Upswing Continues - European Debt Crisis still Unresolved: Joint Economic Forecast Spring 2011
Dienstleistungsauftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie,
2011
Abstract
In spring 2011 the world economy is in an upswing phase, especially due to the momentum in the emerging economies. Germany too is experiencing a strong upturn. The institutes expect that German GDP will increase this year by 2.8% and by 2.0% next year. For 2011 and 2012, an unemployment rate of 6.9% and 6.5%, respectively, is forecast. Growth forces will gradually shift towards domestic demand. Wages will increase in the wake of the upswing, and the inflation rate will be relatively high at 2.4% in 2011 and 2.0% in 2012. Government net borrowing will amount to 1.7% in 2011 and in 2012 will decline to 0.9%, in relation to nominal GDP. The greatest forecast risks are international. If a reduction in the oil supply were to come about because of increasing unrest in the Arab world or if the European debt and confidence crisis were to worsen, this would have a clear effect on the economy. German economic policy is well-advised to maintain its consolidation course and to work for amendments to the European Stability Mechanism.
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The Great Risk Shift? Income Volatility in an International Perspective
Claudia M. Buch
CESifo Working Paper No. 2465,
2008
Abstract
Weakening bargaining power of unions and the increasing integration of the world economy may affect the volatility of capital and labor incomes. This paper documents and explains changes in income volatility. Using a theoretical framework which builds distribution risk into a real business cycle model, hypotheses on the determinants of the relative volatility of capital and labor are derived. The model is tested using industry-level data. The data cover 11 industrialized countries, 22 manufacturing and services industries, and a maximum of 35 years. The paper has four main findings. First, the unconditional volatility of labor and capital incomes has declined, reflecting the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Second, the idiosyncratic component of income volatility has hardly changed over time. Third, crosssectional heterogeneity in the evolution of relative income volatilities is substantial. If anything, the labor incomes of high- and low-skilled workers have become more volatile in relative terms. Fourth, income volatility is related to variables measuring the bargaining power of workers. Trade openness has no significant impact.
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Forecasting the CO2 certificate price risk
Henry Dannenberg, Wilfried Ehrenfeld
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2008
Abstract
Modeling the price risk of CO2 certificates is one important aspect of integral corporate risk management related to emissions trading. The paper presents a risk model which may be the basis for evaluating the risk of emission certificate prices. We assume that the certificate price is determined by the expected marginal CO2 abatement costs prevailing at the current trade period and stochastically fluctuates around the respective level as returned from the mean reversion process. Due to uncertainties about future environmental states we suppose that within one trade period, erratic changes in the expected marginal abatement costs may occur leading to shifts in the price level. The aim of the work is to model the erratic changes of the expected reversion level and to estimate the parameters of the mean reversion process.
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Do Weak Supervisory Systems Encourage Bank Risk-taking?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Financial Stability,
2008
Abstract
Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.
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