This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.

This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils relate to labour market imperfections and how labour market imperfections relate to employer wage premia. Based on representative German plant data for the years 1999–2016, we document that 70% of employers pay wages below the marginal revenue product of labour and 30% pay wages above. We further find that the prevalence of wage mark-downs is significantly smaller when organised labour is present and that the ratio of wages to the marginal revenue product of labour is significantly bigger. Finally, we document a close link between labour market imperfections and mean employer wage premia, that is wage differences between employers corrected for worker sorting.

Looking at historical cross-country interactions, this book examines the role of the US in the world economy. Illustrating that US shocks tend to have a global nature and that Monetary Union only partially shelters the Euro area from its external environment, the US should fully assume its responsibility, minimizing shock transmission.

As policymakers refocus on growth, the ability to take a firm-level view is key to disentangling the various factors at the root of competitiveness, and thus to designing appropriate policies. Firm-level data provides critical information for the design of appropriate competitiveness measures that complement traditional macro analysis. More work remains to be done assembling firm-level information, but the variance of the distribution of firm characteristics already conveys important information in addition to standard averages. New indicators should be developed to translate the distribution of firm characteristics into indicators of competitiveness designed to capture not only average performance but also the heterogeneity of firm performance. This Policy Contribution builds on ongoing research within EFIGE (www.efige.org), a project to help identify the internal policies needed to improve the external competitiveness of the European Union.

The U.S. share of world merchandise exports has declined sharply over the last decade. Using data at the level of detailed industries, this paper analyzes the decline in U.S. share against the backdrop of alternative measures of the competitiveness of the U.S. economy. We document the following facts: (i) only a few industries contributed to the decline in any meaningful way, (ii) a large part of the drop was driven by the changing size of U.S. export industries and not the size of U.S. sales within those industries, (iii) in a gravity framework, the majority of the decline in the U.S. export share within industries was due to the declining U.S. share of world income, and (iv) in a computed structural measure of firm productivity, average U.S. export productivity has generally maintained its high level versus other countries over time. Overall, our analysis suggests that the dismal performance of the U.S. market share is not a sufficient statistic for competitiveness.

We provide evidence that changes in the equity price and volatility of individual firms (measures that approximate the definition of 'granular shock' given in Gabaix, 2010) are key to improve the predictability of aggregate business cycle fluctuations in a number of countries. Specifically, adding the return and the volatility of firm-level equity prices to aggregate financial information leads to a significant improvement in forecasting business cycle developments in four economic areas, at various horizons. Importantly, not only domestic firms but also foreign firms improve business cycle predictability for a given economic area. This is not immediately visible when one takes an unconditional standpoint (i.e. an average across the sample). However, conditioning on the business cycle position of the domestic economy, the relative importance of the two sets of firms - foreign and domestic - exhibits noticeable swings across time. Analogously, the sectoral classification of the firms that in a given month retain the highest predictive power for future IP changes also varies significantly over time as a function of the business cycle position of the domestic economy. Limited to the United States, predictive ability is found to be related to selected balance sheet items, suggesting that structural features differentiate the firms that can anticipate aggregate fluctuations from those that do not help to this aim. Beyond the purely forecasting application, this finding may enhance our understanding of the underlying origins of aggregate fluctuations. We also propose to use the cross sectional stock market information to macro-prudential aims through an economic Value at Risk.

We investigate to what extent workplace unionization protects workers from external shocks by preventing involuntary job separations. Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a plausibly exogenous shock hitting the whole economy, we compare workers who worked in unionized and non-unionized workplaces directly before the pandemic in a difference-in-differences framework. We find that unionized workers were substantially more likely to remain working for their pre-COVID employer and to be in employment. This greater employment stability was not traded off against lower working hours or labor income.

The great trade collapse in the wake of the 2008-9 financial crisis provideda unique insight into the complexities inherent to international markets, and underlined a number of lessons for us to consider as we evaluate the shape of the global trade recovery. While the factors contributing to the crisis were diverse and multifaceted, it is arguable that persisting imbalances across the globe played a role. How will trade imbalances unwind and what is the role for policies influencing international transactions for goods and services? A precursor to answering this question is a broad understanding of how trade flows react to changes in the macroeconomy, and therefore much of this book will focus on recent assessments of the drivers of trade adjustment. A closely related concept affecting the degree to which countries trade is their relative competitive position. To tie in the chapters with the broader policy emphasis on competitiveness, we will also define and evaluate several drivers of international trade competitiveness.

Global and U.S. trade declined dramatically in the wake of the global financial crisis in late 2008 and early 2009. The subsequent recovery in trade, while vigorous at first, gradually lost momentum in 2010. Against this backdrop, this paper explores the prospects for global and U.S. trade in the medium term. We develop a unified empirical framework ? an error correction model ? that exploits the cointegrating relationship between trade and economic activity. The model allows us to juxtapose several scenarios with different assumptions about the strength of GDP growth going forward and the relationship between trade and economic activity. Our analysis suggests that during the crisis both world trade and U.S. exports declined significantly more than would have been expected on the basis of historical relationships with economic activity. Moreover, this gap between actual and equilibrium trade is closing only slowly and could persist for some time to come.

This paper analyzes the performance of global value chains during the trade collapse. To do so, it exploits a unique transaction-level dataset on French firms containing information on cross-border monthly transactions matched with data on worldwide intrafirm linkages as defined by property rights (multinational business groups, hierarchies of firms). This newly assembled dataset allows us to distinguish firm-level transactions among two alternative organizational modes of global value chains: internalization of activities (intragroup trade/trade among related parties) or establishment of supply contracts (arm's length trade/trade among unrelated parties). After an overall assessment of the role of global value chains during the trade collapse, we document that intra-group trade in intermediates was characterized by a faster drop followed by a faster recovery than arm's length trade. Amplified fluctuations in terms of trade elasticities by value chains have been referred to as the "bullwhip effect" and have been attributed to the adjustment of inventories within supply chains. In this paper we first confirm the existence of such an effect due to trade in intermediates, and we underline the role that different organizational modes can play in driving this adjustment.