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Carbon Transition Risk and Corporate Loan Securitization
Isabella Müller, Huyen Nguyen, Trang Nguyen
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 22,
2022
Abstract
We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.
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Trumps Bilanz nach sechs Monaten
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2017
Abstract
Nach einem halben Jahr im Amt hat die Unsicherheit über Donald Trumps wirtschaftspolitisches Programm ein wenig abgenommen. Bei seiner Wahl hatte ich an dieser Stelle noch argumentiert, das wirtschaftspolitische Programm des künftigen Präsidenten sei „schemenhaft und widersprüchlich.“ Der Protektionismus und die expansive Fiskalpolitik würden gegeneinander wirken, das erstere tendenziell das Wirtschaftswachstum verlangsamen, das zweite es (zumindest kurzfristig) erhöhen. Nach sechs Monaten kann man sagen: Keins von beidem ist tatsächlich so eingetreten wie befürchtet/erwartet.
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Expertise in the Political Process — Benefits, Limits and Risks
Aida Ćumurović, Reint E. Gropp, Lars Brozus, Oliver Geden, Uwe Schneidewind, Karl-Heinz Paqué, Lars P. Feld
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 4,
2017
Abstract
Since the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, confidence in politicians as well as the economists in their advisory expert panels seems to be at an all-time low. Why do politicians reject science-based advice unless it fits into their political agenda? Are economists misunderstood by politicians and vice versa? The tension between the ideal of evidence-based policy-making and the reality of policy-based evidence-making is hardly a new phenomenon. Therefore, the expectation that Donald Trump, the Brexiteers and European populists will necessarily disappoint their voters because they simply cannot deliver what they have promised is misleading. Experts would be well advised to use the debate on the post-factual era as an impetus to reflect critically on their profession. One opinion expressed in this Zeitgespräch is that the contested societal and political impact of modern economics is due to its restricted scientific self-concept. A more open, pluralistic and transdisciplinary self-definition of economics would strengthen its societal influence. Another contributor ponders the proper incentives to persuade academic economists to provide economic policy advice. Key is the independence of advisory institutions like the German Council of Economic Experts. The selection of people with the best scientific qualifications will ensure the reputation of such institutions.
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Kommentar: Wirtschaftspolitik unter Trump: Strohfeuer oder andauernde Kontraktion?
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2016
Abstract
Das wirtschaftspolitische Programm des künftigen US-Präsidenten Donald Trump ist schemenhaft und widersprüchlich. Zwei Punkte stechen bis jetzt heraus: Protektionismus und eine expansive Fiskalpolitik. Protektionismus würde einen langsameren Wachstumspfad für die US-amerikanische Wirtschaft implizieren, eine expansive Fiskalpolitik mit Steuersenkungen und einer starken Erhöhung der Infrastrukturausgaben würde, allerdings nur kurzfristig, das Gegenteil bedeuten.
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