25 Jahre IWH

Professor Dr. Stefan Eichler

Professor Dr. Stefan Eichler
Aktuelle Position

seit 10/16

Professor für International Monetary Economics 

Technische Universität Dresden

seit 4/14

Leiter der Forschungsgruppe Marktstrukturen im Finanzsektor und Finanzstabilität

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Finanzkrisen
  • Geldpolitik
  • Wechselkurse
  • internationale Investitionen

Seit Oktober 2016 ist Stefan Eichler Professor für Internationale Monetäre Ökonomik an der Technischen Universität Dresden. Am IWH leitet er die Forschungsgruppe "Marktstrukturen im Finanzsektor und Finanzstabilität".

Nach seinem Studium der Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Technischen Universität Chemnitz und der Technischen Universität Dresden promovierte Stefan Eichler im Januar 2012 zum Thema „Exchange Rate Expectations, Currency Crises, and the Pricing of American Depositary Receipts”. Von Oktober 2013 bis März 2014 war Stefan Eichler Lehrstuhlvertreter an der Technischen Universität Dresden. Von April bis September 2014 war er Juniorprofessor für "International Macroeconomics and Finance" an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg. Von Oktober 2014 bis September 2016 war er Professor für "Geld und Internationale Finanzwirtschaft" an der Leibniz Universität Hannover.

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Professor Dr. Stefan Eichler
Professor Dr. Stefan Eichler
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Publikationen

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Career experience, political effects, and voting behavior in the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee

Stefan Eichler T. Lähner

in: Economics Letters , 2017

Abstract

We find that career experience shapes the voting behavior of the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members. Members with a career in the Riksbank and the government prefer higher rates. During a legislation with a center-right (center-left) party administration, MPC members with a career background in the government favor higher (lower) interest rates. Highlights: • The determinants of voting behavior in the Swedish Riksbank are considered. • Voting is analyzed with random effects ordered logit models for 1999–2013. • Interplay of career experience and political factors shapes voting behavior. • Government or Riksbank background leads to higher interest rate votes. • Partisan voting behavior is detected for members with government background.

Publikation lesen

Central bank transparency and cross-border banking

Stefan Eichler Helge Littke Lena Tonzer

in: Journal of International Money and Finance , Nr. 6, 2017

Abstract

We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent and operates in a stable economic environment. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad.

Publikation lesen

The political determinants of government bond holdings

Stefan Eichler T. Plaga

in: Journal of International Money and Finance , Nr. 5, 2017

Abstract

This paper analyzes the link between political factors and sovereign bond holdings of US investors in 60 countries over the 2003–2013 period. We find that, in general, US investors hold more bonds in countries with few political constraints on the government. Moreover, US investors respond to increased uncertainty around major elections by reducing government bond holdings. These effects are particularly significant in democratic regimes and countries with sound institutions, which enable effective implementation of fiscal consolidation measures or economic reforms. In countries characterized by high current default risk or a sovereign default history, US investors show a tendency towards favoring higher political constraints as this makes sovereign default more difficult for the government. Political instability, characterized by the fluctuation in political veto players, reduces US investment in government bonds. This effect is more pronounced in countries with low sovereign solvency.

Publikation lesen

Arbeitspapiere

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Central Bank Transparency and Cross-border Banking

Stefan Eichler Helge Littke Lena Tonzer

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 16, 2016

Abstract

We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad.

Publikation lesen

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Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting

Stefan Eichler T. Lähner Felix Noth

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 15, 2016

Abstract

This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district’s bank health increases the probability that this district’s representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.

Publikation lesen

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The Political Determinants of Government Bond Holdings

Stefan Eichler T. Plaga

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 14, 2016

Abstract

This paper analyzes the link between political factors and sovereign bond holdings of US investors in 60 countries over the 2003-2013 period. We find that, in general, US investors hold more bonds in countries with few political constraints on the government. Moreover, US investors respond to increased uncertainty around major elections by reducing government bond holdings. These effects are particularly significant in democratic regimes and countries with sound institutions, which enable effective implementation of fiscal consolidation measures or economic reforms.

Publikation lesen
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