Editorial
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2006
Abstract
Herr Trichet hat die Europäer auf Zinserhöhungen ab Anfang August eingestellt. Die Ankündigung weiterer Zinsanhebungen wird mit den gestiegenen Inflationsrisiken im Euro-Raum begründet. Die Furcht vor einer höheren Inflation haben die Zentralbanker ausschließlich aus der monetären Analyse gewonnen, d. h. aus der Betrachtung der Geldmengen- und Kreditentwicklung im Euro-Raum. Sie wird quantitativ mit einem Modell unterlegt, welches einen engen Zusammenhang zwischen Geldmengenwachstum und folgender Inflation postuliert. Das Prognosemodell hat in der Vergangenheit die tatsächliche Inflationsrate aber meistens überzeichnet, manchmal auch unterzeichnet. Die Abweichungen liegen zwischen -0,2 und 0,5 Prozentpunkte, was bei einem Inflationsziel von 2% eine durchaus beträchtliche Fehlerquote ist und damit zu Fehlentscheidungen beitragen kann.
Read article
Who Invests in Training if Contracts are Temporary? - Empirical Evidence for Germany Using Selection Correction
Jan Sauermann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 14,
2006
Abstract
This study deals with the effect of fixed-term contracts on work-related training. Though previous studies found a negative effect of fixed-term contracts on the participation in training, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether workers with fixed-term contracts receive less or more training, compared to workers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature, we especially distinguish between employer- and employee-financed training in order to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and firm. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we estimate a bivariate probit model to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors, affecting both participation in training and holding fixed-term contracts. Finding negative effects for employer-sponsored, as well as for employee-sponsored training, leads us to conclude that workers with fixed-term contracts do not compensate for lower firm investments.
Read article
Export und Beschäftigung in der ostdeutschen Industrie – ein betrieblicher Längsschnitt
Brigitte Loose, Udo Ludwig
Contribution to IWH Volume,
aus: Beschäftigungsanalysen mit den Daten des IAB-Betriebspanels – Tagungsband zum Workshop des IAB und IWH 2005
2006
Abstract
Gestützt auf verschiedene Erklärungsansätze der traditionellen und neueren Außenhandelstheorien wird untersucht, warum Betriebe des ostdeutschen Verarbeitenden Gewerbes im Exportgeschäft Fuß gefasst haben und welchen Einfluss dieser Geschäftsbereich auf Umsatz und Beschäftigung hat. Im Rahmen einer Längsschnittanalyse der Daten aus den Befragungswellen des IAB-Betriebspanels von 1999 bis 2004 wird dazu zwischen Betrieben unterschieden, die dauerhaft Exportgeschäfte betreiben, gelegentlich exportieren oder nur in Deutschland aktiv sind. Es zeigt sich, dass der Umsatz der dauerhaft oder gelegentlich exportierenden Betriebe kräftig expandierte und diese Betriebe die Beschäftigtenzahl erhöht haben, während die ausschließlich im Inland agierenden Betriebe ihre Umsätze wegen der schwachen Binnenkonjunktur in Deutschland nicht steigern konnten und die Beschäftigung stagnierte. Die Exporteure heben sich von den anderen Betrieben, wie aus der Untersuchung der betrieblichen Determinanten der Exportentwicklung mit einem binären und multinomialen Logit-Modell hervorgeht, durch eine größere Investitions- und Innovationsaktivität sowie einen höheren Qualifikationsgrad der Beschäftigten ab. Sie waren zugleich überdurchschnittlich groß und häufiger im Besitz ausländischer Investoren.
Read article
Original Sin - Analysing Its Mechanics and a proposed Remedy in a Simple Macroeconomic Model
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2006
Abstract
This paper analyses the problem of “original sin“ (the fact that the currency of an emerging market economy usually cannot be used to borrow abroad) in a simple thirdgeneration model of currency crises. The approach differs from alternative frameworks by explicitly modeling the price setting behavior of firms if prices are sticky and the future exchange rate is uncertain. Monetary policy optimally trades off effects on price competitiveness and on debt burdens of firms. It is shown that the proposal by Eichengreen and Hausmann of creating an artificial basket currency as denominator of debt is attractive as a provision against contagion.
Read article
The Loss Distribution of the Entrepreneurial Bad Debt Risk – a Simulation-based Model
Henry Dannenberg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2006
Abstract
The risk of bad debt losses evolves for companies which grant payment targets. Possible losses have to be covered by these companies equity and liquidity reserves. The question of how to quantify the level of risk of bad debt losses will be discussed in this paper. Input values of this risk are the probability of default, exposure at default and loss given default. It is shown how companies can derive probability functions to describe uncertainty and variability for each input value. Based on these probability functions a simulation model is developed to quantify the risk of bad debt losses. Based on an empirical study probability functions for probability of default and loss given default are presented.
Read article
Does Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
Read article
Forced to Freedom? Empirical Relations between Aid and Economic Freedom
Tobias Knedlik, Franz Kronthaler
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 8,
2006
Abstract
The paper explores the relationships between economic freedom on the one side and development aid and IMF credit as approximation for conditional aid on the other side. After a short review of current literature on the issue of economic development, economic freedom, aid, and IMF credit, the paper develops a simple panel regression model to evaluate the relationship between “economic freedom” as dependent variable and “aid” and “IMF credit” as independent variables. The estimation is based upon data taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom. In contrast to previous research, our results allow the rejection of the hypothesis that IMF credit increases economic freedom and that aid is not contributing to economic freedom. The estimation results suggest that, firstly, aid is positively correlated with economic freedom, and secondly, that IMF credit is negatively correlated with economic freedom. Taking IMF credit as proxy for conditional aid, we conclude that for the period of observation it could not be shown that countries can be forced to economic freedom by aid conditions.
Read article
Network Investment and the Threat of Regulation – Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?
Ulrich Blum, Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 7,
2006
Abstract
In summer 2005, the German telecommunication incumbent Deutsche Telekom announced its plans to build a new broadband fibre optics network. Deutsche Telekom decided as precondition for this new network not to be regulated with respect to pricing and third party access. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments and prevents monopolistic prices at the same time, we model an incumbent's decision problem under a threat of regulation in a game-theoretical context. The decision whether to invest or not depends on the probability of regulation and its assumed impact on investment returns. Depending on the incumbent's expectation on these parameters, he will decide if the investment is favourable, and which price to best set. This price is below a non-regulated profit maximising price, since the incumbent tries to circumvent regulation. Thus, we show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention might prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both investment decision and the incumbent's price via his signals on regulation probability and price. These signals an be considered optimal, if they simultaneously allow investment and minimize the incumbent's price.
Read article
Optimierung der Geldpolitik in Schwellenländern durch einen International-Lender-of-Last-Resort
Tobias Knedlik
Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 5 Volks- und Betriebswirtschaft, Band 3202,
2006
Abstract
Current currency crises in emerging market economies show the insufficiency of preventive measures on national, regional and international level. The task of the book is therefore to analyze systematically which conditions monetary policy has to fulfill in order to prevent currency crises. In a first step optimal, crises-preventing monetary policy is modeled. Further the chances for overcoming the limitations of national policy are discussed on the regional and international level. The main result of the descriptive, theoretical and econometric analysis is the construction of an instrument for international monetary policy: the International Lender of Last Resort.
Read article
Progressivity and Flexibility in Developing an Effective Competition Regime: Using Experiences of Poland, Ukraine, and South Africa for developing countries
Franz Kronthaler, Johannes Stephan
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2006
Abstract
The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibility, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing country that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or comprehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime.
Read article