Do House Prices Drive Aggregate Consumption?
Marian Berneburg, Axel Lindner
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2006
Abstract
In recent times increasing house prices have been credited with a stong positive influence on aggre-gate consumption. But it is questionable in how far higher prices are at all able to lift the purchasing power of the economy as whole: The seller’s profit of a high price, equals the buyer’s loss. But while a positive correlation between house prices and consumption is evident, it is not a sign of irra-tional behaviour by market participants. In fact it seems that both factors are driven by other pa-rameters: the interest rate and expectations about future interest rates and economic activity. For a selection of four developed countries, the follow-ing article tries to give an explanation for the house price developments of the past 15 years. While disregarding country specific risk as well as institutional aspects and demographic factors, a present value caluclation forms the basis for esti-mating a fundamentally justified price movement. Expectations for future rents and discount rates are being proxied by a moving average of past values. It can be observed how interest rate changes and long-run economic growth, two as-pects that clearly also drive private consumption, play a key role here.
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Angewandte Industrieökonomik: Theorien, Modelle, Anwendungen
Ulrich Blum, Simone Müller, Andreas Weiske
,
2006
Abstract
Modern entrepreneurship comprises a mix of bourgeois morale and the striving for adventure: Bourgeois morale implies efficiency, reputation, the rule of the law. And adventure implies new frontiers, the spirit of competition, innovation and a pioneer’s attitude – up to the destruction of competitors. The modern entrepreneur’s social position thus is a ambiguous; the entrepreneur needs a special attitude with respect to economic activity as discussed by Werner Sombard (1913) and Max Weber (1905); society has to accept the positive ethical quality of profit seeking in order to survive. The modern theory of the enterprise promoted by neoclassic theory does not include any of these elements of real entrepreneurship. Industrial organisation theory tries to structure models closer to reality, thus allowing empirical testing. In many aspects, it is based on neoclassic theory, but also accepts the concept of strategic behaviour which includes potential reactions of other market participants in ones own activities. Elements of evolutionary economics, risk theory and modern information theory thus become important. The overarching question of the entrepreneur, who strives for a higher than normal profit in the market becomes: under which conditions should I enter the market and under which conditions will potential entrants do the same? How should I set my prizes and what reactions must I expect? How can I signal friendly behaviour to competitors? How can I differentiate myself from them? What importance do innovations and advertising have? The book roles out these questions in three large chapters on technology and market structure, on prize setting and signalling, and on research, development and innovation. An introduction explains individual behavioural patterns within the societal context – often in a historical perspective. Three methodological chapters introduce the reader into strategic thinking as the core aspect of the industrial organisation theory, the “old industrial organisation theory” and the neoclassic basic models. Each chapter is extended by exercises and tips for solutions.
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Innovationskooperationen deutscher Unternehmen im europäischen und innerdeutschen Vergleich
Jutta Günther
Der Mittelstand an der Schwelle zur Informationsgesellschaft,
2005
Abstract
The study deals with innovation cooperation as a means to improve the competitiveness of enterprises. The empirical study compares the cooperation behaviour of innovative enterprises in Germany to other West European countries as well as between East and West Germany. The database used is the second Community Innovation Survey (CIS-2) of the EU. While German firms exhibit a cooperation frequency slightly below the average of the European Economic Area (EEA), enterprises in North European countries are by far most active with respect to cooperation frequency. The most important cooperation partner for firms in the EEA are other firms within the enterprise group, followed by suppliers and customers while German firms cooperate most frequently with universities. The comparative investigation of innovation cooperation in East and West Germany shows that East German firms cooperate more often than West German firms. However, a productivity advantage of cooperating firms against non-cooperating firms is only observable in West Germany. In East Germany, cooperating firms even exhibit a lower sales productivity than non-cooperating firms, which is explainable most probably through the fact that cooperation activities translate into productivity advantages only in the long run.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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Property networks of corporations as cause of abusive behaviour – A stock market analysis based on institutional economics
Makram El-Shagi
Applied Financial Economics Letters,
No. 5,
2005
Abstract
The present study deals with the fact that it seems as if executive boards have developed a self-service-mentality concerning the corporations they are meant to manage. The surprise about this is not the attempt of exploitation (rather the opposite would be surprising from an economic point of view) but the apparent absence of sanctions imposed by the owners. This study shows that this behaviour of corporations’ owners is at least to a main part due to the fact, that the reciprocal property of corporations prevents the exercise of certain property rights by the ‘true’ holders.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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East-West-migration in Germany cannot be explained with overall economic
Christian Dreger, Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2002
Abstract
In the article we investigate migration behaviour between East and West Germany. We employ paneleconometric techniques where the panel units are the so-called Bundesländer. As a result, only a small fraction of migration can be traced to macroeconomic variables. Instead important reasons seem to be individual specific.
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