Fiscal economy potentials of a county structure reform in Saxony-Anhalt
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
In view of the foreseeable demographic and finance-political developments the public house holds of Eastern Germany are under considerable strain to consolidate. This applies particularly to Saxony-Anhalt and there especially to local authorities. In 2003 the municipal expenses level (running material expenses and personnel expenses) of counties and communities in Saxony-Anhalt amounted 1,015 Euro per inhabitant and was clearly higher than the other East German states. Beyond the means of economisation through the efficient application of public funds, considerations are given to the potentials of country structure reforms. In the last legislative period, the CDU/FDP government already established the amalgamation of 24 counties to eleven new ones with the bill of 11.11.2005. The SPD - as an oppositional party at that time - submitted a proposal for an even further-reaching structural change with a concentration to five counties. This article comprises an estimation of the fiscal economisation potentials of both versions. In the first step, the (long term accessible) county expense levels of Saxony-Anhalt within the scope of the existing structure of a county is determined with the help of a Benchmarkanalysis. These results are then compared with expected expense levels of a reformed county structure which leads to the saving effect of the respective county reform. In the result of the analysis it appears that the suggestion of the SPD to the county structure reform allows to expect clearly higher saving effects than the suggestion of the former CDU/FDP government, a strong meaning of the already enforced community administrative reform is imputable.
Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
This paper examines the investment-cash flow sensitivity of publicly listed firms in The Netherlands. Investment-cash flow sensitivities can be attributed to overinvestment resulting from the abuse of managerial discretion, but also to underinvestment due to information problems. The Dutch corporate governance structure presents a number of distinctive features, in particular the limited influence of shareholders, the presence of large blockholders, and the importance of bank ties. We expect that in The Netherlands, the managerial discretion problem is more important than the asymmetric information problem. We use Tobin's Q to discriminate between firms with these problems, where LOW Q firms face the managerial discretion problem and HIGH Q firms the asymmetric information problem. As hypothesized, we find substantially larger investment-cash flow sensitivity for LOW Q firms. Moreover, specifically in the LOW Q sample, we find that firms with higher (bank) debt have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. This finding shows that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem.
- Solidarity Pact II -: The responsibilities of the New Länder
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
In June 2001 the so called "Solidarity Pact II" between the East German States and the Federal Government was set in effect. Federal payments due to the still existing deficit in infrastructure were aggreed upon for the next 20 years. However, as the scope for future payments is limited, public spending has to aim for growth purposes in a more strictly manner than in the past.
Reform of joint tasks: How far can the federal and state governments disengage? A contribution to the discussion about the new establishment of the German system of public finance
IWH Discussion Papers,
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