We calculate the magnitude of the government consumption multiplier in linearized and nonlinear solutions of a New Keynesian model at the zero lower bound. Importantly, the model is amended with real rigidities to simultaneously account for the macroeconomic evidence of a low Phillips curve slope and the microeconomic evidence of frequent price changes. We show that the nonlinear solution is associated with a much smaller multiplier than the linearized solution in long‐lived liquidity traps, and pin down the key features in the model which account for the difference. Our results caution against the common practice of using linearized models to calculate fiscal multipliers in long‐lived liquidity traps.

Point estimates and error bands for SVARs that are set identified are only justified if the researcher is persuaded that some parameter values are a priori more plausible than others. When such prior information exists, traditional approaches can be generalized to allow for doubts about the identifying assumptions. We use information about both structural coefficients and impacts of shocks and propose a new asymmetric t-distribution for incorporating information about signs in a nondogmatic way. We apply these methods to a three-variable macroeconomic model and conclude that monetary policy shocks are not the major driver of output, inflation, or interest rates.

Der Aufschwung in Deutschland hält bereits seit mehr als fünf Jahren an. Er hat allerdings an Fahrt eingebüβt. Dies hat sowohl nachfrageseitige als auch produktionsseitige Gründe. Zum einen hat sich das Auslandsgeschäft im Einklang mit der Verlangsamung der Konjunktur in den wichtigsten deutschen Absatzmärkten abgeschwächt. Zum anderen sehen sich Unternehmen zunehmend Engpässen gegenüber, vor allem bei Arbeitskräften und beim Bezug von Vorleistungsgütern. Überlagert wird dies durch Probleme in der Automobilindustrie im Zusammenhang mit der Einführung des neuen Prüfverfahrens WLTP. Aufgrund der hohen gesamtwirtschaftlichen Bedeutung der Branche hinterlassen diese sichtbare Spuren beim Zuwachs des Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Die Umstellungsprobleme dürften aber im Winterhalbjahr überwunden werden. Hinzu kommen Impulse aufgrund von finanzpolitischen Maβnahmen, die zum Jahresbeginn 2019 in Kraft treten.

This paper investigates the impact of sustained lower productivity growth on exports, by looking at the role of the productivity distribution and allocative efficiency as drivers of export performance. It follows and goes beyond the work of Barba Navaretti et al. (2017), analysing the effects of productivity on exports depending on the dynamics of allocative efficiency. Low productivity growth is a well-documented stylised fact in Western countries – and possibly a reality likely to persist for some time. What could be the impact of persistent sluggish growth of productivity on exports? To shed light on this question, this paper examines the relationship between the productivity distribution of firms and sectoral export performance. The structure of firms within countries or even sectors matters tremendously for the nexus between productivity and exports at the macroeconomic level, as the theoretical and empirical literature documents. For instance, whether too few firms at the top (lack of innovation) or too many firms at the bottom (weak market selection) drives slow average productivity at the macro level has very different implications and therefore demands different policy responses.

The outcome of any important macroeconomic policy change is the net effect of forces operating on different parts of the economy. A central challenge facing policymakers is how to assess the relative strength of those forces. Economists have a range of tools that can be used to make such assessments. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are the leading tool for making such assessments in an open and transparent manner. We review the state of mainstream DSGE models before the financial crisis and the Great Recession. We then describe how DSGE models are estimated and evaluated. We address the question of why DSGE modelers—like most other economists and policymakers—failed to predict the financial crisis and the Great Recession, and how DSGE modelers responded to the financial crisis and its aftermath. We discuss how current DSGE models are actually used by policymakers. We then provide a brief response to some criticisms of DSGE models, with special emphasis on criticism by Joseph Stiglitz, and offer some concluding remarks.

• In summer 2018 the cyclical upswing of the world economy is not over, but it appears to be fragmenting. While economic activity in the European Union has lost steam, the upswing in the US has gained pace, and growth in China appears to be robust. • Markets for commodities as well as for capital are at present strongly affected by political movements: oil prices are more than 50% higher than one year ago, as the US exit from the Iran nuclear deal puts the long run oil supply from Iran at risk, and the strongly expansionary US tax reform explains the rise in US long run interest rates. . • Uncertainties about the future international trade system cause firms to slow down or even reverse the globalization of value chains. As an early consequence, world trade in the second half of 2018 and in 2019 will expand at much slower rates than during 2017. • In the euro area growth slowed in the first quarter 2018, due to weaker investment activity in France and Italy and, more importantly, a fall in exports in all larger euro area economies except Spain. However, the drivers of the upswing such as low interest rates for credit and expanding real incomes will still be supportive in the near future, and fiscal policies will be slighly more expansionary. But a slowdown in world trade will dent export growth as well as corporate profits. All in all, we expect GDP growth in the euro area to go down from 2.4% in 2017 to 2.1% in 2018 and to 1.7% in 2019 – a forecast that will only be realized if damages to the international trade system are limited and if the European sovereign debt crisis does not come back. • While wage inflation has been slowly increasing during the past quarters to about 2%, a clear upwards trend of core consumer price inflation is still not detectable. The recent jump of the headline rate to 1.9% is due to higher oil prices. Our forecasts for 2018 and 2019 are close, although still below, 2%.

• The world economy is booming. The global upswing is investment-driven, and since investment goods usually have a large import content, it is no surprise that world trade has been buoyant during winter. The very expansionary US fiscal policy (tax reform and lifting of spending caps) could give an additional shortterm stimulus for the world economy. • However, we forecast world trade to slow down during 2018. The US administration’s announcement of high tariffs on steel and aluminium comes close to triggering a spiral into a broader trade conflict. Moreover, the globalization of value chains has been slowing down since the financial crisis due to the industrial upgrading in China and in other emerging economies that has declined processing trade. In addition, some types of manufacturing jobs have returned to source countries (reshoring) in response to technology innovation and lower labour costs differentials. • The euro area is in the middle of a broad based cyclical upswing. Higher exports and improved expectations have induced firms to invest more into equipment, as capacity utilization has been above average for some time now and is still increasing, and financing costs are very low. However, recent soft indicators, but also industrial production have been surprisingly downbeat, and there was some turbulence in financial markets, which suggests some caution. • The ECB will probably stop its asset purchase program at the end of 2018, but only later in 2019 start raising interest rates. Fiscal policy in the euro area is slightly expansionary this year, and a notable fiscal stimulus in France and in Germany is to be expected for 2019. • Overall, we forecast euro area GDP to expand by 2.2% in 2018 and by 1.6% in 2019. Accelerating wage dynamics will, together with higher price setting powers of firms and the recent increase in oil prices, cause consumer price inflation rising to nearly to 2% in 2019. Uncertainty, is however substantial, as a slight slowdown cannot be ruled out, which would also impact inflation dynamics.

The adverse macroeconomic consequences of the Great Recession in 2009 spread well beyond the United States, highlighting the importance of financial stability and the housing market for real economic activity. Moreover, the vicious bank-sovereign cycle and the resulting sovereign-debt crisis of 2010-2012 posed a big threat to the survival of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as a whole. While there is widespread consensus about the underlying causes of these crises, policy makers are still debating about what can be done to prevent future crises and, especially in the Euro area, deeply disagree on the direction of reforms. After all, most regulatory measures face not only the trade-off between financial resilience versus efficiency but also the fundamental choice between rule or discretion based interventions (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018).

Die internationale Konjunktur ist seit Herbst 2016 kräftig, und auch im Jahr 2018 dürfte die Weltwirtschaft deutlich expandieren, nach vorliegender Prognose um 3,3%. Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist derzeit in einer Hochkonjunktur. Allerdings ist zweifelhaft, ob die deutsche Wirtschaft über die Kapazitäten verfügt, um das Tempo des Aufschwungs noch lange durchzuhalten. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Deutschland dürfte im Jahr 2018 mit 2,2% noch einmal recht kräftig und im Jahr 2019 mit 1,6% deutlich moderater expandieren. Der Zuwachs der Produktion in Ostdeutschland dürfte im Jahr 2018 mit 2,0% etwas unter dem in Westdeutschland liegen.

This paper shows basic macroeconomic consequences of the German unification for the country in time series spanning from 20 years before the event until 25 years thereafter. Essential findings can well be explained by elementary economic theory. Moreover, it is shown that the German economy had been off steady state already before unification in important aspects. In particular, a steep increase in the current account balance during the 1980s suggests that globalization strongly affected the German economy at that time. While unification stopped the trend to an ever more open economy and to a rising trade surplus for about 10 years, the fall of the iron curtain eventually even increased this trend in the long run.