Im Fokus: Sächsische Kooperationsstrukturen im 7. Forschungsrahmenprogramm der Europäischen Union
Mirko Titze
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2014
Abstract
Im Bereich Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) bieten zwischenbetriebliche Kooperationen die Möglichkeit, Spezialisierungsvorteile zu nutzen und Wissen auszutauschen. Für die Entstehung von Innovationen ist insbesondere personengebundenes Wissen wichtig, dessen Ausbreitung jedoch räumlich begrenzt ist. Für die Innovationsdynamik einer Region sind deswegen neben überregionalen Beziehungen auch regionale Kooperationen bedeutsam. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Kooperationsstrukturen innerhalb geförderter Verbundprojekte des 7. Forschungsrahmenprogramms der Europäischen Union (EU) für den Zeitraum von 2007 bis 2013. Die Untersuchung richtet sich auf den Freistaat Sachsen. Der Beitrag knüpft an eine Untersuchung aus dem Jahr 2013 an, die zeigte, dass sächsische Akteure in einer bestimmten Art von Förderprogrammen, den Bundesprogrammen, heute vergleichsweise viele Kooperationspartner in räumlicher Nähe wählen. Es zeigt sich, dass es formelle Kooperationen zwischen sächsischen Akteuren auch innerhalb der internationalen Konsortien der Forschungsrahmenprogramme der EU gibt. Damit ist der Grundstein für den Austausch von personengebundenem Wissen gelegt. Aus internationaler Perspektive waren in den angesprochenen Projekten vorwiegend Partner aus Westeuropa beteiligt.
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The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk-taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Review of Finance,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a lawsuit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on bank risk-taking. The results suggest that banks whose government guarantee was removed reduced credit risk by cutting off the riskiest borrowers from credit. Using a difference-in-differences approach we show that none of these effects are present in a control group of German banks to whom the guarantee was not applicable. Furthermore, savings banks adjusted their liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt instruments after the removal of the guarantee, while we do not observe this for the control group. We also document that yield spreads of savings banks’ bonds increased significantly right after the announcement of the decision to remove guarantees, while the yield spread of a sample of bonds issued by the control group remained unchanged. The evidence implies that public guarantees may be associated with substantial moral hazard effects.
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Outperforming IMF Forecasts by the Use of Leading Indicators
Katja Drechsel, Sebastian Giesen, Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2014
Abstract
This study analyzes the performance of the IMF World Economic Outlook forecasts for world output and the aggregates of both the advanced economies and the emerging and developing economies. With a focus on the forecast for the current and the next year, we examine whether IMF forecasts can be improved by using leading indicators with monthly updates. Using a real-time dataset for GDP and for the indicators we find that some simple single-indicator forecasts on the basis of data that are available at higher frequency can significantly outperform the IMF forecasts if the publication of the Outlook is only a few months old.
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The Ex Ante versus Ex Post Effect of Public Guarantees
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, Adi Mordel
The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How has it Changed?,
2013
Abstract
In October 2006, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) introduced new ratings for banks that account for the potential of government support. The rating changes are not a reflection of any changes in the respective banks’ credit fundamentals. We use this natural experiment to evaluate the consequences of bail out expectations for bank behavior using a difference in differences approach. The results suggest a striking difference between the effects of bail out probabilities during calm times (“ex ante”) versus during crisis times (“ex post”). During calm times, higher bail-out probabilities result in higher risk taking, consistent with the moral hazard view and much of the empirical literature. However, in crisis times, we find that banks with higher bail out probabilities tend to increase their risk taking less compared to banks that were ex ante unlikely to be bailed-out. Charter values are one part of the explanation: Supported banks may have a funding advantage relative to non-supported banks during the crisis. However, we cannot rule out that other factors also may be playing a role, including tighter supervision of supported banks in crisis times.
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Has Labor Income Become More Volatile? Evidence from International Industry-Level Data
Claudia M. Buch
German Economic Review,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
Changes in labor market institutions and the increasing integration of the world economy may affect the volatility of capital and labor incomes. This article documents and analyzes changes in income volatility using data for 11 industrialized countries, 22 industries and 35 years (1970–2004). The article has four main findings. First, the unconditional volatility of labor income has declined in parallel to the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Second, the industry-specific, idiosyncratic component of labor income volatility has hardly changed. Third, cross-sectional heterogeneity is substantial. If anything, the labor incomes of high- and low-skilled workers have become more volatile relative to the volatility of capital incomes. Fourth, the volatility of labor income relative to the volatility of capital income declines in the labor share. Trade openness has no clear-cut impact.
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Reconciling Narrative Monetary Policy Disturbances with Structural VAR Model Shocks?
Martin Kliem, Alexander Kriwoluzky
Economics Letters,
No. 2,
2013
Abstract
Structural VAR studies disagree with narrative accounts about the history of monetary policy disturbances. We investigate whether employing the narrative monetary shocks as a proxy variable in a VAR model aligns both shock series. We find that it does not.
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Granularity in Banking and Growth: Does Financial Openness Matter?
Franziska Bremus, Claudia M. Buch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 14,
2013
Abstract
We explore the impact of large banks and of financial openness for aggregate growth. Large banks matter because of granular effects: if markets are very concentrated in terms of the size distribution of banks, idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level do not cancel out in the aggregate but can affect macroeconomic outcomes. Financial openness may affect GDP growth in and of itself, and it may also influence concentration in banking and thus the impact of bank-specific shocks for the aggregate economy. To test these relationships, we use different measures of de jure and de facto financial openness in a linked micro-macro panel dataset. Our research has three main findings: First, bank-level shocks significantly impact on GDP. Second, financial openness lowers GDP growth. Third, granular effects tend to be stronger in financially closed economies.
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Granularity in Banking and Growth: Does Financial Openness Matter?
Franziska Bremus, Claudia M. Buch
CESifo Working Paper No. 4356, August,
2013
Abstract
We explore the impact of large banks and of financial openness for aggregate growth. Large banks matter because of granular effects: if markets are very concentrated in terms of the size distribution of banks, idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level do not cancel out in the aggregate but can affect macroeconomic outcomes. Financial openness may affect GDP growth in and of itself, and it may also influence concentration in banking and thus the impact of bank-specific shocks for the aggregate economy. To test these relationships, we use different measures of de jure and de facto financial openness in a linked micro-macro panel dataset. Our research has three main findings: First, bank-level shocks significantly impact on GDP. Second, financial openness lowers GDP growth. Third, granular effects tend to be stronger in financially closed economies.
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Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-Selection and Competition
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.
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Money and Inflation: Consequences of the Recent Monetary Policy
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen
Journal of Policy Modeling,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
We use a multivariate state space framework to analyze the short run impact of money on prices in the United States. The key contribution of this approach is that it allows to identify the impact of money growth on inflation without having to model money demand explicitly.
Using our results, that provide evidence for a substantial impact of money on prices in the US, we analyze the consequences of the Fed's response to the financial crisis. Our results indicate a raise of US inflation above 5% for more than a decade. Alternative exit strategies that we simulate cannot fully compensate for the monetary pressure without risking serious repercussions on the real economy. Further simulations of a double dip in the United States indicate that a repetition of the unusually expansive monetary policy – in addition to increased inflation – might cause growth losses exceeding the contemporary easing of the crisis.
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