This paper examines the macroeconomic and distributional effects of the European Union’s transition to Net Zero emissions through a gradually increasing carbon tax. I develop a New Keynesian Environmental DSGE model with two household types and distinct energy and non-energy sectors. Five alternative uses of carbon tax revenues are considered: equal transfers to households, targeted transfers to Hand-to-Mouth households, subsidies to green energy firms, and reductions in labor and capital income taxes. In the absence of technological progress, the carbon tax policy induces a persistent increase in energy prices and a reduction in GDP, investment, and consumption. Headline inflation falls below zero in the medium run, reflecting weaker aggregate demand. Distributional outcomes vary significantly depending on the implemented revenue recycling scheme: targeted transfers are the most progressive but entail larger macroeconomic costs, while subsidies and tax cuts mitigate output and investment losses but are less effective in narrowing the consumption gap. A limited foresight scenario, in which agents learn about policy targets sequentially, generates more volatile adjustment paths and temporary inflationary spikes around announcements, but long-run outcomes remain close to the baseline.

DThe interactions between supply chains and sustainable finance have become a key area of research in financial markets, driven by growing global awareness of environmental and social challenges. Article 1 examines how lenders use sustainability clauses to monitor borrowers with negative environmental incidents and compares the use of this unique loan agreement design with conventional loan terms, financial and balance sheet-related clauses. We show that lenders are less inclined to include sustainability clauses in the loan agreement if a borrower has a history of negative environmental incidents. In contrast, lenders use sustainability clauses to attract institutional investors to participate in syndication rather than as monitoring tools for borrowers' environmental performance. Article 2 examines whether banks associated with biodiversity loss in the Amazon region experience a withdrawal of deposits when depositors become aware of their financing activities. I find empirical evidence that so-called ‘Amazon carbon banks’ experience slower growth in deposits once depositors learn about their financing activities. This effect is particularly pronounced when Amazon carbon banks have branches in counties that experience greater biodiversity loss compared to other branches. Article 3, how European companies that are heavily integrated into global supply chains (GSC) are affected by a supply chain disruption (Covid-19). We show that Covid-19 negatively affects the revenue growth of companies that are heavily dependent on GSC in their home country. Crucially, we uncover the role of banking relationships in mitigating the disruptive effects.

The establishment of the European Banking Union constitutes a major change in the regulatory framework of the banking system. Main parts are implemented via directives that show staggered transposition timing across EU member states. Based on the newly compiled Banking Union Directives Database, we assess how banks’ funding costs responded to the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV). Our findings show an upward trend in funding costs which is driven by an increase in cost of equity and partially offset by a decline in cost of debt. The diverging trends are most present in countries with an ex-ante lower regulatory capital stringency, which is in line with banks’ short-run adjustment needs but longer-run benefits from increased financial stability.

The European Commission’s growth forecasts play a crucial role in shaping policies and provide a benchmark for many (national) forecasters. The annual forecasts are built on quarterly estimates, which do not receive much attention and are hardly known. Therefore, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis of multi-period ahead quarterly GDP growth forecasts for the European Union (EU), euro area, and several EU member states with respect to first-release and current-release data. Forecast revisions and forecast errors are analyzed, and the results show that the forecasts are not systematically biased. However, GDP forecasts for several member states tend to be overestimated at short-time horizons. Furthermore, the final forecast revision in the current quarter is generally downward biased for almost all countries. Overall, the differences in mean forecast errors are minor when using real-time data or pseudo-real-time data and these differences do not significantly impact the overall assessment of the forecasts’ quality. Additionally, the forecast performance varies across countries, with smaller countries and Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) experiencing larger forecast errors. The paper provides evidence that there is still potential for improvement in forecasting techniques both for nowcasts but also forecasts up to eight quarters ahead. In the latter case, the performance of the mean forecast tends to be superior for many countries.

Zur Erinnerung: Nach Jahren von Inflationsraten nahe null war die Inflationsrate in Deutschland 2022 nach der Corona-Pandemie und dem Überfall Russlands auf die Ukraine auf knapp 7% gestiegen, ähnlich hoch wie zur Energiekrise 1973/74. Die Gründe dafür sind bekannt: expansive Geld- und Finanzpolitik sowie steigende Energiepreise und Nachholeffekte beim Konsum, verbunden mit Lieferkettenproblemen gerade im Handel mit China. Seitdem haben Zentralbanken wie die EZB eine weiche Landung hingelegt. Ohne große Verluste beim Wachstum (zumindest global gesehen) wurde die Inflationsrate auf 1,6% im September 2024 gedrückt. Ein großer Erfolg?