Who Invests in Training if Contracts are Temporary? - Empirical Evidence for Germany Using Selection Correction
Jan Sauermann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 14,
2006
Abstract
This study deals with the effect of fixed-term contracts on work-related training. Though previous studies found a negative effect of fixed-term contracts on the participation in training, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether workers with fixed-term contracts receive less or more training, compared to workers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature, we especially distinguish between employer- and employee-financed training in order to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and firm. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we estimate a bivariate probit model to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors, affecting both participation in training and holding fixed-term contracts. Finding negative effects for employer-sponsored, as well as for employee-sponsored training, leads us to conclude that workers with fixed-term contracts do not compensate for lower firm investments.
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Is co-determination economically reasonable? East German manufacturing and construction as examples
Birgit Schultz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2005
Abstract
In the public discussion there are controversial argumentations how works worker’s participation in form of work council in questions of office politics and economic interests. Theoretical publications of this topic show mainly positive effects for staff and management. Therefore we analyse the effects of work council for chances in employment. In establishments with a positive result situation at the status quo and a work council we found a positive trend on employment and the future result. Compared to primarily prosperous establishments without staff association downgrade their result situation. In case of negative result situation establishments with a work council have no greater problems to reduce the employment than establishments without a work council.
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Municipal labor market policy - Marshalling yard or escape from public assistance dependency?
Hilmar Schneider
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2001
Abstract
Due to an increasing fiscal burden by welfare payments, municipalities tend
more and more to initiate employment and training programs under their own
responsibility besides the Federal Labor Agency. However, critics object
that this might predominantly be viewed as an attempt to shift fiscal
burdens to the Federal Labor Agency rather than a policy option towards
labor market integration of low-wage workers. In order to investigate this
issue, the IWH carried out a country-wide survey within twelve
municipalities and rural districts. The sample comprises 200 employable
welfare recipients, among them participants of labor market programs as well
as a reference group of non-participants. The results of the IWH welfare
survey are at best suggesting a moderate success of program participation
with regard to labor market integration. Nevertheless, the programs appear
to be profitable for municipalities, since they succeed in bringing
participants out of welfare dependency. In many cases, however, welfare is
replaced by unemployment support, which means that only the fiscal
responsibility changes. A shortcoming of the results has to be seen in the
fact that municipalities tend to assign especially those people for program
participation, who are already better fitting into requirements of the labor
market. This seriously impairs the comparability of participants and
non-participants. In view of the remarkable amount of expenditures it seems
therefore advisable to put more attention on the effectiveness of the
programs than has been done in the past. This could be achieved by a
stronger orientation towards an experimental design of assignment for
program participation.
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