Preisverzerrungen Fehlanzeige – Keine Hinweise für Effekte der Bankenrettung in den USA
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Im Zuge der Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007 bis 2009 rückte die Kontroverse um staatliche Notrettungsprogramme für den Bankensektor verstärkt ins Blickfeld. Diese Programme haben das Ziel, den Finanzsektor und somit auch realwirtschaftliche Entwicklungen zu stabilisieren. Dem stehen die finanziellen Kosten zu Lasten des Steuerzahlers, erhöhte Risikoübernahmen durch den Staat sowie mögliche verzerrende Wirkungen auf die Marktstruktur gegenüber. Dieser Artikel diskutiert mögliche Preisverzerrungen durch das Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in den USA aus dem Jahr 2008 vor dem Hintergrund eines aktuellen Forschungsbeitrags, der die langfristigen indirekten Effekte des Programms innerhalb der Gruppe der nicht unterstützten Banken untersucht. Hierbei zeigen sich keine Hinweise dafür, dass das Programm zur Bankenrettung zu nachhaltigen Unterschieden im Bankenwettbewerb nach 2010 geführt hat. Die Zinsmargen von Banken mit einer höheren Rettungswahrscheinlichkeit stiegen nur in der direkten Folgezeit von TARP, d. h. im Jahr 2010 an. Ein signifikanter Anstieg des Kredit- und Depotwachstum der Banken für den Zeitraum von 2010 bis 2013 kann nicht verzeichnet werden.
Is Subsidizing Companies in Difficulties an Optimal Policy? An Empirical Study on the Effectiveness of State Aid in the European Union
IWH Discussion Papers,
Even though state aid in order to rescue or restructure ailing companies is regularly granted by European governments, it is often controversially discussed. The aims for rescuing companies are manifold and vary from social, industrial and even political considerations. Well-known examples are Austrian Airlines (Austria) or MG Rover (Great Britain). Yet, this study aims to answer the question whether state aid is used effectively and whether the initial aim why aid has been paid has been reached, i.e. the survival of the company. By using data on rescued companies in the EU and applying a survival analysis, this paper investigates the survival rates of these companies up to 15 years after the aid has been paid. In addition, the results are compared to the survival rates of non-rescued companies which have also been in difficulties. The results suggest that despite the financial support, business failure is often only post-poned; best survival rates have firms with long-term restructuring, enterprises in Eastern Europe, smaller firms and mature companies. However, non-funded companies have an even higher ratio to go bankrupt.
Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint
The Journal of Industrial Economics,
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
State Aid in the Enlarged European Union: Taking Stock
From Global Crisis to Economic Growth. Which Way to Take?, Vol. 1,
In the early phase of transition that started with the 1990s, Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) pursued economic restructuring that involved massive injections of state support. With reference to the history of state aids in centrally planned economies we display state aid practices of CEECs since full EU membership and analyse whether their industrial policies during and after transition challenged the European state aid legislation and whether these fit into the EUs strategy of ‘less but better targeted aid’. Therefore, qualitative analysis in case studies is used to supplement a quantitative description of state aid levels in East and West. Findings suggest that in recent years a level playing field across the EU has indeed emerged. In fact, the most pronounced differences in this respect are not observed between CEECs and the EU-15 but rather between Northern and Southern member states.
Competition between Financial Markets in Europe: What can be Expected from MiFID?
Financial Markets and Portfolio Management,
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) could be the foundation of new trading platforms in Europe. This contribution employs insights from the theoretical and empirical literature to highlight some of the possible implications of MiFID. In particular, we argue that more competition will lead to more liquid markets, reflected in lower bid–ask spreads and greater depth. It will also lead to innovation in incumbent markets and stimulate the design of new trading platforms. MiFID has already introduced more competition, as evidenced by the startup of Instinet Chi-X, the announcement of new initiatives, including Project Turquoise and BATS, and the reactions of incumbent exchanges.
Lending Technology, Bank Organization and Competition
Journal of Financial Transformation,
This paper reviews recent theoretical and empirical studies investigating how both bank technology and organization shape bank-borrower interactions. We refer to two related concepts for bank technology. First, the technologies banks employ in loan granting decisions and second, the advances in information technology linked to the bank's lending technology. We also summarize and interpret the theoretical and empirical work on bank organization and its influence on lending technologies. We show that the choice of lending technology and bank organization depend heavily on the availability of information, the technological progress in the collection of information, as well as the banking market structure and the legal environment. We draw important policy conclusions from the literature. Competition authorities and supervisors have to remain alert to the consequences of the introduction of any new technology because: (1) advances in technology do not necessarily lead to more intense banking competition, and (2) the impact of technological and financial innovation on financial efficiency and stability depends on the incentives of the entire „loan production chain.‟
The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking Competition
Review of Finance,
We investigate how bank organization shapes banking competition. We show that a bank's geographical lending reach and loan pricing strategy is determined by its own and its rivals’ organizational structure. We estimate the impact of organization on the geographical reach and loan pricing of a large bank. We find that the reach of the bank is smaller when rival banks are large and hierarchically organized, have superior communication technology, have a narrower span of organization, and are closer to a decision unit with lending authority. Rival banks’ size and the number of layers to a decision unit soften spatial pricing.
16.04.2008 • 15/2008
2. Konferenz Regulatorische Risiken „Regulierung und Wettbewerbsfreiheit: Wem soll Wettbewerbspolitik nützen?“ am 21./22. April 2008
Am 21. und 22. April 2008 veranstalten das Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) und die Handelshochschule Leipzig (HHL) gemeinsam die 2. Konferenz Regulatorische Risiken: „Regulierung und Wettbewerbsfreiheit: Wem soll Wettbewerbspolitik nützen?“ im Konferenzraum des IWH, Kleine Märkerstraße 8, in Halle (Saale). Weitere wissenschaftliche Kooperationspartner sind die Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg und das CIRANO, ein gemeinsames wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut