How does immigration affect support for redistribution? While most research focuses on overall tax and spending levels, we investigate how immigration influences preferences conditional on tax structures. Using two original survey experiments in the UK, we find that low- and middle-income respondents are more likely to support redistribution to immigrants under progressive systems shielding them from fiscal costs, but oppose redistribution when immigrants are identified as beneficiaries and the tax structure increases their fiscal burden. In contrast, high-income respondents' preferences are largely unaffected by either tax structure or immigrant inclusion. These findings suggest that progressive taxation (1) is a viable revenue-generating strategy without provoking major political backlash; (2) reduces native resistance to immigrant welfare inclusion; (3) helps explain puzzling variation in immigration's effects on welfare attitudes; and (4) clarifies why low- and middle-income groups sometimes reject generous welfare programs despite standing to benefit. Our results highlight the importance of institutional design in shaping how economic self-interest and immigration concerns interact.

This paper documents substantial fiscal waste in the context of one the world’s largest regional development programs – the EU Cohesion Policy. We study Italy, and find that 20% of funding commitments are never paid out and funneled into unfinished or never-started projects. In our setting, this happens for reasons unrelated to fiscal constraints – municipalities appear to simply leave money on the table. Foregone spending is more prevalent in Southern regions, but there is also stark variation across municipalities within regions. We show that such under-utilization of available funds is strongly associated with limited administrative capacity of local governments.