23.05.2023 • 14/2023
Analysis of earnings calls: Blathering managers harm their company
If a senior executive refuses to give information to professional investors, the company's stock market value drops afterwards. This is shown in a study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) after evaluating
1.2 million answers from tele-phone conferences.
Fabian Wöbbeking
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Gender Equality & Anti-Discrimination
Equal Opportunities at IWH ...
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Gender Equality & Anti-Discrimination
Equal Opportunities at IWH ...
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Headwinds from Germany and abroad: institutes revise forecast significantly downwards According to Germany’s five...
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Productivity
Productivity: More with Less by Better Available resources are scarce. To sustain our...
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East Germany
The Nasty Gap 30 years after unification: Why East Germany is still 20% poorer than the...
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14.02.2023 • 4/2023
Study on Europe's top bankers: Risky business despite bonus cap
Ten years ago, the EU Parliament decided to cap the flexible remuneration of bank managers. But the cap on bonuses misses its target: Managers of systemically important European banks take high risks without changes, shows a study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
Michael Koetter
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External Social Networks and Earnings Management
Ming Fang, Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Qiang Wu
British Accounting Review,
No. 2,
2022
Abstract
Using a sample of U.S. listed firms for the 2000–2017 period, we examine how external social networks of top executives and directors affect earnings management in their firms. We find that well-connected firms are more aggressive in managing earnings through both accruals and real activities and that the results are robust after controlling for internal executive social ties. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that earnings management decreases after a socially connected executive or director dies. Additional analysis shows that connections forged by past professional working experiences have a greater impact on earnings management than connections forged by education and other social activities. Moreover, CFO social networks have a greater influence on earnings management than CEO social networks. Finally, we explore the underlying mechanisms, finding that 1) firms that are socially connected to each other show more similarities in their earnings management than firms that do not share a connection, and 2) more connected firms are less likely to incur accounting restatements. Collectively, our findings indicate that the external social networks of top executives and directors are important determinants of both their accrual- and real activity-based earnings management.
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The Adverse Effect of Contingent Convertible Bonds on Bank Stability
Melina Ludolph
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2022
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of CoCo bonds that qualify as additional tier 1 capital on bank fundamentals. The results reveal a significant reduction in the distance to insolvency following the hybrid bond issuance due to increased earnings volatility. Further analyses suggest a link between CoCo issuance and more active earnings management, evidenced by a higher standard deviation of loan loss provisions and impairment charges. The findings substantiate long-standing theoretical hypotheses suggesting that the regulatory design requirements for going-concern CoCos adversely affect bank stability. Furthermore, they correspond to the notion that private monitoring is largely absent as a corrective measure due to prevailing uncertainties and information frictions.
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Military Directors, Governance and Firm Behavior
Chen Cai, Iftekhar Hasan, Yinjie (Victor) Shen, Shuai Wang
Advances in Accounting,
December
2021
Abstract
We build a large dataset of board of directors with military experience and document a substantial and persistent presence of independent military directors serving on corporate boards. We find that firms with independent military directors are associated with better monitoring outcomes, including less excessive CEO compensation, greater forced CEO turnover–performance sensitivity, and less earnings management.
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