Progressivity and Flexibility in Developing an Effective Competition Regime: Using Experiences of Poland, Ukraine, and South Africa for developing countries
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2006
Abstract
The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.
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Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis
Christian Growitsch, Heike Wetzel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
In the course of railway reforms in the end of the last century, national European governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies – companies owning a network and providing transport services – argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realise economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology. Our findings are that in a majority of European Railway companies exist economies of scope.
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The Magnitude of Distortions when Measuring Bank Efficiency with Misspecified Input Prices
Michael Koetter
Competition and Profitability in European Financial Services: Strategic, Systemic and Policy Issues,
2006
Abstract
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A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conditions of Knowledge Transfer by New Employees in Companies
Sidonia vonLedebur
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia. Based on a model by HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees to act in favour of the company by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an innovation
(before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is
that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere.
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Angewandte Industrieökonomik: Theorien, Modelle, Anwendungen
Ulrich Blum, Simone Müller, Andreas Weiske
,
2006
Abstract
Modern entrepreneurship comprises a mix of bourgeois morale and the striving for adventure: Bourgeois morale implies efficiency, reputation, the rule of the law. And adventure implies new frontiers, the spirit of competition, innovation and a pioneer’s attitude – up to the destruction of competitors. The modern entrepreneur’s social position thus is a ambiguous; the entrepreneur needs a special attitude with respect to economic activity as discussed by Werner Sombard (1913) and Max Weber (1905); society has to accept the positive ethical quality of profit seeking in order to survive. The modern theory of the enterprise promoted by neoclassic theory does not include any of these elements of real entrepreneurship. Industrial organisation theory tries to structure models closer to reality, thus allowing empirical testing. In many aspects, it is based on neoclassic theory, but also accepts the concept of strategic behaviour which includes potential reactions of other market participants in ones own activities. Elements of evolutionary economics, risk theory and modern information theory thus become important. The overarching question of the entrepreneur, who strives for a higher than normal profit in the market becomes: under which conditions should I enter the market and under which conditions will potential entrants do the same? How should I set my prizes and what reactions must I expect? How can I signal friendly behaviour to competitors? How can I differentiate myself from them? What importance do innovations and advertising have? The book roles out these questions in three large chapters on technology and market structure, on prize setting and signalling, and on research, development and innovation. An introduction explains individual behavioural patterns within the societal context – often in a historical perspective. Three methodological chapters introduce the reader into strategic thinking as the core aspect of the industrial organisation theory, the “old industrial organisation theory” and the neoclassic basic models. Each chapter is extended by exercises and tips for solutions.
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Conditions of knowledge transfer of new staff members in companies – a game theoretical analysis -
Sidonia vonLedebur
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. New knowledge is often produced at a different place from its implementation. Thus knowledge transfer is necessary. One possible transfer channel is the employment of people with distinct knowledge not yet available in a company. This study analyses the conditions of efficient transfer of new employees in companies with a game-theoretic model.
It is shown that a high additional reward in relation to the additional effort necessary for knowledge transfer enhances the transfer. But other incentives play a significant role as well, e.g. an adequate team size and a good working atmosphere.
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Measuring the Efficiency of Regional Innovation Systems – An Empirical Assessment
Michael Fritsch, Viktor Slavtchev
Freiberg Working Papers, Nr. 08-2006,
No. 8,
2006
Abstract
We measure the efficiency of regional innovation systems (RIS) in Germany by means of a knowledge production function. This function relates private sector Research and Development (R&D) in a region to the number of inventions that have been registered by residents of that region. Two approaches are followed. First, it is assumed that differences in the productivity of private sector R&D between regions affect the slope of the KPF, which represents the marginal productivity of R&D input. The second approach assesses regional differences within the framework of a stochastic frontier knowledge production function. This approach mainly reveals differences with regard to the intercept of the knowledge production function and, therefore, with regard to the average productivity. We compare the results of both approaches and discuss a number of critical issues such as the properties of the distribution of efficiencies, the appropriate size of RIS, and how to deal with the issue of spatial autocorrelation.
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The coalition treaty from a fiscal point of view
Kristina vanDeuverden
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2005
Abstract
After weeks of negotiations the coalition finally agreed on the conditions for their political work. Not surprisingly, the coalition agreement is complex and intransparent – with a multitude of single measures far away from a precise definition. Quantifying the programme and estimating resulting cash flows is currently difficult; official calculations are – if at all – only partly available. Anyhow, the contract will form the basis for economic policy during the next four years; therefore its evaluation by now is indispensable. The thin red line of the agreement – not astonishingly when considering the precarious financial situation of the public sector – is consolidation. However, more than 80% of the consolidation volume results from the revenue side. Though one third of this is due to the cutback of tax exemptions, the lion’s share comes from raising tax rates, mainly the VAT standard rate. In contrast, cutting back public expenditure is minor and the agreement clearly comes short of the Koch/Steinbrück proposal; even new tax reliefs are created. The consolidation is almost completely borne by private households. Enterprises as a whole are barely hit. However, they have to wait until 2008 for a reform of company taxation – one of the most pressing problems in this legislative period. To reduce the companies tax burden until the reform starts the conditions for tax depreciation are temporarily relaxed. Anyway, from an international point of view the statutory tax rate is an important signal to enterprises deciding where to invest. Lowering effective tax rates by changing depreciation conditions is intransparent and, thus, will be less effective. Furthermore savings within the public sector are planned to accomplish consolidation; 10 billion Euro should result from efficiency gains and reduced expenditure. Consolidation measures mainly focus on the budget of the federal government. However, Länder and communities will participate in the additional tax revenues. In contrast, social securities will loose – and therefore also the share of employment that is subject to social insurance contribution. Particularly the unemployment insurance will be burdened by the decrease of its premium rate. Besides, the federal government will reduce its grants to the pension funds and most notably the health system. The contract is dominated by fiscal constraints. Cyclical requirements are considered only cursory and pressing structural reforms are put off. The reforms of company’s taxation, of fiscal federalism, of the health system as well as a proceeding reform of the labour market are only proposed. How and when measures in these fields are realised will determine whether fiscal policy can set a new course.
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The (never) ending story of the truck toll system – a contract theory view
Niels Krap
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2005
Abstract
After long-lasting negotiations, representatives of the Federal Government and the consortium Toll Collect signed a 17,000 pages contract on 20 September, 2002. It was fixed that Toll Collect had to develop and afterwards operate a system for the automatic collection of a satellite-supported distance-based truck toll until the end of August 2003. However, technical difficulties in the development of the new system led to delays to an unexpected extent. In this article, it is examined whether the results of the renegotiations that followed were consistent to the economics of contract theory. It can be shown that both contracting parties were bound to the contractual relation, so that the preliminary termination of the contract by the Federal Minister of Transport on 17 February, 2004 became void by an agreement only few days later. Additionally, it could be identified that the contract set correct incentives for both parties, Federal Government and Toll Collect, and covered the possibility of efficient renegotiation.
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The role of municipalities in water management - a conference report
Peter Haug, Birger Nerré
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2005
Abstract
At the 7th July 2005, the IWH under the auspices of the department of urban economics hosted a conference on the perspectives of municipal business activity in the range of water supply and disposal. Primary concern of the event was to determine the future role of municipalities. The colloquium was directed towards scientists, practitioners and politicians acting in the range of water management. The contributions addressed a wide range of topics, with the following emphases: benchmarking of municipal economic activity, empirical analyses on the efficiency and the propensity to invest, the problem of spatial disparities within the supply of infrastructure, reform suggestions for the framework of rules of the German water management. The lectures were followed by a panel discussion, attended by representatives from politics, organizations and science.
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