Juniorprofessor Dr. Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher

Juniorprofessor Dr. Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher
Aktuelle Position

seit 7/12

Leiter der Forschungsgruppe Finanzföderalismus und institutioneller Wandel

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 7/12

Juniorprofessor für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Finanzpolitik

Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg


  • fiskalischer Föderalismus
  • Vertragstheorie
  • Theorie der öffentlichen Güter
  • Umweltökonomik
  • Steuerpolitik

Seit Juli 2012 ist Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher Juniorprofessor für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Finanzpolitik an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg und Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Makroökonomik am Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle. Darüber hinaus leitet er die Forschungsgruppe "Finanzföderalismus und institutioneller Wandel" am IWH.

Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher hat Volkswirtschaftslehre an den Universitäten in Tübingen, Lausanne und Bonn studiert. Anschließend war er Doktorand im Rahmen des DFG-Schwerpunktprogramms „Institutionelle Gestaltung Föderaler Systeme". Die Promotion erfolgte 2009 an der Technischen Universität Chemnitz (Dissertation: On Federal Transfers and Incentives). Bis Juni 2012 arbeitete er als wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Technischen Universität Chemnitz und war 2006 sowie 2010 als Gastforscher an der Hebräischen Universität in Jerusalem tätig.

Ihr Kontakt

Juniorprofessor Dr. Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher
Juniorprofessor Dr. Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher
Mitglied - Abteilung Makroökonomik
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-735


Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods

Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher Dirk T. G. Rübbelke E. Sheshinski

in: Economica , 2010


International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.

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International Side-payments to Improve Global Public Good Provision when Transfers are Refinanced through a Tax on Local and Global Externalities

Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher A. Markandya Dirk T. G. Rübbelke

in: International Economic Journal , Nr. 1, 2014


This paper discusses a tax-transfer scheme that aims to address the under-provision problem associated with the private supply of international public goods and to bring about Pareto optimal allocations internationally. In particular, we consider the example of the global public good ‘climate stabilization’, both in an analytical and a numerical simulation model. The proposed scheme levies Pigouvian taxes globally, while international side-payments are employed in order to provide incentives to individual countries for not taking a free-ride from the international Pigouvian tax scheme. The side-payments, in turn, are financed via environmental taxes. As a distinctive feature, we take into account ancillary benefits that may be associated with local public characteristics of climate policy. We determine the positive impact that ancillary effects may exert on the scope for financing side-payments via environmental taxation. A particular attractive feature of ancillary benefits is that they arise shortly after the implementation of climate policies and therefore yield an almost immediate payback of investments in abatement efforts. Especially in times of high public debt levels, long periods of amortization would tend to reduce political support for investments in climate policy.

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Bracket Creeps: Bane or Boon for the Stability of Numerical Budget Rules?

Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher Götz Zeddies

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 29, 2016


As taxpayers typically pay relatively low attention to a small inflation-induced bracket creep of the income tax, policy-makers tend to postpone its correction into the future. However, the fiscal illusion fades away and political pressure for a tax relief arises since after some years, the cumulative increase of the average tax rate exceeds a critical threshold. Using Germany as an example, this paper shows that bracket creeps can provoke revenue cycles in public budgets hindering governments‘ compliance with the numerical budget rules. An indexation of the tax tariff, which provides an automatic correction of the bracket creep could prevent such fluctuations and thus provides a favorable framework for the debt rule.

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Fiscal Equalization, Tax Salience, and Tax Competition

Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 3, 2014


Jurisdictions that engage in inter-regional tax competition usually try to attenuate competitive pressures by substituting salient tax instruments with hidden ones. On this effect, we investigate the efficiency consequences of inter-regional tax competition and fiscal equalization in a federal system when taxpayers fail to optimally react on shrouded attributes of local tax policy. If the statuary tax rate is a relatively salient instrument and taxpayers pay low attention to the quality and the frequency of tax enforcement, the underlying substitution of tax instruments with the aim of reducing the perceived tax price may suppress the under-exploitation of tax bases that is typically triggered by fiscal equalization.

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The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services

Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher J. T. Addison T. Kuhn

in: IZA Discussion Papers, No. 5170 , Nr. 5170, 2010


The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.

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