Enjoying the Quiet Life Under Deregulation? Evidence from Adjusted Lerner Indices for U.S. Banks
Michael Koetter, James W. Kolari, Laura Spierdijk
Review of Economics and Statistics,
No. 2,
2012
Abstract
The quiet life hypothesis posits that firms with market power incur inefficiencies rather than reap monopolistic rents. We propose a simple adjustment to Lerner indices to account for the possibility of foregone rents to test this hypothesis. For a large sample of U.S. commercial banks, we find that adjusted Lerner indices are significantly larger than conventional Lerner indices and trending upward over time. Instrumental variable regressions reject the quiet life hypothesis for cost inefficiencies. However, Lerner indices adjusted for profit inefficiencies reveal a quiet life among U.S. banks.
Read article
Liberalization and Rules on Regulation in the Field of Financial Services in Bilateral Trade and Regional Integration Agreements
Diemo Dietrich, J. Finke, C. Tietje
Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht Nr. 97,
2010
Abstract
The recent international financial crisis has sparked a fierce debate about its causes and about how to prevent a recurrence. As liberalization and deregulation were widely considered being among the major culprits, de-liberalization and re-regulation seemed a natural response. However, an economic approach to this issue does not support such black-and-white solutions. Although liberalizing financial services sectors may threaten a developing country's financial stability in the short run, it also fosters long-run economic growth if sound legal and economic institutions are in place that can mitigate the adverse side-effects of liberalization. For achieving this objective, states need the policy space to implement such regulatory measures. Contrary to a wide-spread belief, states are not unduly hampered by bilateral or multilateral agreements. Instead, by providing a far-reaching exception concerning prudential regulation states can define their own regulatory approach. The challange for developing countries thus is to install regulatory capacities.
Read article
Agenda 2010: Neues unter Deutschlands Himmel?
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
The paper analyzes to what extent the reform of the German social security and welfare system, known as the “Hartz-IV-Reforms” under the “Agenda 2010”, has been successful. It is shown that the integration of welfare and social security payments increased efficiency as did prior deregulations of the labor market. However, the implementation was partly inefficient due to a misalignment between crucial instruments and incentive structure of individuals. This led to unforeseen expenditures that partly continue until today. Due to this inefficiency, parts of the reform lost its political acceptance. Furthermore, the article shows that many of these reforms had already been prepared intellectually by selected think tanks in the 90ies. The reforms are consistent with a consensus among scholars regarding the ability of the modern state to protect citizens from individual life risks. Finally, the article discusses the future agenda with respect to other important economic policy instruments beyond the integration of welfare and social security such as incentive structure in the established taxation system.
Read article
From University Town to Knowledge City: Strategies and Regulatory Hurdles in Germany
Peter Franz
Knowledge-Based Urban Development: Planning and Applications in the Information Era,
2008
Abstract
The trend of cities, serving as a location for universities and research institutes, to take into consideration new strategies utilizing this location factor for growth-oriented urban development can also be observed in Germany. An overview of the quantitative preconditions shows that many German cities dispose of favorite preconditions for such a knowledge city strategy. An analysis of the policy arena comes to the result that the political actors are confronted with the task of a complex multi-level-policy where networking skills become essential. A comparison with the policy conditions in the U.S. makes it quite clear that especially the German universities have the status of semi-autonomous actors complicating negotiating and coordinating activities between city and science representatives. First examples of deregulation show that these hurdles can be overcome in the future.
Read article
Developing Collaborative Advantage: Preconditions and Restrictions for ‘Knowledge City’ Strategies in East Germany
Peter Franz
Institutions for Knowledge Generation and Knowledge Flows - Building Innovative Capabilities for Regions. Papers presented at the 10th Uddevalla Symposium 2007,
2007
Abstract
The trend of cities, serving as a location for universities and research institutes, to take into consideration new strategies utilizing this location factor for growth-oriented urban development can also be observed in Germany. An overview of the quantitative preconditions shows that many German cities dispose of favorite preconditions for such a knowledge city strategy. An analysis of the policy arena comes to the result that the political actors are confronted with the task of a complex multi-level-policy where networking skills become essential. A comparison with the policy conditions in the U.S. makes it quite clear that especially the German universities have the status of semi-autonomous actors complicating negotiating and coordinating activities between city and science representatives. First examples of deregulation show that these hurdles can be overcome in the future.
Read article
The Impact of Institutions on the Employment Performance in European Labour Markets
Herbert S. Buscher, Christian Dreger, Raúl Ramos, Jordi Surinach
Discussion Paper No. 1732,
2005
Abstract
The paper investigates the role of institutions for labor market performance across European countries. As participation rates have been rather stable over the past, the unemployment problem is mainly caused by shortages in labor demand. Labor demand is expressed by its structural parameters, such as the elasticities of employment to output and factor prices. Institutional variables include employment protection legislation, the structure of wage bargaining, measures describing the tax and transfer system and active labor market policies. As cointegration between employment, output and factor prices is detected, labor demand equations are fitted in levels by efficient estimation techniques. Then, labor demand elasticities are explained by institutions using panel fixed effects regressions. The results suggest that higher flexibility and incentives of households to work appear to be appropriate strategies to improve the employment record. The employment response to economic conditions is stronger in a more deregulated environment, and the absorption of shocks can be relieved.
Read article
Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
Read article
Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
Read article
Deregulation in Germany - theoretical and empirical analyses - Conference Issue
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
In der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen und wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion wird seit langem darüber diskutiert, inwieweit das in Deutschland bestehende Regulierungssystem noch angemessen ist. Tatsächlich sind seit Beginn der achtziger Jahre eine ganze Reihe von Märkten liberalisiert worden, die früher durch staatliche Monopole gekennzeichnet waren. Darüber hinaus wurden übermäßige Regulierungen aber auch in anderen Bereichen abgebaut, so im Handwerk, im Einzelhandel oder auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, weil sie sich zunehmend als hemmend für die wirtschaftliche Dynamik erwiesen haben. Mit Blick auf die fortbestehenden Wachstumsprobleme Deutschlands stehen Möglichkeiten der Deregulierung auch weiterhin im Vordergrund des Interesses.
Read article
The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
Read article