Business Cycle Forecast, Summer 2008: Price Hikes and Financial Crisis Cloud Growth Prospects
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2008
Abstract
In the summer of 2008 the turmoil on financial markets and that on the markets for energy dim the prospects for the world economy. The acceleration of the oil price hike during the first half of the year has led to an increase in expected inflation and to higher interest rates on capital markets, while stock prices are going down. At the same time, the financial crisis is far from over, and banks in the US and in Western Europe continue in their efforts to consolidate their balance sheets. Thus, the expansion of credit supply will be scarcer in the next quarters. All this means that demand will slow in the developed economies during the next quarters. However, the massive fiscal stimulus will help the US economy to stabilize, and the world economy still benefits from the high growth dynamics in the emerging markets economies. All in all, the developed economies will not reach their potential growth rate before the second half of 2009. In Germany, the upswing comes to a temporary halt during summer of this year. Slowing foreign demand and the oil price hike induce firms to postpone investments, and private consumption, the soft spot of the upswing in Germany, is still sluggish due to high inflation rates that impair purchasing power. For the end of 2008, chances are good that growth in Germany accelerates again, because German exporters are still penetrating emerging markets as competitiveness does not diminish. All in all, the German economy will grow by 2.3% in 2008 (mainly due to the very high dynamics at the beginning of the year) and by 1.3% in 2009. A main risk of this forecast is that monetary policy fails in easing the high inflationary pressures. As to fiscal policy, efforts to reach sustainable public finances should not weaken.
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Business cycle forecast 2008: German upswing takes a break
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2008
Abstract
Economic growth in the industrial countries will be much more muted in 2008 than in the past year. One cause is the prolonged oil price hike during 2007. The second and more important cause is the intensification of tensions on world financial markets. Due to problems in the financial sector, credit expansion will slow next year in the euro area as well as in the US. This will dampen demand in the real economy. A significant downswing in the industrial countries, however, is not the most likely scenario: in the US, expansive economic policy and a weak dollar that gives production in the US a competitive edge will prevent the economy from sliding into recession. In the euro area, high profitability of firms and structural improvements in the working of labour markets will help the economy cope with the stronger euro and with higher costs of external financing due to the turmoil in the financial sector. In Germany, the upswing has still not reached the demand of private households. The main reason is that real wages were stagnating in 2007 and will not rise by much in 2008, since inflation has accelerated considerably at the end of last year. In addition, weaker dynamics of external demand will dampen export growth. This and the end of tax incentives for investment at the end of 2007 will dampen investment activity. All in all, the economy will slow down in the first half of 2008. However, chances are good that the upswing will only have taken a break: when the dampening external shocks have ceased, the driving powers of the upswing will prevail; dynamic employment growth is a reflection of the strong confidence of firms. A major risk for employment and for the German economy in general is, however, the possibility that the policy concerning the labour markets changes course; bad omens are the recent the introduction of minimum wages for postal services and the announced extension of unemployment benefits for persons older than 50.
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The Role of Credit Ratings in Banking Regulations. Credit Ratings Are Insufficiently Anticipating the Risk for Currency Crises.
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
This contribution analyses whether the behaviour of rating agencies has changed since their failure to predict the Asian crisis. The paper finds no robust econometric evidence that rating agencies have started to take micro-mismatches into account when assigning sovereign ratings. Thus, given the current approach of credit rating agencies, we have reservations concerning the effectiveness of Basel II to prevent the transmission from currency crises to banking crises for potential future crises.
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The Effect of the Iraq War on Foreign Bank Lending to the MENA Region
H. Evren Damar
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,
No. 5,
2007
Abstract
This paper examines whether a large geopolitical event, such as the war in Iraq, can affect foreign bank lending from developed countries to emerging markets. Using country-level data, the paper analyzes the effects of economic shocks and the Iraq war on the availability of foreign bank credit to five countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The war has had a nonuniform effect on foreign banks: Although the war has led to higher U.S. lending, it has also discouraged British and Italian banks from lending to the region. Implications concerning the stability and reliability of foreign bank credit in the face of increased geopolitical risks are identified and discussed.
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Banking Regulation: Minimum Capital Requirements of Basel II Intensify Transmission from Currency Crises to Banking Crises
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2007
Abstract
Emerging market currency crises are often followed by banking crises. One reason for the transmission is the increased value of foreign debt measured in local currency. Equity capital is often insufficient to ensure liquidity. This problem is addressed by Basel II, in particular by its minimum capital requirements. In difference to the current regulation (Basel I), Basel II employs a differentiated risk weighing on base of credit ratings. This contribution calculates the hypothetic effects of the new regulation on minimum capital requirements for the example of the South Korea currency and banking crises of 1997. The results are compared to current regulation. It can be shown that minimum capital requirements in the case of Basel II would have been lower than in the case of Basel I. Additionally, minimum capital requirements would have increased dramatically. The transmission from currency to banking crises would not have been prevented, but would have been accelerated. Thereby, minimum capital requirements under Basel I have been relatively low because of South Korea’s OECD membership. It can therefore be concluded that in other emerging market economies, which are not OECD members, the ratio of minimum capital requirements of Basel II to the minimum capital requirements of Basel I prior the crises would have been even lower. Therefore, the new instrument of banking regulation would have intensified the transmission from currency to banking crises.
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East German Economy: Demand Push Stronger than Structural Deficiencies
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2007
Abstract
In 2006, growth of production was surprisingly strong in Eastern Germany. The structural deficiencies there would have suggested a slower pace. In particular, linkages with national and international business cycles have been underestimated. To a large part, the reason why output grew by 3 per cent did not come from Eastern Germany itself, but from the Old Länder and from abroad. In the New Länder, the strong upward swing in investment activity stimulated the economy. However, owing to a small increase in total income of private households, their purchasing power lagged behind.
The improved ability of East German firms to absorb cyclical impulses from exports and from Germany’s general investment activity proved to be a crucial factor. In particular, the endowment of workplaces with modern production facilities as well as the continued reduction in the disadvantages with respect to cost-competitiveness in the tradable goods sector were beneficial. The labour cost advantage compared to West German competitors increased further while the disadvantage compared to those from Central and Eastern Europe decreased.
Benefiting from these factors, economic activity in Eastern Germany will grow faster than in the Old Länder as long as the upswing in Germany and abroad remains strong. In 2007 and 2008, investments – especially in equipment – and exports will be the driving forces again. For exports, the strongly expanding markets in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Russia will gain in importance. As income and employment prospects improve, private consumption will support the growth in production. Registered unemployment should decrease below the 1-million threshold.
Manufacturing will remain the primary force of the upswing; its advantages in production costs will not vanish as long as, even in presence of scarcity of skilled labour, salaries and wages do not increase more than in Western Germany. In the wake of robust economic growth, the New Länder will make further progress in catching up with respect to production and income.
Companies will regain support from the banking industry. Yet, investment capital still stems from public funding programmes to a non-negligible extent. In the medium run, access to credit will ease as a result of further improvements in the firms’ net worth position. However, dependency on internal funds remains high and exposes companies to comparatively strong cyclical risks. In an economic downturn, the structural deficiencies of the East German economy will impair economic expansion.
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Schätzunsicherheit oder Korrelation, Welche Risikokomponente sollten Unternehmen bei der Bewertung von Kreditportfoliorisiken wann berücksichtigen?
Henry Dannenberg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2007
Abstract
The use of probability of default estimates to assess the risks of a credit portfolio should not ignore estimation uncertainty. The latter can be quantified by confidence intervals. But assumptions about dependencies of these intervals are inconsistent with assumptions of conventional credit portfolio models. Based on simulation studies this paper shows, that a model which include estimation uncertainty but ignore default correlation might estimate the real credit risk more correctly than a model that implicates default correlation but ignore estimation uncertainty. The latter is a trait of conventional credit portfolio models. In this paper quantifying of estimation uncertainty based on the idea of confidence intervals and the underlying probability distributions of these intervals.
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Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and Efficiency of Corporate Foreign Investment
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home, firms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can refinance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing firms’ effective financing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources inefficiently as they then save on financing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.
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The role of banking portfolios in the transmission from the currency crises to banking crises - potential effects of Basel II
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 21,
2006
Abstract
This paper evaluates the potential effects of the Basel II accord on preventing the transmission from currency crises to financial crises. By analyzing the case study of South Korea, it shows how mismatches on banks’ balance sheets were the primary cause for such a transmission, and models how Basel II would have affected those balance sheets. The paper shows that due to South Korea’s positive credit rating in the months leading up to the crisis, the regulatory capital reserves under Basel II would have been even lower than those under Basel I, and that therefore Basel II would have had adverse effects on the development of the crisis. In the second part, the article analyses whether the behavior of rating agencies has changed since their failure to predict the Asian crisis. The paper finds no robust econometric evidence that rating agencies have started to take micromismatches into account when assigning sovereign ratings. Thus, given the current approach of credit rating agencies, we have reservations concerning the effectiveness of Basel II to prevent the transmission from currency crises to banking crises, both for the case of South Korea and for potential future crises.
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Do House Prices Drive Aggregate Consumption?
Marian Berneburg, Axel Lindner
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2006
Abstract
In recent times increasing house prices have been credited with a stong positive influence on aggre-gate consumption. But it is questionable in how far higher prices are at all able to lift the purchasing power of the economy as whole: The seller’s profit of a high price, equals the buyer’s loss. But while a positive correlation between house prices and consumption is evident, it is not a sign of irra-tional behaviour by market participants. In fact it seems that both factors are driven by other pa-rameters: the interest rate and expectations about future interest rates and economic activity. For a selection of four developed countries, the follow-ing article tries to give an explanation for the house price developments of the past 15 years. While disregarding country specific risk as well as institutional aspects and demographic factors, a present value caluclation forms the basis for esti-mating a fundamentally justified price movement. Expectations for future rents and discount rates are being proxied by a moving average of past values. It can be observed how interest rate changes and long-run economic growth, two as-pects that clearly also drive private consumption, play a key role here.
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