We investigate to what extent workplace unionization protects workers from external shocks by preventing involuntary job separations. Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a plausibly exogenous shock hitting the whole economy, we compare workers who worked in unionized and non-unionized workplaces directly before the pandemic in a difference-in-differences framework. We find that unionized workers were substantially more likely to remain working for their pre-COVID employer and to be in employment. This greater employment stability was not traded off against lower working hours or labor income.

This paper investigates the impact of studying the first-choice university subject on dropout and switching field of study for a cohort of students in Germany. Using detailed survey data, and employing an instrumental variable strategy based on variation in the local field of study availability, we provide evidence that students who are not enrolled in their preferred field of study are more likely to change their field, delay graduation and drop out of university. The estimated impact on dropout is particularly strong among students of low socio-economic status and is likely to be driven by lower effort and motivation.

Micro-data on robots have been very sparse in Germany so far. Consequently, a dedicated section has been introduced in the IAB Establishment Panel 2019 that includes questions on the number and type of robots used. This article describes the background and development of the survey questions, provides information on the quality of the data, possible checks and steps of data preparation. The resulting data is aggregated on industry level and compared with the frequently used robot data by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) which contains robot supplier information on aggregate robot stocks and deliveries.

We analyze the impact of robot adoption on female employment. Our analysis is based on novel micro data on robot use by German manufacturing establishments linked with social security records. An event study analysis for robot adoption shows increased churning among female workers. Whereas hiring rises significantly at robot adoption, separations increase with a smaller magnitude one year later. Overall, employment effects are modestly positive and strongest for medium-qualified women. We find no adverse employment effects for female workers in any of our broad qualification groups. 

Abstract In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 per cent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.

We revisit the employer size wage effect (ESWE) – arguably the most basic and influential departure from the law of one price for labor. Our main result is that this canonical fact disappears completely across establishments within the same firm, even though they operate in different local labor markets. We uncover and dissect this fact by including a firm fixed effect in otherwise standard cross-sectional regressions of wages on establishment size. We implement this demanding specification in population-wide triple-linked firm-establishment-employee data in Germany. This result is new in the ESWE literature (for which our paper also provides the first systematic meta-analysis). This wage-size decoupling is hard to square with the view that employment is determined along a finitely elastic employerspecific labor supply curve – i.e., employers pay exactly the minimum needed for the quantity of labor, but no more – the foundation of the monopsony view. By contrast, large multi-establishment firms (MEF) appear to hire off their labor supply curves (or those curves are very elastic), pay wage premia above the monopsonistic minimum, and leave excess labor supply. We find some evidence for a reemergence of the ESWE within low-premium MEFs. Overall, at least for the 25% of German employment in large firms for which the ESWE disappears, wage setting and employment determination may be better accounted for by alternative models, namely accommodating above-market-clearing wage premia and rationing of labor supply, such as efficiency wage theories.

This paper provides new causal evidence on how patent allowances affect firms and their employees based on quasi-random assignment of patent applications to examiners. Exploiting employer-employee records with newly linked German firm data and web-scraped patent documents, we show that patent-induced shocks reduce firm exit, improve productivity, and increase wages, with rent-sharing elasticities between 0.10 and 0.21. Wage gains are broadly observed across occupational tasks, with high heterogeneity: managers benefit disproportionately in publicly traded firms, whereas broader wage increases accrue to workers in non-traded firms. Our findings highlight the role of institutional features and firm organization in shaping how rents are shared.

Spatial segregation of low- and high-wage workers is a persistent economic issue with broad social implications. Using social security data and an AKM wage decomposition, this paper examines spatial wage inequality in West Germany. Spatial inequality in log wages rose sharply between 1998 and 2008, mainly due to increased variance in worker pay premiums across regions (48%) and stronger positive spatial assortative matching of workers and establishments (40%), i.e. colocation. Changes in establishment wage premia are mostly unrelated to rising colocation whereas labor mobility even reduced it. Instead, growth in worker pay premiums among stayers was concentrated in regions where high-wage workers and high-wage establishments were overrepresented already in the 1990s and, thus, magnified pre-existing colocation leading to ‘colocation without relocation’. Germany’s rising trade surplus, especially with Eastern Europe, boosted stayers’ worker pay premiums in those ex-ante high-wage regions and fully explains rising colocation.

This paper analyzes the distribution and composition of pre-tax national income in Germany since 1992, combining personal income tax returns, household survey data, and national accounts. Inequality rose from the 1990s to the late 2000s due to falling labor incomes among the bottom 50% and rising incomes in the top 10%. This trend reversed after 2007 as labor incomes across the bottom 90% increased. The top 1% income share, dominated by business income, remained relatively stable between 1992 and 2019. A large share of Germany’s top 1% earners are non-corporate business owners in labor-intensive professions. At least half of the business owners in P99-99.9 and a quarter in the top 0.1% operate firms in professional services – a pattern mirroring the United States. From 1992 to 2019, Germany’s top 0.1% income concentration exceeded France’s and matched U.S. levels until the late 2000s.

We examine how connections to German federal parliamentarians influence firm dynamics using a novel dataset linking politicians and election candidates to the universe of firms. To identify the causal effects of political access, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Results reveal that political connections reduce firm exits and gradually increase employment growth, with heterogeneous productivity effects depending on the political mandate. Incorporating data on credit ratings, subsidies, and procurement contracts allows us to identify the mechanisms driving the effects over the politician’s career.