Zur Wirtschaftspolitik: Strukturreformen auch in Deutschland erforderlich!
Oliver Holtemöller, Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner, Götz Zeddies
Konjunktur aktuell,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
Die günstige konjunkturelle Lage in Deutschland scheint der Wirtschaftspolitik den Blick auf die mittel- bis langfristigen Probleme zu verstellen. Im Bereich der Finanzpolitik liegt der Fokus derzeit auf der Ausweitung von Sozialleistungen. Wachstumsfreundliche Maßnahmen stehen hinten an. Zwar plant die neue Koalition zusätzliche investive Ausgaben, die grundsätzlich das Produktionspotenzial erhöhen könnten. Aber die konsumtiven Ausgaben stehen eindeutig im Vordergrund. Das wichtige Thema der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen wird auf die lange Bank geschoben, obwohl das Auslaufen der aktuellen Regeln Dringlichkeit gebietet und die Anreizprobleme des aktuellen Länderfinanzausgleichs offenkundig sind. Letztere könnten durch eine höhere Steuerautonomie der Bundesländer, etwa durch Zuschlagsrechte bei der Einkommensteuer, abgemildert werden. Im Bereich der Geldpolitik besteht derzeit die Gefahr, dass das mittelfristige Inflationsziel unterschritten wird. Es gibt zwar noch einige geldpolitische Instrumente, die für zusätzliche Liquiditätsbereitstellung genutzt werden könnten. Allerdings ist die Wirkung der Maßnahmen durch Probleme im Bankensektor derzeit gestört. Deshalb hat der im Jahr 2014 anstehende Stresstest eine hohe Bedeutung für die Wiederherstellung des Vertrauens im Bankensektor. Die Bankenunion sollte beherzt vollendet und nicht durch immer weitere Abstriche in ihrer Wirkung gefährdet werden. Die Europäische Kommission untersucht, ob der hohe deutsche Leistungsbilanzüberschuss auf ein gesamtwirtschaftliches Ungleichgewicht hinweist. Gegenwärtig gibt es allerdings kaum Anzeichen dafür, dass die gesamtwirtschaftliche Lage in Deutschland ungleichgewichtig ist. Der Leistungsbilanzüberschuss erklärt sich daraus, dass in einer alternden Gesellschaft wie der deutschen viel gespart wird und auch wegen der in Zukunft zu erwartenden Knappheit des Faktors Arbeit nicht genug rentierliche Investitionsprojekte im Land zu finden sind. Aus dieser Perspektive steht die Wirtschaftspolitik vor zwei Aufgaben: zum einen, die Risiken ungleichgewichtiger wirtschaftlicher Entwicklungen im Ausland für die Zukunft zu senken, um deutsche Anlagen vor Wertverlusten zu schützen. Zum anderen würde eine erfolgreiche Zuwanderungs- und Integrationspolitik über bessere langfristige Wachstumsperspektiven auch die Attraktivität von Investitionen im Inland erhöhen.
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Liquidity in the Liquidity Crisis: Evidence from Divisia Monetary Aggregates in Germany and the European Crisis Countries
Makram El-Shagi
Economics Bulletin,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
While there has been much discussion of the role of liquidity in the recent financial crises, there has been little discussion of the use of macroeconomic aggregation techniques to measure total liquidity available to the market. In this paper, we provide an approximation of the liquidity development in six Euro area countries from 2003 to 2013. We show that properly measured monetary aggregates contain significant information about liquidity risk.
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Estimating Monetary Policy Rules when the Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates is Approached
Konstantin Kiesel, M. H. Wolters
Kiel Working Papers, No. 1898,
2014
Abstract
Monetary policy rule parameters estimated with conventional estimation techniques can be severely biased if the estimation sample includes periods of low interest rates. Nominal interest rates cannot be negative, so that censored regression methods like Tobit estimation have to be used to achieve unbiased estimates. We use IV-Tobit regression to estimate monetary policy responses for Japan, the US and the Euro area. The estimation results show that the bias of conventional estimation methods is sizeable for the inflation response parameter, while it is very small for the output gap response and the interest rate smoothing parameter. We demonstrate how IV-Tobit estimation can be used to study how policy responses change when the zero lower bound is approached. Further, we show how one can use the IV-Tobit approach to distinguish between desired policy responses, that the central bank would implement if there was no zero lower bound, and the actual ones and provide estimates of both.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View
Claudia M. Buch, Michael Koetter, Jana Ohls
Abstract
In this paper, we use detailed data on the sovereign debt holdings of all German banks to analyse the determinants of sovereign debt exposures and the implications of sovereign exposures for bank risk. Our main findings are as follows. First, sovereign bond holdings are heterogeneous across banks. Larger, weakly capitalised banks and banks with a small depositor base hold more sovereign bonds. Around 31% of all German banks hold no sovereign bonds at all. Second, the sensitivity of banks to macroeconomic factors increased significantly in the post-Lehman period. Banks hold more bonds from euro area countries, from low-inflation countries, and from countries with high sovereign bond yields. Third, there has been no marked impact of sovereign bond holdings on bank risk. This result could indicate the widespread absence of marking-to-market for sovereign bond holdings at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
German Council of Economic Experts Working Paper 02/2013,
No. 2,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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Flight Patterns and Yields of European Government Bonds
Gregor von Schweinitz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2013
Abstract
The current European Debt Crisis has led to a reinforced effort to identify the sources of risk and their influence on yields of European Government Bonds. Until now, the potentially nonlinear influence and the theoretical need for interactions reflecting flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity has been widely disregarded. I estimate government bond yields of the Euro-12 countries without Luxembourg from May 2003 until December 2011. Using penalized spline regression, I find that the effect of most explanatory variables is highly nonlinear. These nonlinearities, together with flight patterns of flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity, can explain the co-movement of bond yields until September 2008 and the huge amount of differentiation during the financial and the European debt crisis without the unnecessary assumption of a structural break. The main effects are credit risk and flight-to-liquidity, while the evidence for the existence of flight-to-quality and liquidity risk (the latter measured by the bid-ask spread and total turnover of bonds) is comparably weak.
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