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Germany’s economy is so bad even sausage factories are closingIWHThe Economist, January 15, 2026
Auf Grundlage zweier deutscher Datensätze, des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels und der Zeitbudgeterhebung, untersucht dieser Beitrag den Einfluss der für Hausarbeit aufgewandten Zeit auf die Löhne. Im Gegensatz zum Gros der internationalen Forschungsliteratur findet sich kein negativer Effekt der Hausarbeit auf die Löhne. Dieses Ergebnis zeigt sich in West- wie Ostdeutschland sowohl für Frauen und Männer, für verheiratete Individuen und Singles als auch für Teilzeit- und Vollzeitbeschäftigte. Unsere Ergebnisse ändern sich zudem nicht, wenn wir verschiedene Formen von Hausarbeit unterscheiden oder die Endogenität der geleisteten Hausarbeit in den Lohnregressionen mithilfe von Instrumentvariablenschätzungen berücksichtigen.
We find that increasing the female share in first-level management by 10% points decreases the unexplained within-job gender pay gap by 0.5 log points. The effect is more pronounced for the female share in second-level than in first-level management.
Using a large German linked employer–employee data set and methods of competing risks analysis, this paper investigates gender differences in job separation rates to employment and nonemployment. In line with descriptive evidence, we find lower job-to-job and higher job-to-nonemployment transition probabilities for women than men when controlling for individual and workplace characteristics and unobserved plant heterogeneity. These differences vanish once we allow these characteristics to affect separations differently by gender. When additionally controlling for wages, we find that both separation rates are considerably lower and also significantly less wage-elastic for women than for men, suggesting an interplay of gender differences in transition behaviour and the gender pay gap.
This study investigates the effect of temporary agency work on the user firm’s productivity. We hypothesise that using temporary agency work to enhance numerical flexibility and to screen job candidates may increase productivity, whereas temporary workers’ lower firm-specific human capital and spillover effects on the user’s permanent employees may adversely affect productivity. Other than the sparse existing literature on this issue, we exploit a large panel data set and control for time-invariant and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity by using the system GMM estimator. We find a robust hump-shaped effect of the extent of temporary agency work on the user firm’s productivity.
Using a large linked employer–employee dataset for Germany with a direct plant-level measure of product market competition and controlling for job-cell fixed effects, we investigate whether relative wages of women benefit from strong competition. We find that the unexplained gender pay gap is about 2.4 log points lower in West German plants that face strong product market competition than in those experiencing weak competition, whereas no such link shows up for East Germany.
Using a large linked employer–employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to nonemployment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than 2 years. Our results indicate that works councils to some extent represent the interests of a specific clientele.
This article investigates women’s and men’s labor supply to the firm within a semistructural approach based on a dynamic model of new monopsony. Using methods of survival analysis and a large linked employer‐employee data set for Germany, we find that labor supply elasticities are small (1.9–3.7) and that women’s labor supply to the firm is less elastic than men’s (which is the reverse of gender differences in labor supply usually found at the level of the market). Our results imply that at least one‐third of the gender pay gap might be wage discrimination by profit‐maximizing monopsonistic employers.
This paper presents an alternative explanation of the gender pay gap resting on a simple Hotelling-style duopsony model of the labour market. Since there are only two employers, equally productive women and men have to commute and face travel cost to do so. We assume that some women have higher travel cost, e.g., due to more domestic responsibilities. Employers exploit that women on average are less inclined to commute and offer lower wages to all women. Since women's firm-level labour supply is for this reason less wage-elastic, this model is in line with Robinson's explanation of wage discrimination.
