Network investment and the threat of regulation: avoiding monopoly or infrastructure extension
Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
In summer 2005, Deutsche Telekom announced its plans for the buildup of a new fiber glass network. At the same time, it formulated the condition that this network was not to be regulated concerning pricing or use by other providers (network access). In order to make this investment possible, in its coalition treaty the big coalition agreed to exclude the new network from the ex-ante regulation and to include this freedom from regulation in the telecommunication law. The question is now how investments can be facilitated and, at the same time, welfare losses through monopoly gains can be avoided. Applying game theory, it can be shown that a regulation authority like the ‘Bundesnetzagentur’, which is responsible for German telecommunication sector, should signal an increasing tolerance for deviations from its calculated and determined regulatory price in the face of increasing uncertainty concerning expected cost and returns. Thus, the threat of regulation alone leads to tolerable prices, without the actual regulation taking place. In the future, the ‘Bundesnetzagentur’ should reduce information asymmetries and the optimal level of tolerance in order to achieve a more precise intervention price and a more effective threat of regulation. The effectiveness of such a threat decreases if the legislation prevents the regulation authority from using this instrument by law. Against this background, the recent Federal Government resolution from March 17th 2006 noveling the telecommunication law heads for the economically right direction but it has to prove its incentive compatibility in the daily legal practice.
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Determinants of employment - the macroeconomic view
Christian Dreger, Heinz P. Galler, Ulrich (eds) Walwai
Schriften des IWH,
No. 22,
2005
Abstract
The weak performance of the German labour market over the past years has led to a significant unemployment problem. Currently, on average 4.5 mio. people are without a job contract, and a large part of them are long-term unemployed. A longer period of unemployment reduces their employability and aggravates the problem of social exclusion.
The factors driving the evolution of employment have been recently discussed on the workshop Determinanten der Beschäftigung – die makroökonomische Sicht organized jointly by the IAB, Nuremberg, and the IWH, Halle. The present volume contains the papers and proceedings to the policy oriented workshop held in November 2004, 15-16th. The main focus of the contributions is twofold. First, macroeconomic conditions to stimulate output and employment are considered. Second, the impacts of the increasing tax wedge between labour costs and the take home pay are emphasized. In particular, the role of the contributions to the social security system is investigated.
In his introductory address, Ulrich Walwei (IAB) links the unemployment experience to the modest path of economic growth in Germany. In addition, the low employment intensity of GDP growth and the temporary standstill of the convergence process of the East German economy have contributed to the weak labour market performance. In his analysis, Gebhard Flaig (ifo Institute, München) stresses the importance of relative factor price developments. A higher rate of wage growth leads to a decrease of the employment intensity of production, and correspondingly to an increase of the threshold of employment. Christian Dreger (IWH) discusses the relevance of labour market institutions like employment protection legislation and the structure of the wage bargaining process on the labour market outcome. Compared to the current setting, policies should try to introduce more flexibility in labour markets to improve the employment record. The impact of interest rate shocks on production is examined by the paper of Boris Hofmann (Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt). According to the empirical evidence, monetary policy cannot explain the modest economic performance in Germany. György Barabas and Roland Döhrn (RWI Essen) have simulated the effects of a world trade shock on output and employment. The relationships have been fairly stable over the past years, even in light of the increasing globalization. Income and employment effects of the German tax reform in 2000 are discussed by Peter Haan and Viktor Steiner (DIW Berlin). On the base of a microsimulation model, household gains are determined. Also, a positive relationship between wages and labour supply can be established. Michael Feil und Gerd Zika (IAB) have examined the employment effects of a reduction of the contribution rates to the social security system. To obtain robust results, the analysis is done under alternative financing scenarios and with different macroeconometric models. The impacts of allowances of social security contributions on the incentives to work are discussed by Wolfgang Meister and Wolfgang Ochel (ifo München). According to their study, willingness to work is expected to increase especially at the lower end of the income distribution. The implied loss of contributions could be financed by higher taxes.
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The coalition treaty from a fiscal point of view
Kristina vanDeuverden
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2005
Abstract
After weeks of negotiations the coalition finally agreed on the conditions for their political work. Not surprisingly, the coalition agreement is complex and intransparent – with a multitude of single measures far away from a precise definition. Quantifying the programme and estimating resulting cash flows is currently difficult; official calculations are – if at all – only partly available. Anyhow, the contract will form the basis for economic policy during the next four years; therefore its evaluation by now is indispensable. The thin red line of the agreement – not astonishingly when considering the precarious financial situation of the public sector – is consolidation. However, more than 80% of the consolidation volume results from the revenue side. Though one third of this is due to the cutback of tax exemptions, the lion’s share comes from raising tax rates, mainly the VAT standard rate. In contrast, cutting back public expenditure is minor and the agreement clearly comes short of the Koch/Steinbrück proposal; even new tax reliefs are created. The consolidation is almost completely borne by private households. Enterprises as a whole are barely hit. However, they have to wait until 2008 for a reform of company taxation – one of the most pressing problems in this legislative period. To reduce the companies tax burden until the reform starts the conditions for tax depreciation are temporarily relaxed. Anyway, from an international point of view the statutory tax rate is an important signal to enterprises deciding where to invest. Lowering effective tax rates by changing depreciation conditions is intransparent and, thus, will be less effective. Furthermore savings within the public sector are planned to accomplish consolidation; 10 billion Euro should result from efficiency gains and reduced expenditure. Consolidation measures mainly focus on the budget of the federal government. However, Länder and communities will participate in the additional tax revenues. In contrast, social securities will loose – and therefore also the share of employment that is subject to social insurance contribution. Particularly the unemployment insurance will be burdened by the decrease of its premium rate. Besides, the federal government will reduce its grants to the pension funds and most notably the health system. The contract is dominated by fiscal constraints. Cyclical requirements are considered only cursory and pressing structural reforms are put off. The reforms of company’s taxation, of fiscal federalism, of the health system as well as a proceeding reform of the labour market are only proposed. How and when measures in these fields are realised will determine whether fiscal policy can set a new course.
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The Impact of Institutions on the Employment Performance in European Labour Markets
Herbert S. Buscher, Christian Dreger, Raúl Ramos, Jordi Surinach
Discussion Paper No. 1732,
2005
Abstract
The paper investigates the role of institutions for labor market performance across European countries. As participation rates have been rather stable over the past, the unemployment problem is mainly caused by shortages in labor demand. Labor demand is expressed by its structural parameters, such as the elasticities of employment to output and factor prices. Institutional variables include employment protection legislation, the structure of wage bargaining, measures describing the tax and transfer system and active labor market policies. As cointegration between employment, output and factor prices is detected, labor demand equations are fitted in levels by efficient estimation techniques. Then, labor demand elasticities are explained by institutions using panel fixed effects regressions. The results suggest that higher flexibility and incentives of households to work appear to be appropriate strategies to improve the employment record. The employment response to economic conditions is stronger in a more deregulated environment, and the absorption of shocks can be relieved.
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Competition Policy in Central Eastern Europe in the Light of EU Accession
Jens Hölscher
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
This study reviews the progress made in EU accession candidates on competition policy. The analysis shows that institution-building and legislation are well under way and that anti-trust practice is not too lax. Due to the diversity among the accession countries under review, the study finds that the strictly rule-based frame work of the EU might not be the most favourable solution for some candidates: firstly, the small and open economies of most candidates make it particularly difficult to define the ‘relevant market’ in competition cases. Secondly, the traditionally intense vertical integration of production in accession states calls for a reassessment of ‘vertical restraints’. The policy implications of this study suggest that the EU competition task force should take a proactive, case-by-case approach vis-à-vis its new members.
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Competition Policy in Central East Europe in light of EU Accession
Johannes Stephan
Journal of Common Market Studies,
2004
Abstract
This study reviews the progress made in EU accession candidates on competition policy. The analysis shows that institution-building and legislation are well under way and that anti-trust practice is not too lax. Due to the diversity among the accession countries under review, the study finds that the strictly rule-based frame work of the EU might not be the most favourable solution for some candidates: firstly, the small and open economies of most candidates make it particularly difficult to define the ‘relevant market’ in competition cases. Secondly, the traditionally intense vertical integration of production in accession states calls for a reassessment of ‘vertical restraints’. The policy implications of this study suggest that the EU competition task force should take a proactive, case-by-case approach vis-à-vis its new members.
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Merger Control and Competition Policy in Central East Europe in view
Johannes Stephan
ICFAI Journal of International Business Law,
2003
Abstract
This study reviews the progress made in EU accession candidates with respect to competition policy. The analysis shows that institution building and legislation is well under way and that anti-trust practise is not too lax. Due to the diversity among the accession countries under review, the study finds that the strictly rule-based framework of the EU might not represent the most favourable solution for some candidates: firstly, the small and open economies of most candidates make it particularly difficult to define the “relevant market” in competition cases. Secondly, the traditionally intense vertical integration of production in accession states calls for a reassessment of “vertical restraints”. The policy implications of this study suggest that the EU competition task force should take a rather proactive, case-by-case approach vis-à-vis its new members.
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