Uncovered Workers in Plants Covered by Collective Bargaining: Who Are They and How Do They Fare?
Boris Hirsch, Philipp Lentge, Claus Schnabel
British Journal of Industrial Relations,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
Abstract In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 per cent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
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Early Child Care and Labor Supply of Lower-SES Mothers: A Randomized Controlled Trial
Henning Hermes, Marina Krauss, Philipp Lergetporer, Frauke Peter, Simon Wiederhold
CESifo Working Paper,
No. 10178,
2022
Abstract
We present experimental evidence that enabling access to universal early child care for families with lower socioeconomic status (SES) increases maternal labor supply. Our intervention provides families with customized help for child care applications, resulting in a large increase in enrollment among lower-SES families. The treatment increases lower-SES mothers' full-time employment rates by 9 percentage points (+160%), household income by 10%, and mothers' earnings by 22%. The effect on full-time employment is largely driven by increased care hours provided by child care centers and fathers. Overall, the treatment substantially improves intra-household gender equality in terms of child care duties and earnings.
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The Gender Reveal: The Effect of Sons on Young Fathers’ Criminal Behavior and Labor Market Activities
Kabir Dasgupta, André Diegmann, Tom Kirchmaier, Alexander Plum
Labour Economics,
October
2022
Abstract
Based on New Zealand’s administrative court charges data, we document child gender-specific differences in future criminal behavior of young fathers. The deterrent impact of having a son on the future likelihood of receiving convictions persists for as long as ten years post-childbirth. Utilizing population-wide monthly tax registers and Census data, we provide key insights into the role model hypothesis. We show that young fathers with a son have (i) a higher likelihood of being in employment, (ii) higher wages and salaries, (iii) lower benefit dependency, (iv) better qualification, and (v) a higher likelihood of being in a partnered relationship.
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29.09.2022 • 24/2022
The East German economy expanded strongly in the first half of 2022, but falls into recession in the second half of the year ‒ Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2022 and of Länder data from recent publications of the Statistical Office
The energy crisis is pushing the German economy into recession. This also affects the economy in East Germany. According to the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), East German production will expand at a slightly stronger rate of 1.5% than in Germany as a whole. For the coming year, the decline in East Germany is expected to be less pronounced than in the west at 0.1% (Germany: ‒0.4%). For 2024, the economists forecast a growth of 1.7% (Germany: 1.9%).
Oliver Holtemöller
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29.09.2022 • 23/2022
Joint Economic Forecast 2/2022: Energy crisis: inflation, recession, welfare loss
The crisis on the gas markets is having a severe impact on the German economy. Soaring gas prices are drastically increasing energy costs, leading to a massive reduction of the purchasing power. Despite a decline in the second half of the year, gross domestic product is expected to expand by 1.4% this year. For the coming year, the institutes expect a contraction by 0.4%, followed by an increase of 1.9% in 2024.
Oliver Holtemöller
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17.08.2022 • 19/2022
Labour mobility is part of structural change
The coal phase-out will also change the affected regions in that part of the workforce will migrate. Politicians should take this process into account in structural policy, because it cannot be completely prevented. A study published by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) illustrates this with a historical example.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Do Firms Respond to Gender Pay Gap Transparency?
Morten Bennedsen, Elena Simintzi, Margarita Tsoutsoura, Daniel Wolfenzon
Journal of Finance,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
We examine the effect of pay transparency on the gender pay gap and firm outcomes. Using a 2006 legislation change in Denmark that requires firms to provide gender-disaggregated wage statistics, detailed employee-employer administrative data, and difference-in-differences and difference-in-discontinuities designs, we find that the law reduces the gender pay gap, primarily by slowing wage growth for male employees. The gender pay gap declines by 2 percentage points, or 13% relative to the prelegislation mean. Despite the reduction of the overall wage bill, the wage transparency mandate does not affect firm profitability, likely because of the offsetting effect of reduced firm productivity.
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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
Economic Inquiry,
No. 3,
2022
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks see less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost when more distressed banks remain in business. In these regions, the banking sector has been less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks.
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On the Employment Consequences of Automation and Offshoring: A Labor Market Sorting View
Ester Faia, Sébastien Laffitte, Maximilian Mayer, Gianmarco Ottaviano
Lili Yan Ing, Gene M. Grossman (eds), Robots and AI: A New Economic Era. Routledge: London,
2022
Abstract
We argue that automation may make workers and firms more selective in matching their specialized skills and tasks. We call this phenomenon “core-biased technological change”, and wonder whether something similar could be relevant also for offshoring. Looking for evidence in occupational data for European industries, we find that automation increases workers’ and firms’ selectivity as captured by longer unemployment duration, less skill-task mismatch, and more concentration of specialized knowledge in specific tasks. This does not happen in the case of offshoring, though offshoring reinforces the effects of automation. We show that a labor market model with two-sided heterogeneity and search frictions can rationalize these empirical findings if automation strengthens while offshoring weakens the assortativity between workers’ skills and firms’ tasks in the production process, and automation and offshoring complement each other. Under these conditions, automation decreases employment and increases wage inequality whereas offshoring has opposite effects.
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Offshoring, Domestic Employment and Production. Evidence from the German International Sourcing Survey
Wolfhard Kaus, Markus Zimmermann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 14,
2022
Abstract
This paper analyses the effect of offshoring (i.e., the relocation of activities previously performed in-house to foreign countries) on various firm outcomes (domestic employment, production, and productivity). It uses data from the International Sourcing Survey (ISS) 2017 for Germany, linked to other firm level data such as business register and ITGS data. First, we find that offshoring is a rare event: In the sample of firms with 50 or more persons employed, only about 3% of manufacturing firms and 1% of business service firms have performed offshoring in the period 2014-2016. Second, difference-in-differences propensity score matching estimates reveal a negative effect of offshoring on domestic employment and production. Most of this negative effect is not because the offshoring firms shrink, but rather because they don’t grow as fast as the non-offshoring firms. We further decompose the underlying employment dynamics by using direct survey evidence on how many jobs the firms destroyed/created due to offshoring. Moreover, we do not find an effect on labour productivity, since the negative effect on domestic employment and production are more or less of the same size. Third, the German data confirm previous findings for Denmark that offshoring is associated with an increase in the share of ‘produced goods imports’, i.e. offshoring firms increase their imports for the same goods they continue to produce domestically. In contrast, it is not the case that offshoring firms increase the share of intermediate goods imports (a commonly used proxy for offshoring), as defined by the BEC Rev. 5 classification.
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