Solidarity with Israel The Alliance of Science Organisations in Germany stands in solidarity with Israel. ...
Transformation tables for administrative borders in Germany
Transformation tables for administrative borders in Germany The state has the ability...
IWH FDI Micro Database
IWH FDI Micro Database The IWH FDI Micro Database (FDI = Foreign Direct...
Transformation tables for administrative borders in Germany – data In order to...
The Impacts of Intellectual Property Rights Protection on Cross-Border M&As
Quarterly Journal of Finance,
We investigate the impacts of improved intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions performance. Using multiple measures of IPR protection and based on generalized difference-in-differences estimates, we find that countries with better IPR protection attract significantly more hi-tech cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions activity, particularly in developing economies. Moreover, acquirers pay higher premiums for companies in countries with better IPR protection, and there is a significantly higher acquirer announcement effect associated with these hi-tech transactions.
Intellectual Property Rights Policy, Competition and Innovation
Journal of the European Economic Association,
To what extent and in what form should the intellectual property rights (IPR) of innovators be protected? Should a company with a large technology lead over its rivals receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited advantage? In this paper, we develop a dynamic framework for the study of the interactions between IPR and competition, in particular to understand the impact of such policies on future incentives. The economy consists of many industries and firms engaged in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. IPR policy regulates whether followers in an industry can copy the technology of the leader. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize some of its properties. We then quantitatively investigate the implications of different types of IPR policy on the equilibrium growth rate and welfare. The most important result from this exercise is that full patent protection is not optimal; instead, optimal policy involves state-dependent IPR protection, providing greater protection to technology leaders that are further ahead than those that are close to their followers. This is because of a trickle-down effect: providing greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their followers than a certain threshold increases the R&D incentives also for all technology leaders that are less advanced than this threshold.
The Role of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime for Foreign Investors in Post-Socialist Economies
IWH Discussion Papers,
We integrate international business theory on foreign direct investment (FDI) with institutional theory on intellectual property rights (IPR) to explain characteristics and behaviour of foreign investment subsidiaries in Central East Europe, a region with an IPR regime-gap vis-à-vis West European countries. We start from the premise that FDI may play a crucial role for technological catch-up development in Central East Europe via technology and knowledge transfer. By use of a unique dataset generated at the IWH in collaboration with a European consortium in the framework of an EU-project, we assess the role played by the IPR regimes in a selection of CEE countries as a factor for corporate governance and control of foreign invested subsidiaries, for their own technological activity, their trade relationships, and networking partners for technological activity. As a specific novelty to the literature, we assess the in influence of the strength of IPR regimes on corporate control of subsidiaries and conclude that IPR-sensitive foreign investments tend to have lower functional autonomy, tend to cooperate more intensively within their transnational network and yet are still technologically more active than less IPR-sensitive subsidiaries. In terms of economic policy, this leads to the conclusion that the FDI will have a larger developmental impact if the IPR regime in the host economy is sufficiently strict.
Race to the Market: Can Standards Survive the Acceleration of Innovation and Product Life Cycles?
Spatial Dispersed Production and Network Governance, Papers Presented at the 11th Uddevalla Symposium, 15 – 17. May 2008, Kyoto, Research Report 2008,
Plagiarism of emerging market countries has for a considerable time been seen as the main challenge to the western approach of codifying and securing intellectual property rights (IPRs). This neglects the fact that historically all countries which tried to converge to the level of successful economies copied technology. The discussion shadows our view that the more imminent question is whether the steady increase in competition intensity which shortens product life cycles and puts pressure on the invention and innovation system, provides enough time to patent and to standardize. As patent activity not only provides incentives for sinking costs into R&D but is also a first step in the dissemination of technologies, and as standards, especially formal standards, generate level playing fields in broad and reliable markets, this may be critical in the long run. Furthermore, the migration of technologies as a result of a steady reorganization of the spatial division of labor may lead to the adverse situation that countries harboring technologies do not have appropriate institutions for knowledge codification.
Exogenous factors that – at least in the short run – cannot be influenced by the standardization bodies are the level of cooperation among interested parties (and mutual trust and institutional linkage), the competitiveness of the technology, the ability to generate externalities by knowledge codification, and the productivity of the technologies. The most important single success factor that standardization bodies can influence is the speed with which a committee proceeds to timely publish formal standards. With reference to a game-theoretical model and based on data for 1997 and 2007 on published formal standards, we show that until now, standardization bodies seem to have successfully coped with the situation.
Globalisation Forces an Acceleration of Standardization Processes
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
The increase in the intensity of competition in recent years, especially in markets for industrial products, has increased the pressure for businesses to innovate. This finds expression in an accelerated introduction of new products and processes, leading to a shortening of product life cycles. Equally, the pressure to innovate also increased the pressure on research and development processes of businesses.
For this reason, the patent system and the standardization system get under pressure, because these systems for codifying and saving intellectual property rights need time for necessary inspections and to reach a consensus on different proposed specifications. This article focuses on the standardization system. Under the condition of temporal pressure, there are three possibilities for standardization: abstaining from standardization, switch to non consensus-based industrial standardization or accelerate the standardization process. This article examines if standardization organisations have successfully accelerated their processes to survive in the sandwich position between shortened product cycles and accelerated market introduction of products. It turns out that the acceleration has succeeded – through a series of institutional reforms, such as a prioritization of international before the national standards by the beginning and middle of the last decade agreements.
Market Follows Standards
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Standards are an important part of the codified knowledge of a society. In contrast to industry standards, formal standards are created in a consensus-based procedure open to all interested parties. Only if an economic interest for application exists will formal standards be produced. Interested parties have to shoulder participation costs themselves, which enforces economic interest. Up to a certain extent, governments also trigger and finance formal standardisation processes through the new approach, which creates a framework that is filled by private activity. Standards stand at the end of intellectual property rights if the totality of the value chain of knowledge production is looked at. One important aspect is their accessibility and the inclusion of all necessary intellectual property rights, especially patents, at reasonable prices. Conversely, consortia may exclude groups from the use of their standards. By preventing the licensing of those patents included in a standard, they can effectively block market entry. Thus, “successful” standards often face antitrust problems. Formal standards reduce costs of production through economies of scale, economies of scope and network-economies. Goods and processes that are standardized signal quality, the inclusion of high technological standards and permanent presence in the markets, which again accelerates market dissemination. Firms face a dilemma: On the one hand, the penetration of a markets with industry standards offers potentials for high profits; on the other hand, this has to be balanced against the risk of failure, especially if clients are hesitant because they do not know which standard will be successful in the end. Formal standards create and stabilize trust markets. This is especially true in the area of globalisation. Europe, which has to face an enormous competition in the international knowledge economy, needs an institutionally efficient approach to formal standardisation. This contribution addresses future problems of the European standardisation that have been developed within the framework of a working group of the European Standardisation Organisation called Future Landscape of European Standardisation (FLES).