25 Jahre IWH

Professor Hans Degryse, Ph.D.

Professor Hans Degryse, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

 

seit 12/16

Research Fellow der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 01/12

Research Professor

KU Leuven

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Finanzintermediation
  • empirische Bankenforschung

Hans Degryse ist seit Dezember 2016 Research Fellow am IWH. Seine Forschung konzentriert sich auf Finanzintermediation und umfasst empirische Forschung im Bereich Banking, Bankenrecht und Volkswirtschaftspolitik, sowie die Marktmikrostruktur.

Seit 2012 ist Hans Degryse Research Professor an der KU Leuven. Zuvor unterrichtete er am CentER, dem Forschungsinstitut der Tilburg Universität.

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Professor Hans Degryse, Ph.D.
Professor Hans Degryse, Ph.D.
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Publikationen

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The Political Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries

Hans Degryse Thomas Lambert Armin Schwienbacher

in: The Economic Journal , im Erscheinen

Abstract

Voting rights were initially limited to wealthy elites providing political support for stock markets. The franchise expansion induces the median voter to provide political support for banking development, as this new electorate has lower financial holdings and benefits less from the riskiness and financial returns from stock markets. Our panel data evidence covering the years 1830–1999 shows that tighter restrictions on the voting franchise induce greater stock market development, whereas a broader voting franchise is more conducive to the banking sector, consistent with Perotti and von Thadden (2006). The results are robust to controlling for other institutional arrangements and endogeneity.

Publikation lesen

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On the Nonexclusivity of Loan Contracts: An Empirical Investigation

Hans Degryse Vasso Ioannidou Erik von Schedvin

in: Management Science , Nr. 12, 2016

Abstract

We study how a bank's willingness to lend to a previously exclusive firm changes once the firm obtains a loan from another bank ("outside loan") and breaks an exclusive relationship. Using a difference-in-difference analysis and a setting where outside loans are observable, we document that an outside loan triggers a decrease in the initial bank's willingness to lend to the firm, i.e., outside loans are strategic substitutes. Consistent with concerns about coordination problems and higher indebtedness, we find that this reaction is more pronounced the larger the outside loan and it is muted if the initial bank's existing and future loans retain seniority and are protected with valuable collateral. Our results give a benevolent role to transparency enabling banks to mitigate adverse effects from outside loans. The resulting substitute behavior may also act as a stabilizing force in credit markets limiting positive comovements between lenders, decreasing the possibility of credit freezes and financial crises.

Publikation lesen

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Informal or Formal Financing? Evidence on the Co-Funding of Chinese Firms

Hans Degryse Liping Lu Steven Ongena

in: Journal of Financial Intermediation , 2016

Abstract

Different modes of external finance provide heterogeneous benefits for the borrowing firms. Informal finance offers informational advantages whereas formal finance is scalable. Using unique survey data from China, we find that informal finance is associated with higher sales growth for small firms but lower sales growth for large firms. We identify a complementary effect between informal and formal finance for the sales growth of small firms, but not for large firms. Co-funding, thereby simultaneously using the informational advantage of informal finance and the scalability of formal finance, is therefore the optimal choice for small firms.

Publikation lesen
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