Fallende Lohnquoten: Die Rolle von Technologie und Marktmacht
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Die Lohnquote, definiert als die Summe der Arbeitnehmerentgelte geteilt durch die Gesamtproduktion einer Volkswirtschaft, ist in den letzten 40 Jahren in vielen Ländern gefallen. Das Fallen der Lohnquote besitzt potenziell weitreichende Implikationen für das Ausmaß an Ungleichheit und für den Wohlstand von Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmern. Daneben kann eine fallende Lohnquote auch ein Anzeichen für einen Anstieg der Firmenmarktmacht sein. Anhand von Mikrodaten zum deutschen Verarbeitenden Gewerbe untersucht dieser Artikel, welche Rolle technologischer Wandel und steigende Firmenmarktmacht als Ursachen für das Fallen der Lohnquote spielen. Es zeigt sich, dass technologischer Wandel und ein Anstieg der Firmenmarktmacht, insbesondere auf Arbeitsmärkten, jeweils die Hälfte der fallenden Lohnquote im deutschen Verarbeitenden Gewerbe erklären. Daher können politische Maßnahmen, die Firmenmarktmacht reduzieren, nicht nur eine effizienzsteigernde Wirkung entfalten, sondern, als ein Nebeneffekt, auch den Anteil der Löhne an der Gesamtproduktion erhöhen.
The Impact of Overconfident Customers on Supplier Firm Risks
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
Research has shown that firms with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) tend to overinvest and are exposed to high risks due to unrealistically optimistic estimates of their firms’ future performance. This study finds evidence that overconfident CEOs also affect suppliers’ risk taking. Specifically, serving overconfident customers can lead to high supplier risks, measured by stock volatility, idiosyncratic risk, and market risk. The effects are pronounced when customers aggressively invest in research and development (R&D). Our results are robust after addressing self-selection bias and using different CEO overconfidence measures. We also document some real effects of customer CEO overconfidence on suppliers.
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Price-cost Margin and Bargaining Power in the European Union
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
Using firm-level data between 2004 and 2012 for eleven countries of the European Union (EU), we document the size of product and labour market imperfections within narrowly defined sectors including services which are virtually undocumented. Our findings suggest that perfect competition in both product and labour markets is widely rejected. Levels of the price-cost margin and union bargaining power tend to be higher in some service sectors depicting however substantial heterogeneity. Dispersion within sector and across countries tends to be higher in some services sectors assuming a less tradable nature which suggests that the Single Market integration is partial particularly relaxing the assumption of perfect competition in the labour market. We report also figures for the aggregate economy and show that Eastern countries tend to depict lower product and labour market imperfections compared to other countries in the EU. Also, we provide evidence in favour of a very limited adjustment of both product and labour market imperfections following the international and financial crisis.
Innovation and Top Income Inequality
The Review of Economic Studies,
In this article, we use cross-state panel and cross-U.S. commuting-zone data to look at the relationship between innovation, top income inequality and social mobility. We find positive correlations between measures of innovation and top income inequality. We also show that the correlations between innovation and broad measures of inequality are not significant. Next, using instrumental variable analysis, we argue that these correlations at least partly reflect a causality from innovation to top income shares. Finally, we show that innovation, particularly by new entrants, is positively associated with social mobility, but less so in local areas with more intense lobbying activities.
Bank Market Power and Loan Contracts: Empirical Evidence
Using a sample of syndicated loan facilities granted to US corporate borrowers from 1987 to 2013, we directly gauge the lead banks’ market power, and test its effects on both price and non‐price terms in loan contracts. We find that bank market power is positively correlated with loan spreads, and the positive relation holds for both non‐relationship loans and relationship loans. In particular, we report that, for relationship loans, lending banks charge lower loan price for borrowing firms with lower switching cost. We further employ a framework accommodating the joint determination of loan contractual terms, and document that the lead banks’ market power is positively correlated with collateral and negatively correlated with loan maturity. In addition, we report a significant and negative relationship between banking power and the number of covenants in loan contracts, and the negative relationship is stronger for relationship loans.
Real Effects of Bank Capital Regulations: Global Evidence
Journal of Banking & Finance,
We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998–2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth.