial cycles matter for lending decisions.

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Working Papers

Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View

Claudia M. Buch Michael Koetter Jana Ohls

in: Bundesbank Discussion Paper 29/2013 , No. 29, 2013

Abstract

In this paper, we use detailed data on the sovereign debt holdings of all German banks to analyse the determinants of sovereign debt exposures and the implications of sovereign exposures for bank risk. Our main findings are as follows. First, sovereign bond holdings are heterogeneous across banks. Larger, weakly capitalised banks and banks with a small depositor base hold more sovereign bonds. Around 31% of all German banks hold no sovereign bonds at all. Second, the sensitivity of banks to macroeconomic factors increased significantly in the post-Lehman period. Banks hold more bonds from euro area countries, from low-inflation countries, and from countries with high sovereign bond yields. Third, there has been no marked impact of sovereign bond holdings on bank risk. This result could indicate the widespread absence of marking-to-market for sovereign bond holdings at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

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Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View

Claudia M. Buch Michael Koetter Jana Ohls

in: IWH Discussion Papers , No. 12, 2015

Abstract

We identify the determinants of all German banks’ sovereign debt exposures between 2005 and 2013 and test for the implications of these exposures for bank risk. Larger, more capital market affine, and less capitalised banks hold more sovereign bonds. Around 15% of all German banks never hold sovereign bonds during the sample period. The sensitivity of sovereign bond holdings by banks to eurozone membership and inflation increased significantly since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Since the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, banks prefer sovereigns with lower debt ratios and lower bond yields. Finally, we find that riskiness of government bond holdings affects bank risk only since 2010. This confirms the existence of a nexus between government debt and bank risk.

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International Banking and Cross-border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany

Jana Ohls Markus Pramor Lena Tonzer

in: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers , No. 27, 2016

Abstract

We analyze the inward and outward transmission of regulatory changes through German banks’ (international) loan portfolio. Overall, our results provide evidence for international spillovers of prudential instruments, these spillovers are however quite heterogeneous between types of banks and can only be observed for some instruments. For instance, foreign banks located in Germany reduce their loan growth to the German economy in response to a tightening of sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements and loan to value ratios in their home country. Furthermore, from the point of view of foreign countries, tightening reserve requirements was effective in reducing lending inflows from German banks. Finally, we find that business and financial cycles matter for lending decisions.

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