The Stability of Bank Efficiency Rankings when Risk Preferences and Objectives are Different
Michael Koetter
European Journal of Finance,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
We analyze the stability of efficiency rankings of German universal banks between 1993 and 2004. First, we estimate traditional efficiency scores with stochastic cost and alternative profit frontier analysis. Then, we explicitly allow for different risk preferences and measure efficiency with a structural model based on utility maximization. Using the almost ideal demand system, we estimate input- and profit-demand functions to obtain proxies for expected return and risk. Efficiency is then measured in this risk-return space. Mean risk-return efficiency is somewhat higher than cost and considerably higher than profit efficiency (PE). More importantly, rank–order correlation between these measures are low or even negative. This suggests that best-practice institutes should not be identified on the basis of traditional efficiency measures alone. Apparently, low cost and/or PE may merely result from alternative yet efficiently chosen risk-return trade-offs.
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Culture as a Base for Efficient Economic Systems
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
Globalization puts the German economic model, the so-called social market economy, under pressure. Constituting elements of this model are fundamental social and economic values. Globalization puts some of these values under pressure and creates inefficiencies because the costs of running the social and economic fabric rise. This is an important justification to inquire into the normative foundations of economic efficiency The following article discusses to what extent culture is a base for efficient economic systems. Information theory is regarded as a key element for explaining social change. The arguments are based on institutional economics with a special view on transaction costs and on cooperation structures. It is shown that specific information technologies promote forms of cooperation, which influence institutional arrangements. The related information technologies themselves are part of the cultural system and its value structures. As a consequence, competition among economic systems favours certain combinations of technologies, cultural arrangements and economic systems. In as much as cultural competition precedes economic competition in the sense of a certain way of thinking, the cultural system can be regarded as a strategic competitive parameter for an economy.
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Is a Centralisation of Local Governmental Structures an Appropriate Way to Ensure an Efficient Provision of Local Public Services? Findings from Case Studies in the State of Saxony-Anhalt
Gerhard Heimpold, Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2008
Abstract
Choosing the appropriate organisational model for local government (i. e. centralised vs. federal model) forms an essential challenge for local communities. Against the background of Fiscal Federalism, a trade-off between the two models mentioned can be expected: Though the centralised model may bring up economies of scale and scope, the federal form of local government may have advantages, too, for instance regarding the extent of civil participation. The article has the intention to answer the question how the degree of centralisation/decentralisation of local governmental organisation affects the provision of services of public interest. The article is based on case studies conducted in ten municipalities located in the State of Saxony-Anhalt, Germany. The government of Saxony-Anhalt intends to implement a reform project targeted at the modernisation of local governmental organisation. The basic reform idea is to transform the local governmental structures from a situation (at the beginning of 2008) where a co-existence of centralised and federally organised municipalities is given towards a future situation where the centralised model should be dominating. In line with the expectation derived from theory, the empirical findings do not draw a picture, which is unequivocally in favour either of the centralised or of the federal model. However, the reform of modernisation of local governmental organisation should remain on the agenda, especially due to a shrinking population in the rural parts of Saxony-Anhalt. This could support the state government’s plans of a more centralized organisation of local government. But this would mean to give up the advantages of the existing federal model of local government. Therefore, in addition to the centralised model favoured by the state government, politicians in Saxony-Anhalt should look for the possibility of an alternative “third” model, which tries to combine the advantages of economies of scale with a greater degree of civil participation.
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Effects of “Democratic Control” on the Efficiency of Local Public Enterprises: Empirical Evidence for Water Suppliers in Eastern Germany
Peter Haug
Public Finance and Management,
No. 1,
2008
Abstract
This paper deals with the effects of interference by local governments on the business affairs of publicly owned utilities. A partial model is presented to illustrate the consequences of “democratic control” on the public managers’ effort and the efficiency of local public production. To empirically check the theoretical results, a two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) was carried out on a sample of Eastern German water suppliers. The organizational form is used in the regression analysis to measure the degree of municipal control. The results of the OLS- and Tobit regression indicate an efficiency-enhancing effect on organizational forms with less distinctive control options for local politicians.
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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Strategien der neuen Bundesländer im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe „Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“ – Ein Vergleich –
Mirko Titze
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 14,
2007
Abstract
The Common Task “Improvement of Regional Economic Structure” is one of the most important instruments for the “Reconstruction East”. Herein the federal states have an extensive flexibility to define their own kind of industrial policy. Due to their structural deficits this paper is focused on the federal states in East-Germany. A decrease in the budget constrains the governments to improve efficiency of subsidies. However, there is one way to solve this problem: change unselective government aid to regional as well as sectoral government aid. This paper shows that there is only one federal state, which has applied this kind of policy: the federal state of Brandenburg.
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Reform of Local Municipal Structures: Centralization not only Implicates Advantages
Peter Haug, Claus Michelsen
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2007
Abstract
The question whether centralized or decentralized municipal structures are more efficient has been discussed, not only in Germany, for a long time primarily under aspects of law and administrative sciences. In this article, we use an economic approach instead. The prevailing theories on interjurisdictional competition are not conclusive about the cost and welfare effects of centralization. Therefore, using the example of Saxony-Anhalt we investigate empirically if there are any significant differences in expenses or personnel between more centralized municipal governance forms (“Einheitsgemeinden”) or rather decentralized forms (“Verwaltungsgemeinschaften”). Our cross-section analysis for selected municipal activities reveals that both types are very similar in their cost and manning structures. Significant differences can be explained rather by different population densities than by the organizational structure. Considering these results we do not recommend a forced amalgamation of the municipalities in Saxony-Anhalt. Especially, if frustration cost or the political transaction cost, which both rise with centralization, are taken into account.
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Optimizing knowledge transfer by new employees in companies
Sidonia vonLedebur
Knowledge Management Research and Practice,
No. 4,
2007
Abstract
Companies realize innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. One possible source of innovative ideas are new employees. Based on an existing game-theoretic model the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analyzed. Offering knowledge to a colleague cannot be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives, which motivate the employees to act in favor of the company. The aim of this paper is to show what influences the propensity of the employees to engage in knowledge transfer and how the management can design the incentive structure for optimal transfer. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is at least partly generalized on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: too few or too many developers decrease the remaining company profit. A further result is that depending on the cost structure, perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company.
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Market Follows Standards
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Standards are an important part of the codified knowledge of a society. In contrast to industry standards, formal standards are created in a consensus-based procedure open to all interested parties. Only if an economic interest for application exists will formal standards be produced. Interested parties have to shoulder participation costs themselves, which enforces economic interest. Up to a certain extent, governments also trigger and finance formal standardisation processes through the new approach, which creates a framework that is filled by private activity. Standards stand at the end of intellectual property rights if the totality of the value chain of knowledge production is looked at. One important aspect is their accessibility and the inclusion of all necessary intellectual property rights, especially patents, at reasonable prices. Conversely, consortia may exclude groups from the use of their standards. By preventing the licensing of those patents included in a standard, they can effectively block market entry. Thus, “successful” standards often face antitrust problems. Formal standards reduce costs of production through economies of scale, economies of scope and network-economies. Goods and processes that are standardized signal quality, the inclusion of high technological standards and permanent presence in the markets, which again accelerates market dissemination. Firms face a dilemma: On the one hand, the penetration of a markets with industry standards offers potentials for high profits; on the other hand, this has to be balanced against the risk of failure, especially if clients are hesitant because they do not know which standard will be successful in the end. Formal standards create and stabilize trust markets. This is especially true in the area of globalisation. Europe, which has to face an enormous competition in the international knowledge economy, needs an institutionally efficient approach to formal standardisation. This contribution addresses future problems of the European standardisation that have been developed within the framework of a working group of the European Standardisation Organisation called Future Landscape of European Standardisation (FLES).
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Accounting for Distress in Bank Mergers
Michael Koetter, J. W. B. Bos, Frank Heid, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool, Daniel Porath
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.
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