The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
Read article
A Dynamic Approach to Interest Rate Convergence in Selected Euro-candidate Countries
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2009
Abstract
We advocate a dynamic approach to monetary convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001 untill January 22, 2009 sample period. Our results show a varied degree of bond yield co-movements, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. However, since the EU accession, we find some divergence of relative bond yields. We argue that a ‘static’ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not fully conducive for advancing stability of financial systems in the euro-candidate countries.
Read article
Agenda 2010: Neues unter Deutschlands Himmel?
Ulrich Blum
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
The paper analyzes to what extent the reform of the German social security and welfare system, known as the “Hartz-IV-Reforms” under the “Agenda 2010”, has been successful. It is shown that the integration of welfare and social security payments increased efficiency as did prior deregulations of the labor market. However, the implementation was partly inefficient due to a misalignment between crucial instruments and incentive structure of individuals. This led to unforeseen expenditures that partly continue until today. Due to this inefficiency, parts of the reform lost its political acceptance. Furthermore, the article shows that many of these reforms had already been prepared intellectually by selected think tanks in the 90ies. The reforms are consistent with a consensus among scholars regarding the ability of the modern state to protect citizens from individual life risks. Finally, the article discusses the future agenda with respect to other important economic policy instruments beyond the integration of welfare and social security such as incentive structure in the established taxation system.
Read article
Do Weak Supervisory Systems Encourage Bank Risk-taking?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Financial Stability,
2008
Abstract
Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.
Read article
The Stability of Bank Efficiency Rankings when Risk Preferences and Objectives are Different
Michael Koetter
European Journal of Finance,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
We analyze the stability of efficiency rankings of German universal banks between 1993 and 2004. First, we estimate traditional efficiency scores with stochastic cost and alternative profit frontier analysis. Then, we explicitly allow for different risk preferences and measure efficiency with a structural model based on utility maximization. Using the almost ideal demand system, we estimate input- and profit-demand functions to obtain proxies for expected return and risk. Efficiency is then measured in this risk-return space. Mean risk-return efficiency is somewhat higher than cost and considerably higher than profit efficiency (PE). More importantly, rank–order correlation between these measures are low or even negative. This suggests that best-practice institutes should not be identified on the basis of traditional efficiency measures alone. Apparently, low cost and/or PE may merely result from alternative yet efficiently chosen risk-return trade-offs.
Read article
International Banking and the Allocation of Risk
Claudia M. Buch
IAW Discussion Paper No. 32,
2007
Abstract
Macroeconomic risks could magnify individual bank risk. Mitigating the influence of economy-wide risks on banks could therefore be very important to maintain a smooth-running banking system. In this paper, we explore the extent to which macroeconomic risks affect banks. We use a bank-level dataset on over 2,000 banks worldwide for the years 1995-2002 to study the effect of macroeconomic volatility, the openness of the banking system, and banking regulations on bank risks. Our measure of bank risk is the volatility of banks' pre-tax profits. We find that macroeconomic volatility increases banks' profit volatility and that international openness of the banking system lowers bank risk. We find no impact of banking regulation on profit volatility. Our findings suggest that if policymakers want to lower bank risk, they should seek to lower macroeconomic volatility as well as increase openness in the banking system.
Read article
Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of Contagion Risk in the Belgian Banking System
Hans Degryse, Grégory Nguyen
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
Robust (cross-border) interbank markets are important for the proper functioning of modern financial systems. However, a network of interbank exposures may lead to domino effects following the event of an initial bank failure. We investigate the evolution and determinants of contagion risk for the Belgian banking system over the period 1993–2002 using detailed information on aggregate interbank exposures of individual banks, large bilateral interbank exposures, and cross-border interbank exposures. The "structure" of the interbank market affects contagion risk. We find that a change from a complete structure (where all banks have symmetric links) toward a "multiplemoney-center" structure (where money centers are symmetrically linked to otherwise disconnected banks) has decreased the risk and impact of contagion. In addition, an increase in the relative importance of cross-border interbank exposures has lowered local contagion risk. However, this reduction may have been compensated by an increase in contagion risk stemming from foreign banks.
Read article
The IWH signals approach: the present potential for a financial crisis in selected Central and East European countries and Turkey
Hubert Gabrisch, Simone Lösel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2006
Abstract
The steep increase of oil prices, general threats rooting from Iran’s nuclear program, and doubts about the future policy of important central banks recently caused more uncertainties of investors on international financial markets. This explains the higher volatility and the fall of indices on stock markets including those of some Central and East European countries. International investors could respond with adjustments of their portfolio and trigger off a financial crisis. On this background, the article studies the potential for a financial crises in the region mentioned. The analytical tool is the IWH signals approach. The study concludes that the risk of the outbreak of a financial crisis within the next 18 months is rather unrealistic in most countries. A stable economic policy, high real growth rates, a financial system already robust compared to earlier times of transition, and appropriate exchange rate arrangements protect the countries against speculative attacks and portfolio adjustments. When the composite indicator shows deterioration like in the Baltic countries, it turned out to be negligible. For the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the composite indicator even improved. A closer look to individual indicators reveals still some problems in the banking sectors of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, however, without out major impact on the composite indicator.
This general assessment does not apply to Romania, and, in particular, to Turkey. The composite indicator signals a significant increase of the risk potential for the next 18 months in both countries. There is a considerable need for sound policy action.
Read article
Bank Market Discipline and Indicators of Banking System Risk: The European Evidence
Reint E. Gropp
Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries,
2004
Abstract
Read article
Measurement of Contagion in Banks' Equity Prices
Reint E. Gropp, G. Moerman
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 3,
2004
Abstract
This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within-country and across country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically important” banks in the EU.
Read article