The Effects of Antitrust Laws on Horizontal Mergers: International Evidence
Chune Young Chung, Iftekhar Hasan, JiHoon Hwang, Incheol Kim
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
This study examines how antitrust law adoptions affect horizontal merger and acquisition (M&A) outcomes. Using the staggered introduction of competition laws in 20 countries, we find antitrust regulation decreases acquirers’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding horizontal merger announcements. A decrease in deal value, target book assets, and industry peers' announcement returns are consistent with the market power hypothesis. Exploiting antitrust law adoptions addresses a downward bias to an estimated effect of antitrust enforcement (Baker (2003)). The potential bias from heterogeneous treatment effects does not nullify our results. Overall, antitrust policies seem to deter post-merger monopolistic gains, potentially improving customer welfare.
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Epidemics in the Neoclassical and New Keynesian Models
Martin S. Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebelo, Mathias Trabandt
Abstract
We analyze the effects of an epidemic in three standard macroeconomic models. We find that the neoclassical model does not rationalize the positive comovement of consumption and investment observed in recessions associated with an epidemic. Introducing monopolistic competition into the neoclassical model remedies this shortcoming even when prices are completely flexible. Finally, sticky prices lead to a larger recession but do not fundamentally alter the predictions of the monopolistic competition model.
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Inside Asset Purchase Programs: The Effects of Unconventional Policy on Banking Competition
Michael Koetter, Natalia Podlich, Michael Wedow
ECB Working Paper Series,
No. 2017,
2017
Abstract
We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed Euro 218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.
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Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Theon van Dijk
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2013
Abstract
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
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Folgen des Wettbewerbs zwischen Krankenversicherungen für die Kosten im Gesundheitswesen
Ingmar Kumpmann
Gesundheitspolitik, Wettbewerb und Gesundheitssystemforschung. DIBOGS-Beiträge zur Gesundheitsökonomie und Sozialpolitik Bd. 3,
2009
Abstract
In this study it is argued that competition among health insurers can bring about higher costs in the health care sector. Medical services are inhomogeneous goods; thus the competition between physicians can be modeled by Chamberlins concept of monopolistic competition. The physicians have a strong bargaining power face to face a multitude of competing health insurers acting as purchasers of health care services. The costs can be lower if the physicians’ strong position is compensated by a monopolistic health insurer. Two case studies show the applicability of the argument. A regression analysis confirms the correlation between (public) monopolistic health insurer and lower costs in the health care sector.
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Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
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The East German Cement Cartel: Cartel Efficiency and Policy after Economic Transformation
Ulrich Blum
Eastern Economic Review,
2007
Abstract
In 2003 the German Antitrust Commission (GAC) proved the existence of a cartel in the German cement industry. The German cement producers involved in the case were fined € 661 million for having established quotas to extract additional rents. One of the main centers of this cartel was East Germany, where the East German Cement Combine with its giant facilities had been sold, in the early 1990s, to four large producers by Treuhand in the process of privatizing the economy. Only in respect to in this market did all defendants concede having had a part in forming a cartel.
In this paper, we challenge the argument of excess revenue that the GAC puts forward for the East German market. We argue that legal evidence does not necessarily translate into economic evidence. We show that demand for cement is realized in geographical and, to a more limited extent, in product space. Thus, in the absence of cartels we would expect monopolistic competition to prevail. We argue that any transition in the market regime, from the cartel to the post cartel period, must be traceable in the individual firm’s demand function which differs from the clients’ demand function because of costs for spatial and product differentiation. Within the framework of an econometric model, we cannot identify any structural changes in demand. Most likely, imports from Poland and the Czech Republic were dumped into the East German market and some medium sized producers were responsible for the cartel never working.
Finally the paper shows how difficult it is to generate competition in certain industries even under the umbrella of a well-established market economy, i.e. that of West Germany, and that the openness of the economy, i.e. trans-border shipments, are decisive.
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Longterm development of return on assets – an empirical panel data analysis
Olaf Neubert
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
One of the basic propositions of economic theory is the fact that competition does not allow permanent very high or very low returns. But how can the permanent surplus gain of a monopolist be distinguished from innovation gains? In which markets is a regulatory interference necessary? Contrary to the static analysis, the concept of dynamic competition explicitly considers the temporal development of return and gain. An entrepreneur can achieve an advantage over the competitors through new products or new production processes. Hence arising innovation gains function as incentives for imitators to join the development which in turn leads to a reduction of the surplus gains. Thus, these gains are not contradictory to an effective competition. On the basis of annual balance sheets of German firms, this article analyses the temporal development of returns on assets. It is to evaluate whether the adaptation process assumed by Schumpeter that matches very high and very low gains with a longterm level can be confirmed, and how fast this process works. The average industry returns of the manufacturing industry show a convergence to a longterm level. During this process, an average of 40% of the deviation from the longterm level are melted every year. However, the analysis of company returns shows longterm differences. The adaptation rate of companies, 50%, is significantly higher compared to the industry value. The analysis of the connection between the adaptation rate and the longterm return level of companies proves that companies which face above-average competition strength obtain a higher longterm return level than other companies. When firms operate within markets with high stress of competition they do not achieve below-average returns but rather significantly above-average returns in the long term.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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