Governance and Finance
Corporate governance today is about more than just making profits for shareholders. It now aims to balance the needs of all stakeholders-employees, investors, creditors, and business partners. Good governance helps companies run better, attract talent, gain customer trust, and lower financial costs. Conversely, poor governance can lead to scandals, job losses, and broken contracts.
The “Governance and Finance” research group studies how governance works in modern financial markets. One of the focuses is on how firms choose, motivate, and keep talented leaders, especially CEOs, since exemplary leadership is key to company success.
The group is also interested in investigating how changes in financial markets, like the rise of big shareholders, activist investors, or even creditors, affect company decisions. The goal is to understand how different players and institutions influence company behavior and what that means for the future of business.
Research Cluster
Financial Resilience and RegulationYour contact
- Department Financial Markets
Refereed Publications
The Impact of Endogenous and Exogenous Cash Inflows in Experimental Asset Markets
in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 166 (October), 2019
Abstract
Previous studies report a robust positive relationship between cash endowments and asset prices in experimental asset markets. Higher cash endowments generally increase the proportion of riskless versus risky wealth at the individual and aggregate level as well as the capacity of market participants to seize investment opportunities, i.e., their transactional liquidity. In this study, we vary the size and composition of riskless endowments in order to analyze the impact of different types of “cash” on trading behavior in experimental asset markets with randomly fluctuating fundamental values. In all treatments except the baseline, we allow subjects to control the liquidity of their cash endowment endogenously by providing some proportion of their riskless endowment in a physical store of value, which can be converted into experimental currency for trading. We observe that most subjects retain a large proportion of their wealth in the physical store of value. Inconsistent with rational choice theory, average trading prices and trading volumes are lower when “cash” is provided in a convertible store of value rather than experimental currency. Surprisingly, the price effect manifests asymmetrically on the buy side but not the sell side. Moreover, we control for potential changes in risk appetite resulting from higher riskless endowments. Our results suggest that transactional liquidity not a risky demand shift drives the relationship between cash endowments and asset prices.
College Choice, Selection, and Allocation Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis
in: Quantitative Economics, Vol. 10 (3), 2019
Abstract
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.
Non-linearity in the Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Indonesia
in: International Economics, Vol. 150 (August), 2017
Abstract
This paper investigates the finance-growth nexus where bank credit is decomposed into investment, consumption, and working capital credit. From a panel dataset of provinces in Indonesia, it documents that higher financial development measured by financial deepening and financial intermediation exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with economic growth. This non-linear effect of financial deepening is driven by both investment credit and consumption credit. These results suggest that too much investment credit and, to a lesser extent, consumption credit are detrimental to economic growth. Ultimately, only financial intermediation associated with working capital credit has a positive and monotonic impact on economic growth.
Does Social Capital Matter in Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Corporate Tax Avoidance
in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 55 (3), 2017
Abstract
We investigate whether the levels of social capital in U.S. counties, as captured by strength of civic norms and density of social networks in the counties, are systematically related to tax avoidance activities of corporations with headquarters located in the counties. We find strong negative associations between social capital and corporate tax avoidance, as captured by effective tax rates and book-tax differences. These results are incremental to the effects of local religiosity and firm culture toward socially irresponsible activities. They are robust to using organ donation as an alternative social capital proxy and fixed effect regressions. They extend to aggressive tax avoidance practices. Additionally, we provide corroborating evidence using firms with headquarters relocation that changes the exposure to social capital. We conclude that social capital surrounding corporate headquarters provides environmental influences constraining corporate tax avoidance.
Social Capital and Debt Contracting: Evidence from Bank Loans and Public Bonds
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 52 (3), 2017
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Common Ownership and CEO Social Ties Across Portfolio Firms
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 9, 2026
Abstract
This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.
Common Ownership, Tacit Know-How, and the Market for Technology
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 3, 2026
Abstract
Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.
Delegated Social Responsibility: Is Managerial Prosociality a Source of Agency Cost?
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 2, 2026
Abstract
Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principalagent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find that principals set ethically constrained targets and wages that track fairness benchmarks. Agents, however, do not divert resources to stakeholders: transfers are negative on average, and prosocial traits do not increase giving. Instead, contract terms, though unenforceable, systematically shape effort, transfers, and returns. Notably, prosocial agents generate higher total returns. Prosociality appears to mitigate rather than create efficiency losses, suggesting that discretion channels norm-sensitive loyalty rather than stakeholder redistribution.
From Rivals to Allies? CEO Connections in an Era of Common Ownership
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 7, 2025
Abstract
Institutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms’ hiring events and detailed information on CEO biographies. In addition, for peer firms, gaining a CEO connection from a hiring firm’s CEO appointment correlates with higher returns on assets, stock market returns, and decreasing product similarity between companies. We find evidence consistent with common owners allocating CEO connections to shape managerial decisionmaking and increase portfolio firms’ performance.
From Shares to Machines: How Common Ownership Drives Automation
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 23, 2024
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