Race to the Market: Can Standards Survive the Acceleration of Innovation and Product Life Cycles?
Ulrich Blum
Spatial Dispersed Production and Network Governance, Papers Presented at the 11th Uddevalla Symposium, 15 – 17. May 2008, Kyoto, Research Report 2008,
2008
Abstract
Plagiarism of emerging market countries has for a considerable time been seen as the main challenge to the western approach of codifying and securing intellectual property rights (IPRs). This neglects the fact that historically all countries which tried to converge to the level of successful economies copied technology. The discussion shadows our view that the more imminent question is whether the steady increase in competition intensity which shortens product life cycles and puts pressure on the invention and innovation system, provides enough time to patent and to standardize. As patent activity not only provides incentives for sinking costs into R&D but is also a first step in the dissemination of technologies, and as standards, especially formal standards, generate level playing fields in broad and reliable markets, this may be critical in the long run. Furthermore, the migration of technologies as a result of a steady reorganization of the spatial division of labor may lead to the adverse situation that countries harboring technologies do not have appropriate institutions for knowledge codification.
Exogenous factors that – at least in the short run – cannot be influenced by the standardization bodies are the level of cooperation among interested parties (and mutual trust and institutional linkage), the competitiveness of the technology, the ability to generate externalities by knowledge codification, and the productivity of the technologies. The most important single success factor that standardization bodies can influence is the speed with which a committee proceeds to timely publish formal standards. With reference to a game-theoretical model and based on data for 1997 and 2007 on published formal standards, we show that until now, standardization bodies seem to have successfully coped with the situation.
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Globalisation Forces an Acceleration of Standardization Processes
Ulrich Blum, Henry Dannenberg
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2008
Abstract
The increase in the intensity of competition in recent years, especially in markets for industrial products, has increased the pressure for businesses to innovate. This finds expression in an accelerated introduction of new products and processes, leading to a shortening of product life cycles. Equally, the pressure to innovate also increased the pressure on research and development processes of businesses.
For this reason, the patent system and the standardization system get under pressure, because these systems for codifying and saving intellectual property rights need time for necessary inspections and to reach a consensus on different proposed specifications. This article focuses on the standardization system. Under the condition of temporal pressure, there are three possibilities for standardization: abstaining from standardization, switch to non consensus-based industrial standardization or accelerate the standardization process. This article examines if standardization organisations have successfully accelerated their processes to survive in the sandwich position between shortened product cycles and accelerated market introduction of products. It turns out that the acceleration has succeeded – through a series of institutional reforms, such as a prioritization of international before the national standards by the beginning and middle of the last decade agreements.
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Market Follows Standards
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2007
Abstract
Standards are an important part of the codified knowledge of a society. In contrast to industry standards, formal standards are created in a consensus-based procedure open to all interested parties. Only if an economic interest for application exists will formal standards be produced. Interested parties have to shoulder participation costs themselves, which enforces economic interest. Up to a certain extent, governments also trigger and finance formal standardisation processes through the new approach, which creates a framework that is filled by private activity. Standards stand at the end of intellectual property rights if the totality of the value chain of knowledge production is looked at. One important aspect is their accessibility and the inclusion of all necessary intellectual property rights, especially patents, at reasonable prices. Conversely, consortia may exclude groups from the use of their standards. By preventing the licensing of those patents included in a standard, they can effectively block market entry. Thus, “successful” standards often face antitrust problems. Formal standards reduce costs of production through economies of scale, economies of scope and network-economies. Goods and processes that are standardized signal quality, the inclusion of high technological standards and permanent presence in the markets, which again accelerates market dissemination. Firms face a dilemma: On the one hand, the penetration of a markets with industry standards offers potentials for high profits; on the other hand, this has to be balanced against the risk of failure, especially if clients are hesitant because they do not know which standard will be successful in the end. Formal standards create and stabilize trust markets. This is especially true in the area of globalisation. Europe, which has to face an enormous competition in the international knowledge economy, needs an institutionally efficient approach to formal standardisation. This contribution addresses future problems of the European standardisation that have been developed within the framework of a working group of the European Standardisation Organisation called Future Landscape of European Standardisation (FLES).
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The Challenges of the Furture
Ulrich Blum
Standardization Future Conference,
2005
Abstract
Requirements for a global standardization systems are proposed with a special focus on intellectual property rights. Standards possess a strong upstream relationship to patents which must be cleared and accessible, and an important downstream aspect as their copyright must be secured. This is of special importance with respect to the definition of long-term technological roadmaps.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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Property networks of corporations as cause of abusive behaviour – A stock market analysis based on institutional economics
Makram El-Shagi
Applied Financial Economics Letters,
No. 5,
2005
Abstract
The present study deals with the fact that it seems as if executive boards have developed a self-service-mentality concerning the corporations they are meant to manage. The surprise about this is not the attempt of exploitation (rather the opposite would be surprising from an economic point of view) but the apparent absence of sanctions imposed by the owners. This study shows that this behaviour of corporations’ owners is at least to a main part due to the fact, that the reciprocal property of corporations prevents the exercise of certain property rights by the ‘true’ holders.
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The Role of Intellectual Property Rights Regimes for R&D Cooperation between Industry and Academia
Ulrich Blum, S. Müller
Academia-Business Links,
2004
Abstract
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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