What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Funding
Claus Michelsen, Dominik Weiß
Post-Communist Economies,
2010
Abstract
The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.
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Poland Weathers the Crisis
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2009
Abstract
Expansion of economic activity in Poland in 2009 continued at a markedly lower level compared to previous years, but despite the falling external and domestic demand, economic recession did not happen until now. Early stabilisation measures, supported also by the European Community (EC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), helped to avoid substantial instabilities in the financial sector. It seems that Poland is not as hardly affected by the financial crisis as other countries. Unlike previous years, now net exports were the main driving force for growth – they more than compensated the decrease in domestic demand.
Unemployment had risen up from the lowest level in the last decade, but still moderately due to measures of job security. Given the further shrinking labour demand, unemployment will increase despite modest economic activity. Fiscal policy has to meet challenges under the current economic crises: Excess expenditure and deficiency in receipts will deteriorate general government deficit in 2009 and 2010. Without adopted consolidation strategy, Polish convergence to the Euro area will have to be postponed.
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What Happened to the East German Housing Market? – A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Funding –
Claus Michelsen, Dominik Weiß
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 20,
2009
Abstract
The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.
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Can Fixed Exchange Rates Discipline Fiscal Policy?
Makram El-Shagi
CEGE Diskussionspapier Nr. 84,
2009
Abstract
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Tentative Recovery, Public Debt on the Rise
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
2. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In autumn 2009, the world economy appears to be growing again. The situation has improved mainly because drastic measures of central banks and governments stabilized the financial sector. More recently, the real economy is supported by fiscal programs taking effect. However, recoveries are usually slow if, as it is the case now, recessions have been intertwined with banking and housing crises. Thus, the industrial economies will not gain much dynamics this year and next, while chances for an upswing in emerging economies are much better.
The German economy stabilized during summer as well, with remarkably robust private consumption. An upswing, however, is, due to several factors, not in sight: Some important export markets will not rebound quickly, and consumption will be dampened by rising unemployment that, up to now, has been contained, not least with the aid of short-term working schemes. All in all, production shrinks by 5% in 2009 and will increase by no more than 1.2% next year. Public deficits are on the rise, with (in relation to GDP) 3.2% this year and 5.2% in 2010.
A credit crunch due to deteriorating balance sheets of banks is a major risk for the German economy. Policy should address this problem by making sure that equity ratios are sufficiently high. One way would be to impose public capital on banks that do not comply with certain regulatory ratios. These should be higher than the ones presently in force. Fiscal policy should begin consolidating in 2011, mainly by dampening the rise of expenditures. Tax cuts are only justified if they are accompanied by very ambitious spending cuts.
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German Economy Drawn into the World Recession
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
1. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In spring 2009, the world economy is in a deep recession. The intensification of the financial crisis in autumn has caused a sharp contraction of demand. The reaction of monetary and fiscal policy was substantial, but up to now (April 2009), it has not succeeded in restoring confidence of economic agents. Although some leading indicators point to a stabilization of production in the coming quarters, the downturn will not come to an end before next winter, because the financial crisis will continue to put strain on the real economy for some time to come.
The German economy is in its deepest recession since the foundation of the Federal Republic. Germany is particularly affected, because at the core of the economy is the production of those goods for that world demand has collapsed most: capital goods and high-quality consumer durables. While exports and private investment activity will continue to shrink this year (albeit at a slower rate), private consumption will be a stabilizing factor for some time, as will public investment activity in the second half of the year. Later in 2009 and in 2010, rising unemployment will depress consumption, while in this forecast, it is assumed that exports and investment slowly recover in 2010, because the financial turmoil will calm down.
For economic policy, a recapitalization of the banking sector should have priority. The ECB should lower its key interest rate to 0.5%. Given the sharply increasing fiscal deficits, a new, third fiscal program would be counterproductive. Only if monetary policy fails to stabilize the economy, further fiscal measures, coordinated at a European level, should be considered.
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The New EU Members on the Verge of Disaster: What to Do?
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
The long lasting, but externally financed boom in the new EU countries has collapsed under the impacts of the global financial crisis. The countries’ fiscal and monetary authorizes do not seem to be able to effectively resist – a deep crisis is under way. The situation is particularly dramatic in the Baltic countries, where the hands of the monetary authority are institutionally tied, and an expansionary fiscal policy would trigger off speculative attacks on the exchange rate. Neither the maintaining of the currency board arrangement nor an ‘emergency access’ to the Euro zone would help. The other non-Euro members of the Union still aim to adopt the Euro in the next future and, thus, are reluctant to give up the Maastricht criteria. The Euro countries Slovakia and Slovenia might face a major deterioration of their credit rating if governments would attempt to increase fiscal deficits. All in all, two problems are to be solved: first, the external provision of liquidity to their economies and, second, an approach that anchors policies in the countries against economic nationalism, which is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. We propose a combination of a reformed exchange rate mechanism with a stability and solidarity fund for all countries. The former would help to avoid too strong depreciations and the latter would provide liquidity to stabilize the exchange rate and the entire economy.
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Business Cycle Forecast 2009: World Financial Crisis Triggers Deep Recession in Germany
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
At the beginning of 2009, the major industrialized economies are in recession. The financial turmoil has developed into a crisis of confidence to and solvency of the financial sector, raising financing costs and lowering the value of assets for firms and households. Monetary and fiscal policies have reacted strongly, but they will not succeed in ending the recession until the financial sectors in the US and in Western Europe have stabilized. This forecast is made under the assumption that stabilization will start in the second half of 2009 because the continued protection of important financial institutions by governments will restore confidence – albeit at a low level – and because at this time, the fall of US-house prices will start to fade off.
The German economy is hit particularly hard, because the financial crisis depresses worldwide investment demand and the sectors producing investment goods are at the heart of the German economy. The recession will not end before the second half of 2009, and capacity utilization will decrease throughout the year. We expect a tentative revival to begin in a recovery of exports. While private investment will shrink markedly, consumption of private households and the government as well as public investment will dampen the downturn. GDP will shrink by 1.9% in Germany and in East Germany by 1.5% because this region is less dependent on exports.
Economic policy has to help restoring confidence, and this can only be achieved if it behaves in a consistent and predictable way.
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