Homepage
Chinese mass imports strengthen extreme parties Globalisation has led to an increase in votes for the political fringes...
See page
Charts
Info Graphs Sometimes pictures say more than a thousand words. Therefore, we selected...
See page
Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance
Michael Koetter, Kasper Roszbach, G. Spagnolo
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 4,
2014
Abstract
The financial crisis has ignited a debate about the appropriate objectives and the governance structure of Central Banks. We use novel survey data to investigate the relation between these traits and banking system stability focusing in particular on their role in micro-prudential supervision. We find that the separation of powers between single and multiple bank supervisors cannot explain credit risk prior or during the financial crisis. Similarly, a large number of Central Bank governance traits do not correlate with system fragility. Only the objective of currency stability exhibits a significant relation with non-performing loan levels in the run-up to the crisis. This effect is amplified for those countries with most frequent exposure to IMF missions in the past. Our results suggest that the current policy discussion whether to centralize prudential supervision under the Central Bank and the ensuing institutional changes some countries are enacting may not produce the improvements authorities are aiming at. Whether other potential improvements in prudential supervision due to, for example, external disciplinary devices, such as IMF conditional lending schemes, are better suited to increase financial stability requires further research.
Read article
New IMF Lending Facilities and Financial Stability in Emerging Markets
J. John, Tobias Knedlik
Economic Analysis and Policy,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
In the light of the current global financial and economic crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has undertaken some major reforms of its lending facilities. The new Flexible Credit Line and the High Access Precautionary Arrangements differ from what has been in place so far, by allowing for ex ante conditionality. This paper summarizes preconditions for effective last resort lending and evaluates the newly introduced measures, concluding that the Flexible Credit Line comes very close to what has been called an International Lender of Last Resort. The main obstacles are the low demand and slow progress in complementary reforms.
Read article
A Cost Efficient International Lender of Last Resort
Tobias Knedlik
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,
2010
Abstract
The current reform of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) lending instruments has transformed the Fund towards an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). Current research discusses various general frameworks for installing an ILOLR. However, it remains unclear how the ILOLR should actually operate. This paper discusses six different options for the construction of an ILOLR that supports central banks during currency crises. The paper concludes that the most cost efficient version of the ILOLR would be direct intervention by the IMF using IMF resources, with the option of using additional reserves from central banks. The paper considers measures of cost efficiency, such as cost of borrowing, intervention, and sterilization and moral hazard problems.
Read article
Reform of IMF Lending Facilities Increases Stability in Emerging Market Economies
J. John, Tobias Knedlik
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2010
Abstract
Following the current international financial and economic crisis the IMF reformed its lending facilities. Two new instruments are of particular importance: the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the High Access Precautionary Arrangements (HAPA). The major innovation of the new facilities is that the traditional ex-post conditionality is replaced by an ex-ante qualification process. An ex-ante qualification process leads to a short-term availability of funds during the emergence of crises and avoids long negotiation processes during a crisis. Additionally, the FCL is high powered, amounting to 900 to 1000% of the quota. It can therefore be expected that the programs have preventive effects. In difference to previous attempts to implement precautionary credit lines, the FCL and HAPA successfully created demand. First empirical observations show, that a stigmatization, which could have been expected from experience, did not take place. Countries who qualified for the FCL did rather well during the current crisis and did not face shrinking confidence due to expected crises. To be more efficient, the new lending facilities should be complemented be an international regulatory framework, which limits moral-hazard-induced higher risk taking. Additionally more members should be encouraged to demand the new instruments to increase its systemic importance.
Read article