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Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects

Using a large linked employer–employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to nonemployment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than 2 years. Our results indicate that works councils to some extent represent the interests of a specific clientele.

15. Oktober 2010

Autoren Boris Hirsch Thorsten Schank Claus Schnabel

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Professor Dr. Boris Hirsch
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