Upswing Continues - European Debt Crisis still Unresolved: Joint Economic Forecast Spring 2011
Dienstleistungsauftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie,
2011
Abstract
In spring 2011 the world economy is in an upswing phase, especially due to the momentum in the emerging economies. Germany too is experiencing a strong upturn. The institutes expect that German GDP will increase this year by 2.8% and by 2.0% next year. For 2011 and 2012, an unemployment rate of 6.9% and 6.5%, respectively, is forecast. Growth forces will gradually shift towards domestic demand. Wages will increase in the wake of the upswing, and the inflation rate will be relatively high at 2.4% in 2011 and 2.0% in 2012. Government net borrowing will amount to 1.7% in 2011 and in 2012 will decline to 0.9%, in relation to nominal GDP. The greatest forecast risks are international. If a reduction in the oil supply were to come about because of increasing unrest in the Arab world or if the European debt and confidence crisis were to worsen, this would have a clear effect on the economy. German economic policy is well-advised to maintain its consolidation course and to work for amendments to the European Stability Mechanism.
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Prävention und Management von Staatsinsolvenzen in der Europäischen Währungsunion
Oliver Holtemöller, Tobias Knedlik
Wirtschaftsdienst,
2011
Abstract
EU institutions are currently dealing with the management of debt crises in European countries. The instruments of crisis management are, however, timely restricted and expire in 2013. It is planned to install a permanent crisis prevention and resolution mechanism for the time after. In this contribution the authors develop such a permanent crisis prevention and resolution mechanism.
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Conference Report : Analyses and Policies for East Germany – Research Results from the IWH
B. Damm, Jutta Günther
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
On November 18th, 2010, the conference “Analyses and Policies for East Germany“ took place for the 4th time. IWH’s objective as the host of the conference was to present and discuss current research and, based on that, to provide some political consulting. The meeting dealt with possible paths of economic development of East Germany after the global financial crisis and how political objectives will influence the region. After presenting a general overview of the current situation, speakers also covered specific topics. Among these issues were: the co-operation between private companies and academic science in the field of photovoltaics, the demographic situation as well as potentials due to immigration to the region, the long-term results of the new administrative order of East German cities, and the necessity to overcome the current high-debt situation of the East German Länder.
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The Role of Rating Agencies in Financial Crises: Event Studies from the Asian Flu
Makram El-Shagi
Cambridge Journal of Economics,
2010
Abstract
Based on case studies from countries that have been hit hardest by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the present paper shows that the accusation that sovereign ratings led to a severe acceleration of the crisis is unconvincing and that the empirical method often used to support accusations against rating agencies is inappropriate for the problem under analysis. Rather, it must be emphasised that ratings were downgraded in most countries very shortly before the end of the crisis. In some countries, the ratings were even further downgraded after the end of the crisis as countries started to recover. This is not in line with the thesis that the crisis was accelerated by rating agencies.
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Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Assessing Alternative Schemes in a Banking Model of Debt Overhang
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Abstract
We evaluate policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalize risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance granted without reference to new activities, like establishing a bad bank, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
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Concerning the development of the debt level of the New Länder since the German unification
Sabine Freye
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
20 Jahre Deutsche Einheit - Teil 2 -
2010
Abstract
During the 1990s, public indebtedness rose remarkably in all German political subdivisions. This development was particularly strong in the New Länder. At the beginning of the 1990s, they had low indebtedness rates. Today, 20 years later, the debt level of some New Länder lies over the average value of all Federal states. The background of this development is complex and depends also on the individual situation of each state. Generally, the rise of the debt level of the New Länder can be attributed to the 1990s’ estimation of a fast adjustment of the New Länder’s economic and financial power to that of the old Federal states. From today's point of view, this estimation was too optimistic. Furthermore, the New Länder have been affected differently by the transformation-conditioned structural change and the therefore arising difficulties with the necessary adjustment to the market.
In Saxony-Anhalt, which is characterised by the highest debt level of the New Länder, the collapse of the basic industry has led to high regional unemployment and to a substantial migration of the population. Still Saxony-Anhalt has countrywide the largest negative migration balance.
Regardless of these state-specific characteristics of the transformation process, there is a gradual change in the attitude towards existing debts and their handling, starting around the year 2000. So, the interest in budget consolidation increases constantly. This development was supported by the economic boom of the years 2006 and 2007. At present, the economic crisis puts the consolidation efforts of the states to the test.
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Deriving the Term Structure of Banking Crisis Risk with a Compound Option Approach: The Case of Kazakhstan
Stefan Eichler, Alexander Karmann, Dominik Maltritz
Discussion paper, Series 2: Banking and financial studies, No. 01/2010,
No. 1,
2010
Abstract
We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to infer a term structure of banking crisis risk from market data on bank stocks in daily frequency. Considering debt service payments with different maturities this term structure assigns a separate estimator for short- and long-term default risk to each maturity. Applying the Duan (1994) maximum likelihood approach, we find for Kazakhstan that the overall crisis probability was mainly driven by short-term risk, which increased from 25% in March 2007 to 80% in December 2008. Concurrently, the long-term default risk increased from 20% to only 25% during the same period.
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The ADR Shadow Exchange Rate as an Early Warning Indicator for Currency Crises
Stefan Eichler, Alexander Karmann, Dominik Maltritz
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2009
Abstract
We develop an indicator for currency crisis risk using price spreads between American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and their underlyings. This risk measure represents the mean exchange rate ADR investors expect after a potential currency crisis or realignment. It makes crisis prediction possible on a daily basis as depreciation expectations are reflected in ADR market prices. Using daily data, we analyze the impact of several risk drivers related to standard currency crisis theories and find that ADR investors perceive higher currency crisis risk when export commodity prices fall, trading partners’ currencies depreciate, sovereign yield spreads increase, or interest rate spreads widen.
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Finanzielle Instabilität und Krise in den Post-Transformations-Ländern
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
Contagion was only the trigger of the unexpectedly severe crisis in European post-transition countries. Rather, increasing financial fragility of the countries since 2001, after their banking and financial sector was overtaken by international financial institutions, was the origin. Euphoric expectations induced an asset price inflation followed by an increasing debt burden of the private sector, which was fueled by net capital inflows. This study argues that simple concepts of demand reduction do not offer any way out of the crisis. A second transition is necessary, which establishes a new growth model being robust against speculative capital flows and offering high growth rates.
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Russia: A Victim to Transition or to the Financial Crisis?
Marina Grusevaja
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
The global financial crisis has revealed deficiencies of the Russian economic system which are caused by the path of the transformation from central planning to the market economy, and not only attributable to the downfall of crude oil prices. While the worldwide liquidity crunch impaired the availability of loans to enterprises, the situation in Russia has deteriorated especially by the large exposure of the private sector to short-term foreign liabilities and by the one-sided orientation of the economy relying on the natural resources industry. Until the mid-2008, the foreign debt of the private banks and non-banks had increased strongly and had strengthened the dependence of the Russian economy on the developments on the international financial markets. The Ruble devaluation at the end of January 2009 aggravated the situation. The high short-term foreign debt of the private sector and the dependence on exports of natural resources are typical outcomes of the Russian transformation path. Therefore, on the one hand, the banking sector has not being able to satisfy financing demand of the private sector beyond the natural resources industries, enterprises became forced to borrow short-term money abroad. On the other hand, the economic strategy of the past seventeen years has strengthened the influence of the state on the natural resources sector – with the strong priority to develop it further. Hence, the one-sided economic development negatively affects the adaptability of the real-economic sector to change during the crisis period. In essence, the present political preferences of the government are aimed at providing direct financial assistance and at protectionist measures. In the long run, these actions could lead to stronger intervention of the state in the economy. Due to these recent developments, the crisis is likely to continue in Russia longer than in the other transformation countries.
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