25 Years IWH

cover_DP_2016-20.jpg

Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt

We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and different compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt.

16. June 2016

Authors Stefano Colonnello G. Curatola Ngoc Giang Hoang

Whom to contact

For Researchers

Stefanie Müller
Stefanie Müller
Press Officer

If you have any further questions please contact me.

+49 345 7753-720 Request per E-Mail

For Journalists

Stefanie Müller
Stefanie Müller
Press Officer

If you have any further questions please contact me.

+49 345 7753-720 Request per E-Mail
Mitglied der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft LogoTotal-Equality-LogoWeltoffen Logo