Regional economic conditions are well-established determinants of the geography of political resentment. However, regions are not homogeneous, and the mechanisms through which local economies affect individual political attitudes are unclear. We argue that feelings of relative deprivation are shaped by how personal prospects are tied to regional conditions, and that the interaction between subjective individual and regional deprivation affects perceptions of shared struggle and systemic unfairness. Through a large-scale survey experiment in Britain addressing geographical self-selection, we provide causal evidence that poor individuals in poor regions express political resentment, whereas in affluent regions the political attitudes of poor and wealthy individuals are indistinguishable. Our findings stress 1) the importance of egocentric mechanisms whereby local economies shape individual prospects; 2) the significance of subjective beliefs over objective information on deprivation; 3) the mobilization potential of highlighting regional deprivation by political entrepreneurs; 4) the relevance of place-based policies to mitigate political discontent.

We study how idiosyncratic income risk shapes the aggregate and distributional effects of labor and capital income taxation in dynamic general equilibrium models. To this end, we compare a heterogeneous-agent (HA) model with uninsurable idiosyncratic labor productivity risk and a ten-representative-agent (TE) model in which households correspond to fixed wealth deciles without such risk. At the aggregate level, both models generate qualitatively similar responses; however, the HA model exhibits a smaller recessionary impact driven by precautionary savings behavior, which stabilizes investment. At the distributional level, the models differ sharply. In the HA framework, tax shocks trigger endogenous mobility across wealth deciles. These inter-decile transition dynamics tend to benefit lower deciles. In contrast, the TA model features fixed household positions. Our findings highlight that while simpler multi-representative-agent models can approximate aggregate dynamics well, they may miss important distributional adjustment channels. The relevance of these mechanisms ultimately depends on the empirical importance of mobility across the wealth distribution, pointing to a key trade-off between model simplicity and accuracy.

Die Entscheidung für eine Ausbildung oder ein Studium im Bereich Mathematik, Informatik, Naturwissenschaften und Technik (MINT) hängt nicht nur von absoluten Leistungen in Mathematik ab, sondern davon, wie gut Mathematik relativ zu anderen Fächern – etwa Sprache – gelingt. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die intergenerationale Übertragung solcher relativen Stärken in Mathematik und Sprache auf Basis niederländischer Testdaten von Eltern und ihren Kindern. Wir zeigen, dass Eltern, die im Verhältnis zu Sprache besonders gut in Mathematik abschneiden, mit deutlich höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit Kinder haben, die ebenfalls relativ besser in Mathematik sind. Zudem belegen wir, dass diese Übertragung relativer Stärken nicht ausschließlich genetisch oder familiär geprägt ist, sondern durch Schule und Lernumfeld – und damit durch Bildungspolitik – beeinflusst werden kann.

Spatial segregation of low- and high-wage workers is a persistent economic issue with broad social implications. Using social security data and an AKM wage decomposition, this paper examines spatial wage inequality in West Germany. Spatial inequality in log wages rose sharply between 1998 and 2008, mainly due to increased variance in worker pay premiums across regions (48%) and stronger positive spatial assortative matching of workers and establishments (40%), i.e. colocation. Changes in establishment wage premia are mostly unrelated to rising colocation whereas labor mobility even reduced it. Instead, growth in worker pay premiums among stayers was concentrated in regions where high-wage workers and high-wage establishments were overrepresented already in the 1990s and, thus, magnified pre-existing colocation leading to ‘colocation without relocation’. Germany’s rising trade surplus, especially with Eastern Europe, boosted stayers’ worker pay premiums in those ex-ante high-wage regions and fully explains rising colocation.

Wir untersuchen die kurz- und langfristigen Auswirkungen eines starken Anstiegs chinesischer Importe auf Wahlergebnisse in Europa. Populistische sowie links- und rechtsextreme Parteien gewannen erst viele Jahre nach dem Höhepunkt des China-Schocks bedeutenden Zuwachs an Wählerstimmen. Wir zeigen, dass die Auswirkungen von Importschocks überwiegend zugunsten populistischer Parteien ausfallen. In geringerem Maße profitieren in der kurzen Frist zudem linksextreme Parteien, langfristig hingegen rechtsextreme Parteien. Die Effekte auf das Wahlverhalten sind jedoch moderat und wir schlussfolgern, dass Importschocks den Aufstieg der politischen Ränder nur in begrenztem Maße erklären können.