A safe and healthy banking system is a central pillar of financial stability and even political stability. Systemic banking crises lead to political instability and extremism while the same cannot be said of macroeconomic downturns unrelated to banking crises (see e.g. Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2016). Several factors have been identified as potential culprits for the recent financial crisis, among them insufficient bank liquidity, insufficient bank capitalization, risk-taking incentives induced by compensation struc- tures, and moral hazard emanating from government safety nets. My dissertation aims to enhance our understanding of two of these factors: capitalization and compensation, or put differently, (equity) capital and human capital.

In Reaktion auf die Erfahrungen aus der letzten Finanzmarktkrise veröffentlichte die Europäische Kommission im Mai 2014 die Richtlinie zur Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, BRRD). Die Richtlinie legt Regeln zur Abwicklung und Restrukturierung von Banken einschließlich eines Bail-in-Mechanismus fest, der das Verlustrisiko beim Scheitern einer Bank vorrangig deren Anteilseignern und Gläubigern aufbürdet.

Human beings do not act in isolation. This particularly holds for economic systems in which workers are employed at firms. In one of the seminal papers in economics, Coase (1937) identifies transaction costs to be the prime economic reason why firms are formed to organize production, and, consequently, transaction costs also explain why workers are employed at firms. At first glance, this appears to be a subtle detail on the organization of economic activity. It has, however, a huge impact on individuals, as this subtle detail also is the reason why the provision of their workforce in the economy is performed through employment at firms.

The thesis examines the interactions between the micro and macro levels by considering the effects of information at the micro level on the dynamics of aggregated investments. Another contribution examines the extent to which stress at the level of government refinancing and bank stress contributed to the rise in both the level and the heterogeneity of the refinancing costs of non-financial companies in the euro area during the European debt crisis and how they influenced the monetary transmission mechanism. The 3rd research paper analyzes how investments at company level are influenced by interactions between the company and the euro area as a whole.

The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks without burdening tax payers. We exploit the staggered implementation of the BRRD across 15 European Union (EU) member states to identify banks’ capital cost and capital structure responses. In a first stage, we show that average capital costs of banks increased. WACC hikes are lowest in the core countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) compared to formerly stressed EMU and non-EMU countries. This pattern is driven by changes in the relative WACC weight of equity in response to the BRRD, which indicates enhanced financial system resilience. In a second stage, we document asymmetric transmission patterns of banks’ capital cost changes on to corporates’ borrowing terms. Only EMU banks located in core countries that exhibit higher WACC are those that also increase firms’ borrowing cost and contract credit supply. Hence, the BRRD had unintended consequences for selected segments of the real economy.

Die gegenwärtige Corona-Strategie der Bundes­regierung, wenn man sie denn so nennen kann, konzentriert sich darauf, besonders gefährdete Personen durch Impfung zu schützen und die Ansteckung aller anderen durch den Lockdown zu vermeiden. Sie ignoriert, dass Menschen im täglichen Leben immer Risiken eingehen und dabei auch Risiken berücksichtigen, die durch das Verhalten anderer entstehen. Sie entscheiden selbst, wie stark sie sich gefährden, je nach ihrer persönlichen gesundheitlichen Situation und Risikoaffinität. Die Möglichkeit, Risiken einzugehen, ist ein inhärenter Teil einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft: Die Gesellschaft vertraut prinzipiell dem Einzelnen, einigermaßen vernünftige Entscheidungen zu treffen – und die Konsequenzen zu tragen, wenn die Dinge schiefgehen. Der Staat setzt dabei die Rahmenbedingungen, aber niemals mit dem Ziel, das Risiko für den Einzelnen auf null zu drücken. 

The European Commission’s Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances is a rare case of a publicly released early warning system. It was published first time in 2012 by the European Commission as a reaction to public debt crises in Europe. So far, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure takes a one-size-fits-all approach with regard to the identification of thresholds. The experience of Central and Eastern European Countries during the global financial crisis and in the resulting public debt crises has been largely different from that of other European countries. This paper looks at the appropriateness of scoreboard of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure of the European Commission for this group of catching-up countries. It is shown that while some of the indicators of the scoreboard are helpful to predict crises in the region, thresholds are in most cases set too narrow since it largely disregarded the specifics of catching-up economies, in particular higher and more volatile growth rates of various macroeconomic variables.

We investigate how the deterioration of household balance sheets affects worker productivity, and in turn economic downturns. Specifically, we compare the output of innovative workers who experienced differential declines in housing wealth during the financial crisis but were employed at the same firm and lived in the same metropolitan area. We find that, following a negative wealth shock, innovative workers become less productive and generate lower economic value for their firms. The reduction in innovative output is not driven by workers switching to less innovative firms or positions. These effects are more pronounced among workers at greater risk of financial distress.

Recurring financial instabilities have led policymakers to rely on early-warning models to signal financial vulnerabilities. These models rely on ex-post optimization of signaling thresholds on crisis probabilities accounting for preferences between forecast errors, but come with the crucial drawback of unstable thresholds in recursive estimations. We propose two alternatives for threshold setting with similar or better out-of-sample performance: (i) including preferences in the estimation itself and (ii) setting thresholds ex-ante according to preferences only. Given probabilistic model output, it is intuitive that a decision rule is independent of the data or model specification, as thresholds on probabilities represent a willingness to issue a false alarm vis-à-vis missing a crisis. We provide real-world and simulation evidence that this simplification results in stable thresholds, while keeping or improving on out-of-sample performance. Our solution is not restricted to binary-choice models, but directly transferable to the signaling approach and all probabilistic early-warning models.

Die Corona-bedingte Wirtschaftskrise könnte den deutschen Bankensektor massiv in Mitleidenschaft ziehen, wenn die nationale und europäische Aufsicht nicht in den nächsten Monaten gegensteuert. Das ist die Aussage einer IWH-Studie, in der wir die Jahresabschlüsse von mehr als einer halben Million deutscher Unternehmen mit den Bilanzdaten von über 1 000 hiesigen Banken verknüpft haben. Die Stichprobe umfasst rund 90% der Bilanzsumme aller Banken und schließt alle großen systemrelevanten Geldhäuser mit ein. Wir benutzen dabei sektorspezifische Prognosen für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung: Wir beziehen also die Tatsache mit ein, dass die Tourismusbranche besonders und die Baubranche relativ wenig von der Krise betroffen ist. Wir simulieren mehrere Szenarien: eines mit einer schnellen Erholung (V-förmig), eines mit einer relativ langsamen Erholung (U) und ein Szenario, in dem die Krise noch eine längere Zeit anhält (L).