We study the impact of stricter and more harmonized banking regulation along the income distribution using household survey data for 25 EU countries. Exploiting country-level heterogeneity in the implementation of European Banking Union directives allows us to control for confounders and identify effects. Our results show that these regulatory reforms aimed at increasing financial system resilience affected households heterogeneously. More stringent regulation reduces income growth for low-income households due to employment exits. Yet it tends to increase growth rates at the top of the distribution both for employee and self-employed income.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft steht infolge der Energiekrise und des anhaltenden Golfkonflikts vor einer unsicheren Erholung. Steigende Kosten und eine schwächere Beschäftigungsentwicklung belasten die Konjunktur, während die Finanzpolitik stützend wirkt. Unter der Annahme stabiler Energiepreise dürfte die Produktion in diesem und im kommenden Jahr um jeweils 0,9% zunehmen; ähnliche Expansionsraten sind auch für Ostdeutschland zu erwarten.

This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.

In accordance with its statutes, the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) pursues an intensive bilateral knowledge transfer on the basis of excellent scientific research with its partners in the non-academic community. In so doing, the IWH contributes to better informed decision making on a societal level. The overarching goal is to foster mutually beneficial exchanges that involve the provision of evidence-based knowledge to society (transfer from the academic to the non-academic community) and the integration of questions of public interest into its research agenda (transfer from the non-academic to the academic community).

How does immigration affect support for redistribution? While most research focuses on overall tax and spending levels, we investigate how immigration influences preferences conditional on tax structures. Using two original survey experiments in the UK, we find that low- and middle-income respondents are more likely to support redistribution to immigrants under progressive systems shielding them from fiscal costs, but oppose redistribution when immigrants are identified as beneficiaries and the tax structure increases their fiscal burden. In contrast, high-income respondents' preferences are largely unaffected by either tax structure or immigrant inclusion. These findings suggest that progressive taxation (1) is a viable revenue-generating strategy without provoking major political backlash; (2) reduces native resistance to immigrant welfare inclusion; (3) helps explain puzzling variation in immigration's effects on welfare attitudes; and (4) clarifies why low- and middle-income groups sometimes reject generous welfare programs despite standing to benefit. Our results highlight the importance of institutional design in shaping how economic self-interest and immigration concerns interact.