25 Jahre IWH

Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.

Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 9/16

Leiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 9/16

Professor für Financial Economics

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Magdeburg

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Allokation von Unternehmensinvestition und Gesamtwachstum
  • Finanzintermediation
  • Finanzmarktstabilität und Bankenregulierung
  • Risikobereitschaft und Wettbewerb
  • reale Auswirkungen auf Geldpolitik und Wirtschaftspolitik

Michael Koetter ist Universitätsprofessor für Financial Economics an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg und Leiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte am IWH seit September 2016. Die Abteilung richtet die jährliche FIN-FIRE conference on challenges to financial stability aus.

Seine derzeitigen Forschungsinteressen liegen auf drei Gebieten: Erstens, die Rolle von mikro - und makroprudentieller Regulierung für die Stabilität von Finanzsystemen. Zweitens, die Rolle der Finanzintermediäre bei der Neuzuteilung produktiver Ressourcen zwischen Unternehmen, Wirtschaftszweigen und Ländern. Drittens, die politische Ökonomie des Finanz- und Wirtschaftssystems in Hinsicht auf Marktstruktur und Risikotragfähigkeit.

Michael Koetter promovierte an der Universität Utrecht und studierte International Money and Banking an der Universität Maastricht. Er war Professor an der Frankfurt School of Finance & Management (2012 – 2016) und an der Universität Groningen (2006 – 2012). Er ist derzeit Mitglied des wissenschaftlichen Beratungsausschusses des Forschungsdaten- und Servicezentrums der Deutschen Bundesbank, Editor bei der Fachzeitschrift Economics of Transition und Vizepräsident der IBEFA.

Ihr Kontakt

Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Professor Michael Koetter, Ph.D.
Leiter - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-727

Publikationen

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Cross-border Transmission of Emergency Liquidity

Thomas Kick Michael Koetter Manuela Storz

in: Journal of Banking & Finance, im Erscheinen

Abstract

We show that emergency liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve transmitted to non-U.S. banking markets. Based on manually collected holding company structures, we identify banks in Germany with access to U.S. facilities. Using detailed interest rate data reported to the German central bank, we compare lending and borrowing rates of banks with and without such access. U.S. liquidity shocks cause a significant decrease in the short-term funding costs of the average German bank with access. This reduction is mitigated for banks with more vulnerable balance sheets prior to the inception of emergency liquidity. We also find a significant pass-through in terms of lower corporate credit rates charged for banks with the lowest pre-crisis leverage, US-dollar funding needs, and liquidity buffers. Spillover effects from U.S. emergency liquidity provision are generally confined to short-term rates.

Publikation lesen

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Crises and Rescues: Liquidity Transmission Through Global Banks

Michael Koetter Claudia M. Buch C. T. Koch

in: International Journal of Central Banking, im Erscheinen

Publikation lesen

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Too Connected to Fail? Inferring Network Ties from Price Co-movements

Jakob Bosma Michael Koetter Michael Wedow

in: Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, im Erscheinen

Abstract

We use extreme value theory methods to infer conventionally unobservable connections between financial institutions from joint extreme movements in credit default swap spreads and equity returns. Estimated pairwise co-crash probabilities identify significant connections among up to 186 financial institutions prior to the crisis of 2007/2008. Financial institutions that were very central prior to the crisis were more likely to be bailed out during the crisis or receive the status of systemically important institutions. This result remains intact also after controlling for indicators of too-big-to-fail concerns, systemic, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks. Both CDS-based and Equity-based connections are significant predictors of bailouts.

Publikation lesen

Arbeitspapiere

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Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Konstantin Wagner

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 7, 2018

Abstract

We study if the regulation of bank executive compensation has unintended consequences. Based on novel data on CEO and non-CEO executives in EU banking, we show that capping the variable-to-fixed compensation ratio did not induce executives to abandon the industry. Banks indemnified executives sufficiently for the shock to retain them by raising fixed and lowering variable compensation while complying with the cap. At the same time, banks‘ risk-adjusted performance deteriorated due to increased idiosyncratic risk. Collateral damage for the financial system as a whole appears modest though, as average co-movement of banks with the market declined under the cap.

Publikation lesen

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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation

Michael Koetter Thomas Krause Lena Tonzer

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 24, 2017

Abstract

To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.

Publikation lesen

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Do We Want These Two to Tango? On Zombie Firms and Stressed Banks in Europe

Manuela Storz Michael Koetter Ralph Setzer Andreas Westphal

in: ECB Working Paper, 2017

Abstract

We show that the speed and type of corporate deleveraging depends on the interaction between corporate and financial sector health. Based on granular bank-firm data pertaining to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) from five stressed and two non-stressed euro area economies, we show that “zombie” firms generally continued to lever up during the 2010–2014 period. Whereas relationships with stressed banks reduce SME leverage on average, we also show that zombie firms that are tied to weak banks in euro area periphery countries increase their indebtedness even further. Sustainable economic recovery therefore requires both: deleveraging of banks and firms.

Publikation lesen
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