Clustering or Competition? The Foreign Investment Behavior of German Banks
Claudia M. Buch, A. Lipponer
International Journal of Central Banking,
2006
Abstract
Banks often concentrate their foreign direct investment (FDI) in certain countries. This clustering of activities could reflect either the attractiveness of a particular country or agglomeration effects. To find out which of the two phenomena dominates, we need to control for country-specific factors. We use new bank-level data on German banks’ FDI for the 1996-2003 period.We test whether the presence of other banks has a positive impact on the entry of new banks. Once we control for the attractiveness of a country through fixed effects, the negative impact of competition dominates. Hence, pure clustering effects are rather unimportant.
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Longterm development of return on assets – an empirical panel data analysis
Olaf Neubert
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
One of the basic propositions of economic theory is the fact that competition does not allow permanent very high or very low returns. But how can the permanent surplus gain of a monopolist be distinguished from innovation gains? In which markets is a regulatory interference necessary? Contrary to the static analysis, the concept of dynamic competition explicitly considers the temporal development of return and gain. An entrepreneur can achieve an advantage over the competitors through new products or new production processes. Hence arising innovation gains function as incentives for imitators to join the development which in turn leads to a reduction of the surplus gains. Thus, these gains are not contradictory to an effective competition. On the basis of annual balance sheets of German firms, this article analyses the temporal development of returns on assets. It is to evaluate whether the adaptation process assumed by Schumpeter that matches very high and very low gains with a longterm level can be confirmed, and how fast this process works. The average industry returns of the manufacturing industry show a convergence to a longterm level. During this process, an average of 40% of the deviation from the longterm level are melted every year. However, the analysis of company returns shows longterm differences. The adaptation rate of companies, 50%, is significantly higher compared to the industry value. The analysis of the connection between the adaptation rate and the longterm return level of companies proves that companies which face above-average competition strength obtain a higher longterm return level than other companies. When firms operate within markets with high stress of competition they do not achieve below-average returns but rather significantly above-average returns in the long term.
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Progressivity and Flexibility in Developing an Effective Competition Regime: Using Experiences of Poland, Ukraine, and South Africa for developing countries
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2006
Abstract
The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.
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A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conditions of Knowledge Transfer by New Employees in Companies
Sidonia vonLedebur
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia. Based on a model by HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees to act in favour of the company by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an innovation
(before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is
that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere.
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Angewandte Industrieökonomik: Theorien, Modelle, Anwendungen
Ulrich Blum, Simone Müller, Andreas Weiske
,
2006
Abstract
Modern entrepreneurship comprises a mix of bourgeois morale and the striving for adventure: Bourgeois morale implies efficiency, reputation, the rule of the law. And adventure implies new frontiers, the spirit of competition, innovation and a pioneer’s attitude – up to the destruction of competitors. The modern entrepreneur’s social position thus is a ambiguous; the entrepreneur needs a special attitude with respect to economic activity as discussed by Werner Sombard (1913) and Max Weber (1905); society has to accept the positive ethical quality of profit seeking in order to survive. The modern theory of the enterprise promoted by neoclassic theory does not include any of these elements of real entrepreneurship. Industrial organisation theory tries to structure models closer to reality, thus allowing empirical testing. In many aspects, it is based on neoclassic theory, but also accepts the concept of strategic behaviour which includes potential reactions of other market participants in ones own activities. Elements of evolutionary economics, risk theory and modern information theory thus become important. The overarching question of the entrepreneur, who strives for a higher than normal profit in the market becomes: under which conditions should I enter the market and under which conditions will potential entrants do the same? How should I set my prizes and what reactions must I expect? How can I signal friendly behaviour to competitors? How can I differentiate myself from them? What importance do innovations and advertising have? The book roles out these questions in three large chapters on technology and market structure, on prize setting and signalling, and on research, development and innovation. An introduction explains individual behavioural patterns within the societal context – often in a historical perspective. Three methodological chapters introduce the reader into strategic thinking as the core aspect of the industrial organisation theory, the “old industrial organisation theory” and the neoclassic basic models. Each chapter is extended by exercises and tips for solutions.
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Conditions of knowledge transfer of new staff members in companies – a game theoretical analysis -
Sidonia vonLedebur
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. New knowledge is often produced at a different place from its implementation. Thus knowledge transfer is necessary. One possible transfer channel is the employment of people with distinct knowledge not yet available in a company. This study analyses the conditions of efficient transfer of new employees in companies with a game-theoretic model.
It is shown that a high additional reward in relation to the additional effort necessary for knowledge transfer enhances the transfer. But other incentives play a significant role as well, e.g. an adequate team size and a good working atmosphere.
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Incentive-Compatible Grants-in-Aid Mechanisms for Federations with Local Tax Competition and Asymmetric Information
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, T. Kuhn
Proceedings. 98th Annual Conference on Taxation, Miami, Florida, November 17-19, 2005 and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association,
2006
Abstract
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How do multinationals meet investment decisions: The case study of General Motors
Diemo Dietrich, Daniel Höwer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2005
Abstract
The recent events around Opel, the German subsidiary of General Motors, has attracted a great deal of attention, especially with respect to the influence of multinational corporations on the German economy. General Motors' announcement of an internal competition for production capacities in June 2004 has led some observers to the assessment that this would be a step towards more efficiency and profitability. But such internal competition for ressources may be hampered and end up in inefficiency. This is because informational frictions and enforcement problems within a corporation restrict the headquarters ability and willingness to allocate ressources efficiently. Against this background, we discuss possible problems associated with the internal capital allocation within multinational corporations and show their relevance in the case of General Motors.
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Analysis of statements made in favour of and against the adoption of competition law in developing and transition economies
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan, Frank Emmert
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
The paper is concerned with documenting and assessing statements made by policy-makers, opinion formers, and other stakeholders in favour and against the adoption of competition laws with particular reference to transition and developing countries which have not yet enacted these kind of laws. For example, claims that competition enforcement might reduce the inflow of foreign direct investment, or that other policies are successfully used as substitutes for competition law, are assessed. In a first step, the method of generalized analysis structures the list of statements around core issues of common features to make them accessible to further interpretation and assessment. The paper shows that some claims are in fact country or region specific, and specific to the development level of the respective countries. In a second step, the core issues are assessed according to economic and legal criteria. Since the analysis focuses on transition and developing countries, the criteria for economic assessment are predominantly economic growth and development issues, but also include the economic coherency of a set of claims submitted by stakeholders in a given country. The criteria for legal assessment include whether claims are problematic in light of WTO-principles, or are even born out of a political objective which is incompatible with the spirit, if not the letter of WTO-rules.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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