Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.
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How Can We Boost Competition in the Services Sector?
Oliver Holtemöller
Externer Herausgeberband, Nomos,
2017
Abstract
‘How Can We Boost Competition in the Services Sector?’ is a key question in the process of creating a more effi-cient economic environment in Germany. This book contains a collection of conference contributions on service sector reforms from members of academic institutions, ministries, the EU Commission and other organisations. The conference consisted of a keynote on the importance and implementation of structural reforms in Europe and two panels that dealt with the evaluation of past reforms in the services sector and the potential scope and effects of further reforms. Since the 1990s, productivity growth in Germany and other Member States of the European Union has been significantly lower than in the US. The development of productivity growth in the services sector is estimated to account for two thirds of this widening gap. The European Commission advocated reforms in the services sector in its country-specific recommendations for Germany. At a conference in Berlin in July 2016, experts from various fields presented and discussed studies on service sector reforms.
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Structural Reforms in Banking: The Role of Trading
Jan Pieter Krahnen, Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
Journal of Financial Regulation,
No. 1,
2017
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from banks’ trading activities. The goal of this article is to look at the alternative reforms in the US, the UK and the EU, specifically with respect to the role of proprietary trading. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of proprietary trading, as reflected in the Volcker Rule in the US and in the current proposal of the European Commission (Barnier proposal), is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it is likely to crowd out desired trading activities, thereby possibly affecting financial stability negatively. Second, trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations, as suggested under the Vickers proposal for the UK and the Liikanen proposal for the EU, is a more effective solution. Separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies and risk management across banking, non-proprietary trading, and proprietary trading.
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03.05.2016 • 20/2016
Are Lacking Structural Reforms in the Financial Sector the Underlying Reason for the German Criticism of the ECB?
The major reason for the intense criticism of the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) low-interest-rate policy may be the lack of structural reforms in the German banking system. The resulting persistent fragmentation increases the banking sector’s vulnerability to the low-interest-rate environment. Hence, parts of the banking sector, due to their strong ties to politicians, appear to have successfully influenced public opinion against the ECB.
Reint E. Gropp
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Mere Criticism of the ECB is no Solution
M. Fratzscher, Reint E. Gropp, Jan Pieter Krahnen, Hans-Helmut Kotz, Christian Odendahl, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Guntram Wolff
One-off Publications,
2016
Abstract
Criticism in Germany of the ECB is counter-productive. Monetary policy must remain expansive so that it can at least begin to fulfil the ECB mandate. The preservation of its credibility also demands that. Instead of the ECB doing less, European policymakers must do more. They need to act more decisively to set Europe back upon a growth path.
[A shorter version was published under the title “Kritik an Draghi ist noch keine Lösung“ in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung of April 10, 2016].
Policymakers, including in Germany, can no longer shirk their responsibility for the current economic situation in large parts of Europe. That calls for growth-friendly fiscal policy, structural reforms to open up new markets and consolidation and restructuring of the financial sector. We in Germany, above all, must look in the mirror, because we need the majority of these reforms just as urgently as our European neighbours do.
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Structural Reforms in Banking: The Role of Trading
Jan Pieter Krahnen, Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from trading in bank business models. Prominent reform proposals are the Volcker Rule in the U.S., the Vickers Report in the UK, and, based on the Liikanen proposal, the Barnier proposal in the EU. A major element of these reforms is to separate “classical” commercial banking activities from securities trading activities, notably from proprietary trading. While the reforms are at different stages of implementation, there is a strong ongoing discussion on what possible economic consequences are to be expected. The goal of this paper is to look at the alternative approaches of these reform proposals and to assess their likely consequences for bank business models, risk-taking and financial stability. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of only proprietary trading, as envisaged in the current EU proposal, is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it likely crowds out desired trading activities, thereby negatively affecting financial stability. Second, there is potentially a better solution to limit excessive trading risk at banks in terms of potential welfare consequences: Trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations. This kind of separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies across banking, non-proprietary trading and proprietary trading.
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Municipal Size, Administrative Structure and Election Turnout: Consequences of Municipal Reform for the Legitimisation of Political Decision-making Processes
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld, Claus Michelsen
Gebiets- und Verwaltungsstrukturen im Umbruch: Beiträge zur Reformdiskussion aus Erfahrungen in Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thüringen,
No. 360,
2015
Abstract
In the political debate voices are repeatedly heard calling for municipal territories to be enlarged and to dispense with internal administrative sub-divisions of the municipal entities, hence realising the model of the so-called unitary municipality and not that of the federally conceived municipalities. The “costs“ in terms of the economic disadvantages of this centralised model are usually only mentioned in passing, not least due to the problems of quantifying these costs. This paper attempts such a quantification for one aspect of the economic disadvantages of larger and more centralised municipal entities, namely their negative effects on election turnouts. The results of the empirical investigations show that the theoretical suppositions are confirmed, demonstrating that (1.) the choice of the organisational form of municipal administrative entity affects turnout, and (2.) the unitary municipality form leads to a significantly lower election turnout than that found in federally organised types of municipality.
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The Efficiency of Municipal Service Provision: A Study on the Example of Saxony-Anhalt
Peter Haug, Annette Illy, Claus Michelsen
Gebiets- und Verwaltungsstrukturen im Umbruch: Beiträge zur Reformdiskussion aus Erfahrungen in Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thüringen,
No. 360,
2015
Abstract
Against the background of the latest reforms of municipal territories in Sachsen-Anhalt, this paper aims to empirically investigate for this federal state whether the former, very small scale structure of municipal administration could generally be termed “inefficient“. It is of particular importance to determine whether decentralised forms of administration, such as the administrative associations that have been dissolved, are characterised by an efficiency disadvantage in comparison to more strongly centralised standard-municipalities, and whether the former municipalities were too small in terms of their “operational size“.
No justification for the creation of large municipal entities can be derived from the analysis conducted. Owing to the settlement structure and limited possible economies of scale, it is thus not only to be feared that territorially large municipalities in rural areas will fail to significantly improve cost efficiency in the provision of municipal services. Rather, it may also be the case that efficiency will actually decline, as such “giant municipalities“ are often attended by disincentive effects for citizens as well as for policy and administration (e.g. little civil society involvement arising from a lack of identification with the municipality, lack of control of political decision-makers, low levels of preference-justice in administrative action).
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