>>A completely revised version of this paper has been published as: Dettmann, Eva; Giebler, Alexander; Weyh, Antje: flexpaneldid. A Stata Toolbox for Causal Analysis with Varying Treatment Time and Duration. IWH Discussion Paper 3/2020. Halle (Saale) 2020.<<

The paper presents a modification of the matching and difference-in-differences approach of Heckman et al. (1998) and its Stata implementation, the command flexpaneldid. The approach is particularly useful for causal analysis of treatments with varying start dates and varying treatment durations (like investment grants or other subsidy schemes). Introducing more flexibility enables the user to consider individual treatment and outcome periods for the treated observations. The flexpaneldid command for panel data implements the developed flexible difference-in-differences approach and commonly used alternatives like CEM Matching and difference-in-differences models. The novelty of this tool is an extensive data preprocessing to include time information into the matching approach and the treatment effect estimation. The core of the paper gives two comprehensive examples to explain the use of flexpaneldid and its options on the basis of a publicly accessible data set.

This paper explores how banks react to an exogenous shock caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and how the structure of the banking system affects economic development following the shock. Independent banks based in the disaster areas increase their risk-based capital ratios after the hurricane, while those that are part of a bank holding company on average do not. The effect on independent banks mainly comes from the subgroup of highly capitalized banks. These independent and highly capitalized banks increase their holdings in government securities and reduce their total loan exposures to non-financial firms, while also increasing new lending to these firms. With regard to local economic development, affected counties with a relatively large share of independent banks and relatively high average bank capital ratios show higher economic growth than other affected counties following the catastrophic event.

We investigate how adopting the euro affects exports using firm-level data from Slovakia and Estonia. In contrast to previous studies, we focus on countries that adopted the euro individually and had different exchange rate regimes prior to doing so. Following the New Trade Theory we consider three types of adjustment: firm selection, changes in product varieties and changes in the average value of the exports that compose the exports of individual firms. The euro effect is identified by a difference in differences analysis comparing exports by firms to the euro area countries with exports to the EU countries that are not members of the euro area. The results highlight the importance of the transaction costs channel related to exchange rate volatility. We find the euro has a strong pro-trade effect in Slovakia, which switched to the euro from a floating exchange rate, while it has almost no effect in Estonia, which had a fixed exchange rate to the euro prior to the euro changeover. Our findings indicate that the euro effect manifested itself mainly through the intensive margin and that the gains from trade were heterogeneous across firm characteristics.

Steigt ein Fußballverein ab, leiden die Fans. Leidet auch die Region? Der Beitrag nutzt abstiegsbedingte Änderungen in der räumlichen Verteilung der Vereine in vier großen europäischen Profifußballligen, um den kausalen Effekt des Abstiegs eines Erstligavereins auf das regionale Beschäftigungs- und Wirtschaftswachstum zu testen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen signifikant negative kurzfristige Effekte eines Abstiegs auf die Entwicklung der regionalen Beschäftigung und der Bruttowertschöpfung in sportbezogenen Wirtschaftszweigen. Darüber hinaus finden sich negative Auswirkungen auf das gesamte regionale Beschäftigungswachstum.

We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.

This paper investigates the impact of sustained lower productivity growth on exports, by looking at the role of the productivity distribution and allocative efficiency as drivers of export performance. It follows and goes beyond the work of Barba Navaretti et al. (2017), analysing the effects of productivity on exports depending on the dynamics of allocative efficiency. Low productivity growth is a well-documented stylised fact in Western countries – and possibly a reality likely to persist for some time. What could be the impact of persistent sluggish growth of productivity on exports? To shed light on this question, this paper examines the relationship between the productivity distribution of firms and sectoral export performance. The structure of firms within countries or even sectors matters tremendously for the nexus between productivity and exports at the macroeconomic level, as the theoretical and empirical literature documents. For instance, whether too few firms at the top (lack of innovation) or too many firms at the bottom (weak market selection) drives slow average productivity at the macro level has very different implications and therefore demands different policy responses.

I develop a theoretical model to investigate the effect of simultaneous regulation with a leverage ratio and a risk-weighted ratio on banks‘ risk taking and banking market structure. I extend a portfolio choice model by adding heterogeneity in productivity among banks. Regulators face a trade-off between the efficient allocation of resources and financial stability. In an oligopolistic market, risk-weighted requirements incentivise banks with high productivity to lend to low-risk firms. When a leverage ratio is introduced, these banks lose market shares to less productive competitors and react with risk-shifting into high-risk loans. While average productivity in the low-risk market falls, market shares in the high-risk market are dispersed across new entrants with high as well as low productivity.