Business Cycle Forecast 2009: World Financial Crisis Triggers Deep Recession in Germany
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
At the beginning of 2009, the major industrialized economies are in recession. The financial turmoil has developed into a crisis of confidence to and solvency of the financial sector, raising financing costs and lowering the value of assets for firms and households. Monetary and fiscal policies have reacted strongly, but they will not succeed in ending the recession until the financial sectors in the US and in Western Europe have stabilized. This forecast is made under the assumption that stabilization will start in the second half of 2009 because the continued protection of important financial institutions by governments will restore confidence – albeit at a low level – and because at this time, the fall of US-house prices will start to fade off.
The German economy is hit particularly hard, because the financial crisis depresses worldwide investment demand and the sectors producing investment goods are at the heart of the German economy. The recession will not end before the second half of 2009, and capacity utilization will decrease throughout the year. We expect a tentative revival to begin in a recovery of exports. While private investment will shrink markedly, consumption of private households and the government as well as public investment will dampen the downturn. GDP will shrink by 1.9% in Germany and in East Germany by 1.5% because this region is less dependent on exports.
Economic policy has to help restoring confidence, and this can only be achieved if it behaves in a consistent and predictable way.
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Firm Density in East Germany: Findings from the Business Register
Gerhard Heimpold
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2008
Abstract
The contribution focuses on the business density in East Germany in comparison with West Germany. For the purpose of the investigation, a new information source was used – the so-called Business Register. Business density in East Germany is of relevance for two reasons: First, when the wall came down in 1989, the East German economy suffered from the lack of private firms. Second, after 2000, a gap in terms of work places is still existent. The empirical data on business density in East Germany do not reveal an unequivocal picture. Measuring business density by comparing the number of firms with the respective number of population reveals a gap in terms of the number of businesses per 10 000 inhabitants in East Germany. The gap is above average with respect to firms in the manufacturing sector, and it is particularly high regarding larger manufacturing firms. Measuring the business density as a quota of the number of firms and the volume of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reveals a reverse picture: The business density in relation to GDP is on average higher in comparison with the respective value in West Germany. Maybe, the size of the East German market sets limits regarding the number of firms which may act there. However, the size of the domestic market is not so relevant for the firms belonging to the manufacturing sector and to the business-related services since they are expanding to a large extent due to their export activities. Though from the manufacturing sector, relativly positive development perspectives can be expected, the number of large firms per 10 000 inhabitants is relatively low in comparison with West Germany. Public support for strengthening the business landscape in the East German manufacturing sector remains on the agenda of economic policy in Germany.
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German Economy on the Brink of Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
2. Sonderausgabe
2008
Abstract
In autumn 2008, the word economy is in a downswing, caused by the commodity and energy price hike of the first half of the year, housing crises in the US and some other important countries, and in particular by the financial crisis that has recently intensified. The downswing will continue this year and for some time during 2009, and will only come to an end later next year if governments and central banks succeed in stabilizing financial markets in the coming months. In this case, lower prices of commodities and still high growth dynamics in important emerging markets countries will lead to a tentative revival of the world economy.
The German economy is on the brink of a recession. It is particularly vulnerable to a global downswing because exports of investment goods are of upmost importance for the overall economy. Because the uncertainty about the worldwide effects of the financial crisis is very high, the forecast is split. A more probable scenario is based on the assumption of a stabilizing world economy. In this scenario, the growth rate of the German economy in 2009 is 0.2%. The second scenario is based on the assumption of a worldwide recession next year and forecasts that German GDP will shrink by 0.8% in 2009.
Concerning policy, the institutes recommend a strengthening of the capital base of banks via injection of government money. This should be done in a way that gives incentives to banks for attracting additional capital from private sources.
A special chapter of the report analyzes the nature and causes of the price hikes of energy and commodities in the first half of 2008.
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In Focus: State is Winner of Recent German Upswing
Axel Lindner
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2008
Abstract
In 2006 and 2007, production expanded briskly in Germany. Real disposable incomes of private households, however, were almost stagnant. This article sheds, with help of national accounts data, some light on the reasons for this discrepancy: By far the most important factor is that the share of the general government in the disposable income of the whole economy increased strongly. The share of corporations in the disposable income increased, too. Finally, the deflator for consumption rose by more than the deflator of GDP mainly because of the price hike for imported commodities and energy.
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Business Cycle Forecast: On the Edge?
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2008
Abstract
During the summer of 2008, the world economy was further slowing. The financial crisis affects the real economy by tightened credit standards in the US and in the European Union, and housing markets are now in a severe crisis not only in the US, but also in some countries in Western Europe. Finally, consumption of households is affected by stagnating real disposable incomes due to the energy price hike. The slowing world economy, however, has caused the oil price to fall since July, and most emerging markets economies are, up to now, quite resilient.
In Germany, sentiment has deteriorated significantly. Production appears to be about stagnating in the summer. During winter, the devaluation of the euro and a beginning pick up of demand since July will help producers of tradable goods in Germany. Domestic demand will be supported by lower energy prices and healthily growing wage incomes. All in all, gross domestic product (gdp) (adjusted for the number of working days) will increase by 1,8% this year and by 0,8% in 2009.
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Russia: Ongoing Strong Economic Growth Overshadowed by High Inflation
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2008
Abstract
Russian economic growth in 2007 again was driven by strong private consumption and investment, grew by double-digit rates. The roles of budget expenditures and borrowing of private and state-owned firms from abroad in financing investments increased rapidly. Russian inflation climbed again; it was driven up by increases in food prices in line with rising food prices around the world. Inflation pressures had sharpened through more budget spending and scheduled rate increases for electricity and gas as well as for regulated prices for municipal services. Broad money supply (M2) rose rapidly because of strong foreign currency inflows, too. Central bank seeks to bring inflation under control by tightening monetary policy this year. That will somewhat dampen economic growth, but nevertheless GDP growth in the near future will remain at high levels.
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Economic Upswing and Vitalization of the Labor Market – Who Gains From the Upswing?
Herbert S. Buscher
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2008
Abstract
The current situation with respect to the economic development in Germany may be characterized as somewhat suppressed as opposed to euphoric. And this statement holds although the German economy is in an upswing phase since 2005, and the GDP growth rates clearly exceed 2% per annum. The main driving forces of this upswing are mainly from the German exports as well as the domestic investment decisions. Rather underdeveloped compared with the exports and the investment is private consumption. This development is accompanied by positive signals from the German labor market. Declining unemployment figures, increasing regular employment and a smaller number of people in active labor market policy measures are the accompanying positive signals from the labor market. But this in general positive development has not yet reached widespread groups of employees in the sense that their real income has also risen and they thus can dispose of a higher amount of purchasing power. This time lag in the different developments between employment and income may lead to a situation that perceived and actual developments may differ and that actually, there might be a gap between the two. The paper discusses what could be meant with „perceived” development and reaches to the conclusion that actual and perceived developments are not so far away from each other than one might have expected.
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Oil Prices and International Trade: How Petrodollar Recycling Affects the Industrialised Countries
Götz Zeddies
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2008
Abstract
Since 2004, prices for crude oil nearly tripled at international commodity markets. In the wake of the oil crises of the 1970s and ‘80s, numerous empirical studies analysing the macroeconomic effects of sharp increases in commodity prices were carried out pointing at the risks of oil price rises for GDP growth in oil-importing countries. However, in most of these analyses, the impact of oil price increases on international trade of oil-importing countries, which gained in importance in the course of globalisation, is considered only marginally. This is especially the case for the additional revenues of oil-exporting countries spent in large parts for imports from and investment in the industrialised economies.
The present article examines the impact of oil price increases on merchandise exports and imports of single oil-importing industrialised countries. The results show that the curbing effects on merchandise exports are lower than on imports. Whereas import demand responds disproportionally high on the decline in consumption and investment in consequence of oil price increases, the effects on merchandise exports are ambivalent. On the one hand, exports to oil-importing trading partner countries decline due to the local economic downturns, but on the other, exports to oil-exporting countries sharply increase. As a consequence, the negative impact of rising oil prices on macroeconomic activity in oil-importing countries is lowered by the external sector due to growing net exports.
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Determinants of International Fragmentation of Production in the European Union
Götz Zeddies
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2007
Abstract
The last decades were characterized by large increases in world trade, not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to world GDP. This was in large parts caused by increasing exchanges of parts and components between countries as a consequence of international fragmentation of production. Apparently, greater competition especially from the Newly Industrializing and Post-Communist Economies prompted firms in ‘high-wage’ countries to exploit international factor price differences in order to increase their international competitiveness. However, theory predicts that, beside factor price differences, vertical disintegration of production should be driven by a multitude of additional factors. Against this background, the present paper reveals empirical evidence on parts and components trade as an indicator for international fragmentation of production in the European Union. On the basis of a panel data approach, the main explanatory factors for international fragmentation of production are determined. The results show that, although their influence can not be neglected, factor price differences are only one out of many causes for shifting production to or sourcing components from foreign countries.
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