Gender Pay Gap in American CFOs: Theory and Evidence
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Gayane Hovakimian, Zenu Sharma
Journal of Corporate Finance,
June
2023
Abstract
Studies document persistent unexplained gender-based wage gap in labor markets. At the executive level, where skill and education are similar, career interruptions and differences in risk preferences primarily explain the extant gender-based pay gap. This study focuses on CFO compensation contracts of Execucomp firms (1992–2020) and finds no gender-based pay gap. This paper offers several explanations for this phenomenon, such as novel evidence on the risk preferences of females with financial expertise and changes in the social and regulatory climate.
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Revealing Corruption: Firm and Worker Level Evidence from Brazil
Emanuele Colonnelli, Spyridon Lagaras, Jacopo Ponticelli, Mounu Prem, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 3,
2022
Abstract
We study how the disclosure of corrupt practices affects the growth of firms involved in illegal interactions with the government using randomized audits of public procurement in Brazil. On average, firms exposed by the anti-corruption program grow larger after the audits, despite experiencing a decrease in procurement contracts. We manually collect new data on the details of thousands of corruption cases, through which we uncover a large heterogeneity in our firm-level effects depending on the degree of involvement in corruption. Using investment-, loan-, and worker- level data, we show that the average exposed firms adapt to the loss of government contracts by changing their investment strategy. They increase capital investment and borrow more to finance such investment, while there is no change in their internal organization. We provide qualitative support to our results by conducting new face-to-face surveys with business owners of government-dependent firms.
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