Einlagensicherungssysteme erhöhen das moralische Risiko von Banken
Annika Bacher, Felix Noth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2015
Abstract
Einlagensicherungsmechanismen sind Bestandteil vieler Finanzsysteme und sollen in Krisenzeiten einen Ansturm der Sparer auf Banken und daraus resultierende Ansteckungseffekte verhindern. Jedoch bergen Sicherungssysteme zusätzliche Risikoanreize für Kreditinstitute, da eine solche Versicherung die Überwachungsanreize der Einlagengeber reduziert. Im Zuge der Finanzkrise von 2007 bis 2009 ist es in vielen Ländern zu Reformen hinsichtlich der Einlagensicherungssysteme gekommen. Dieser Artikel diskutiert die jüngste Anhebung der Einlagensicherungsgrenze in den USA von 100 000 auf 250 000 US-Dollar aus dem Jahr 2008 vor dem Hintergrund eines aktuellen Forschungsbeitrags. Dieser zeigt deutlich, dass durch die Erhöhung der Einlagensicherung in den USA das Risiko der Banken, die von der Erhöhung besonders profitierten, deutlich gestiegen ist, und gibt damit Hinweise auf den bekannten Zielkonflikt von Einlagensicherungssystemen: kurzfristige Stabilisierung während einer Krise gegenüber langfristigen Risikoanreizen für Banken.
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Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit (“allocative efficiency”). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.
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Welche Risikomaße bilden das Ausfallrisiko für Geschäftsbanken adäquat ab? Eine Analyse am Beispiel US-amerikanischer Banken
Felix Noth, Lena Tonzer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2015
Abstract
Zur Analyse von Risiken im Bankensystem und möglichen Ausfallrisiken von Banken werden verschiedene Maße verwendet, die sowohl auf Bankbilanzdaten als auch auf der Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung von Banken beruhen. Diese Studie vergleicht häufig verwendete Risikomaße für Geschäftsbanken in den USA im Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2013. Es zeigt sich, dass alle getesteten Maße in der Lage sind, das während der Finanzkrise von 2007 bis 2009 stark angestiegene Risiko im US-Bankensystem abzubilden. Zur Prognose einer Bankinsolvenz erweist sich der einfach zu berechnende Anteil an notleidenden Vermögenswerten in der Bilanz als eine gute Ergänzung zu komplexeren Risikomaßen wie dem Z-score.
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Business Cylce Effects of the 2014 Oil Price Slump
Andrej Drygalla, Stefan Gießler, Oliver Holtemöller
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich: Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter,
No. 4,
2015
Abstract
The price for crude oil has dropped remarkably since the middle of the year 2014. Business cycle effects of oil price changes depend on whether these are caused by demand or supply side factors. In the present paper, the decrease in oil prices since the middle of the year 2014 is decomposed into demand side and oil-market specific factors. Subsequently, the contribution of the decline in oil prices to the economic development since the third quarter of 2014 and the expected effects until the end of the year 2016 are analyzed using the international business cycle model of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). The analysis considers both, oil-exporting countries (Russia) as well as oil-importing economies (G7 countries and Austria). Economic activity is stimulated strongest in the United States and Japan, whereas it is remarkably curbed in Russia.
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Private Equity, Jobs, and Productivity
Steven J. Davis, John Haltiwanger, Kyle Handley, Ron S. Jarmin, Josh Lerner, Javier Miranda
American Economic Review,
No. 12,
2014
Abstract
Private equity critics claim that leveraged buyouts bring huge job losses and few gains in operating performance. To evaluate these claims, we construct and analyze a new dataset that covers US buyouts from 1980 to 2005. We track 3,200 target firms and their 150,000 establishments before and after acquisition, comparing to controls defined by industry, size, age, and prior growth. Buyouts lead to modest net job losses but large increases in gross job creation and destruction. Buyouts also bring TFP gains at target firms, mainly through accelerated exit of less productive establishments and greater entry of highly productive ones.
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Executive Compensation Structure and Credit Spreads
Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
Abstract
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
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The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk-taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Review of Finance,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a lawsuit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on bank risk-taking. The results suggest that banks whose government guarantee was removed reduced credit risk by cutting off the riskiest borrowers from credit. Using a difference-in-differences approach we show that none of these effects are present in a control group of German banks to whom the guarantee was not applicable. Furthermore, savings banks adjusted their liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt instruments after the removal of the guarantee, while we do not observe this for the control group. We also document that yield spreads of savings banks’ bonds increased significantly right after the announcement of the decision to remove guarantees, while the yield spread of a sample of bonds issued by the control group remained unchanged. The evidence implies that public guarantees may be associated with substantial moral hazard effects.
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Devaluation Expectations Based on Cross-listed Stocks: Evidence for Financial Crises in Argentina Then and Now
Stefan Eichler
Applied Economics Letters,
No. 10,
2014
Abstract
I use the relative prices of American Depositary Receipts and their underlying stocks to derive devaluation expectations. I find that stockholders currently perceive an overvalued peso. Devaluation expectations are driven by the incentive of competitive devaluation and sovereign default risk.
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Why Do Banks Provide Leasing?
D. Bülbül, Felix Noth, M. Tyrell
Journal of Financial Services Research,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
Banks are engaging in leasing activities at an increasing rate, which is demonstrated by aggregated data for both European and U.S. banking companies. However, little is known about leasing activities at the bank level. The contribution of this paper is the introduction of the nexus of leasing in banking. Beginning from an institutional basis, this paper describes the key features of banks’ leasing activities using the example of German regional banks. The banks in this sample can choose from different types of leasing contracts, providing the banks with a degree of leeway in conducting business with their clients. We find a robust and significant positive impact of banks’ leasing activities on their profitability. Specifically, the beneficial effect of leasing stems from commission business in which the bank acts as a middleman and is not affected by the potential defaults of customers.
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