We assemble data about executives on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking, which reveal that 40% have an employment history in the financial industry. Appointment patterns to NSA boards differ substantially across countries. Generally, the appointment of former finance professionals as prudential supervisors is inconsequential for banks‘ valuations, capitalization, and asset growth. The exception are positive, but short-lived valuation effects for those banks whose alumni are appointed as executives of directly responsible NSA boards. Circumstantial evidence suggests that a “proximity bias“ is a more likely driver of this effect inste

We study how an increase to the deposit insurance limit affects households’ portfolio allocation. Using unique data on individual deposit accounts, a suitable natural experiment, along with detailed information on Canadian households’ portfolio holdings, we show that households respond by drawing down deposits and shifting towards mutual funds and stocks. These outflows amount to 2.8% of outstanding household deposits. The mechanism underlying these portfolio adjustments relies on differences in deposit betas of insured vs. uninsured deposits. More generous deposit insurance coverage, hence, may result in non-trivial adjustments to household portfolios.

Using the adoption of Zombie Property Laws (ZL) across several US states, we show that requiring lenders to maintain properties in the foreclosure process affects mortgage lending decisions and standards. Difference-in-differences estimations using a state border design show that ZL incentivizes lenders to screen mortgage applications more carefully: they deny more applications and impose higher interest rates on originated loans, especially risky loans. In turn, these loans exhibit higher ex post performance. ZL also affects lender behavior after borrowers become distressed, causing them to strategically keep delinquent mortgages alive. Our findings inform the debate on policy responses to foreclosure crises.

Get access Abstract This study examines how changes in state corporate tax rates affect corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance among U.S. firms. Using staggered state-level tax reforms and a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, we identify an asymmetric causal effect: tax cuts significantly enhance CSR performance by reducing concerns, whereas tax increases only marginally weaken CSR strengths. Drawing primarily on signaling theory, complemented by slack resource and stakeholder perspectives, we argue that tax cuts expand financial slack, enabling firms to use CSR as a positive signal of financial strength, long-term orientation, and responsible use of tax savings. In contrast, firms avoid cutting CSR significantly after tax hikes to prevent negative signaling. In support of the theories, our heterogeneity analyses show that these effects are stronger among financially constrained firms and are concentrated in material CSR issues that are financially relevant to investors. A domain-level analysis further reveals that tax increases reduce environmental strengths, while tax cuts lower concerns related to employee relations, diversity, and environmental practices. These findings highlight how tax policy shapes CSR through its impact on financial flexibility and stakeholder expectation, offering implications for corporate strategy and public policy.

We show an equivalence result in the representative-agent New-Keynesian model after demand, wage-markup and correlated price-markup and TFP shocks: assuming sticky prices and flexible wages yields identical allocations for GDP, consumption, labor, inflation and interest rates to the opposite case—flexible prices and sticky wages. This equivalence arises with identical price and wage Phillips-curve slopes and generalizes to any slopes' pair whose sum and product are identical. Equilibrium profits and wages are, however, substantially different; equivalence breaks when these factor-distributional implications matter for aggregate allocations, e.g. in New-Keynesian models with heterogeneous agents, endogenous firm entry, and non-constant returns to scale.

Vietnam, a low middle-income economy, grapples with considerable climate impacts, primarily driven by heat waves, sea level rise, and tropical cyclones. Under ongoing global warming, these extreme weather events are projected to further intensify. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model to study economic transition dynamics from 2015 to 2100, accounting for heat-induced labor productivity losses, agricultural land loss from sea level rise, and residential property damage from tropical cyclones. We compare a Paris-compatible strong mitigation scenario where global warming is limited to well below 2 °C above preindustrial levels to a strong emission scenario where warming reaches 4–5 °C. We find that the impacts of climate change on output and investment are highly uncertain, with differences between the two emission scenarios remaining statistically insignificant until the end of the century, despite substantially higher climate forcing in the latter. By contrast, consumption losses are significantly larger under the high emission scenario. These negative impacts are primarily driven by heat-induced labor productivity losses, while TCs are the main source of uncertainty. Our findings highlight the need for analytical frameworks to capture the different channels through which climate and climate change affect economic development, rather than focusing mainly on output-related damage, as done in many existing studies.

This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.

We revisit the employer size wage effect (ESWE) – arguably the most basic and influential departure from the law of one price for labor. Our main result is that this canonical fact disappears completely across establishments within the same firm, even though they operate in different local labor markets. We uncover and dissect this fact by including a firm fixed effect in otherwise standard cross-sectional regressions of wages on establishment size. We implement this demanding specification in population-wide triple-linked firm-establishment-employee data in Germany. This result is new in the ESWE literature (for which our paper also provides the first systematic meta-analysis). This wage-size decoupling is hard to square with the view that employment is determined along a finitely elastic employerspecific labor supply curve – i.e., employers pay exactly the minimum needed for the quantity of labor, but no more – the foundation of the monopsony view. By contrast, large multi-establishment firms (MEF) appear to hire off their labor supply curves (or those curves are very elastic), pay wage premia above the monopsonistic minimum, and leave excess labor supply. We find some evidence for a reemergence of the ESWE within low-premium MEFs. Overall, at least for the 25% of German employment in large firms for which the ESWE disappears, wage setting and employment determination may be better accounted for by alternative models, namely accommodating above-market-clearing wage premia and rationing of labor supply, such as efficiency wage theories.