Global economic activity appears to be expanding rapidly during spring 2017. Confidence among managers is either strong or has improved in all major regions, and world trade and industrial production have, after two years of weakness, picked up markedly during last winter. For 2 ½ years, the euro area economy has now been constantly expanding at an annual rate of about 1.6%, slightly above potential. Employment has also been expanding steadily. Production and employment have been recently rising almost everywhere, including countries such as France and Italy where unemployment rates still do not appear to be on a downward trend. Official investment data for 2015 and 2016 appear to be distorted: big multinational firms relocated parts of their assets (intellectual property products in particular) or their registered business offices from countries outside the euro area to Ireland. As a consequence, reported gross fixed capital formation in Ireland expanded by 33% in 2015 and by 45% in 2016. Without this effect, investment growth in the euro area is about one percentage point lower in 2015 and 2016. Headline inflation hit 2% in February, but this was only the effect of higher world oil prices. The core rate is stubbornly at slightly below 1%, and wages rise annually by scarcely 1.5%. The revival of the economy will have to continue for considerably more time until inflation will come close to the ECB target zone. As monetary conditions continue to support growth, financial policies will be slightly expansive, and a certain external stimulus should come from the apparent recovery of world trade. Overall, we forecast euro area GDP to expand by 1.7% in both 2017 and 2018. However, policy uncertainty is substantial and could have a negative effect. In particular, elections in member states might give power to movements that aim at disintegrating Europe. Such a turn could rapidly undermine confidence, in particular in the financial strength of highly indebted member states.

Global economic activity has revived since autumn, and equity markets have rallied at the end of the year. Apparently, some of the measures proposed during the US election campaign by the president elect, such as financial market deregulation, economic stimulus, tax cuts and infrastructure are expected to support the economy in the US and beyond. However, this stimulus bears considerable risks already for the near future: other economies could face considerable problems due to a further appreciation of the dollar, rising financing costs and the withdrawal of capital towards the US. In the euro area, as monetary policy continues its expansive course, financing costs will stay very low in 2017, and fiscal policy will be mildly expansive, although a bit less so than in 2016. Confidence of firms and private households has strengthened in recent months, as has the mood on financial markets. We expect that the recovery will continue at about the pace of 2016. GDP will, according to our forecast, increase by 1.6% in 2017 and by 1.7% in 2018. However, the crisis in the Italian banking sector has intensified. It might also trigger another crisis of confidence in European institutional arrangements: according to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, banks may only be saved with public money if owners and creditors of these banks have contributed to the rescue. At present it seems doubtful whether it would be politically feasible to respect this rule. Regarding inflation, our forecast for 2017 is 1.2%. Although energy prices have risen significantly, price pressures are still low.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich in einem moderaten Aufschwung. Die Gemeinschaftsdiagnose Herbst 2016 prognostiziert, dass das Bruttoinlandsprodukt 2016 um 1,9%, 2017 um 1,4% und 2018 um 1,6% zulegen dürfte. Dabei gehen von der Weltkonjunktur nur geringe stimulierende Effekte aus, zudem dürften sich in den außerordentlich niedrigen Kapitalmarktzinsen nicht nur die derzeitige Geldpolitik, sondern auch niedrige Wachstumserwartungen widerspiegeln. All dies hemmt die Ausrüstungsinvestitionen. So ist es weiterhin in erster Linie der Konsum, der den Aufschwung trägt.

The global financial crisis of 2007-08 and its adverse effects on economic activity have put financial stability back on the agenda of both researchers and policymakers. The regulatory debate has since then revolved around the question which reforms are needed to effectively reduce the likelihood and costs of future systemic financial crises. By now, the debate has led to an update of regulatory frameworks on the national, European, and global level. This thesis contributes to the empirical research on the risks to financial stability and to the debate on the regulation of international financial markets. It builds on some of the key insights from the recent global financial crisis and the respective policy responses. Chapter 1 of the thesis analyzes the reasons behind the strong co-movements of credit risk in sovereign bond markets during the financial crisis and the subsequent euro area debt crisis. In addition, it investigates to what extent high co-movements might be the outcome of contagion and through which channels contagion occurs. Chapter 2 investigates how uncertainty in banking affects banks’ loan supply, and it analyzes if the lending behavior is heterogeneous across different types of banks. Turning to the analysis of actual policies, Chapter 3 studies the effect of liquidity provided by the Eurosystem on macroeconomic adjustment in European crisis countries. Finally, Chapter 4 of the thesis assesses the effectiveness of a macroprudential policy instrument, caps on banks’ leverage, in stabilizing credit growth during financial downturns.

This paper investigates the macroeconomic risks associated with undesirably low inflation using a medium-sized New Keynesian model. We consider different causes of persistently low inflation, including a downward shift in long-run inflation expectations, a fall in nominal wage growth, and a favorable supply-side shock. We show that the macroeconomic effects of persistently low inflation depend crucially on its underlying cause, as well as on the extent to which monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound. Finally, we discuss policy options to mitigate these effects.

During the first half of 2016, investment activity of private firms was weak in most advanced economies and labour producitivity was even decreasing, as was world trade in goods. Consumption of private households, however, kept the world economy afloat. Within this global context, the modest recovery of the euro area economy continues, with important tailwinds from labour markets. Employment ist expanding everywhre, even in those countries, such as France and Italy, where unemployment rates have still not come down significantly. Since monetary and fisical policies will not become more expansive in 2017, the stimulus from cheap oil is fading, and exports to the UK will be dragged down by the fallout of the Brexit votem there is reason to expect the euro area recovery to lose some momentum. GDP will, according to our forecast, increase by 1,6% in this year and by 1,5% in 2017, about as much as potential output in the euro area. Our inflation forecast for 2016 is 0,2%. For 2017, we expect inflation to increase up to 1,2%, as during next year the favourable effects of decreasing energy prices will fade off.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich nach wie vor in einem moderaten Aufschwung. Der anhaltende Beschäftigungsaufbau führt zu spürbaren Einkommenssteigerungen, und der Fall der Energiepreise hat die Kaufkraft der privaten Haushalte deutlich erhöht. Beides treibt den privaten Konsum, aber auch die Wohnungsbauinvestitionen, welche überdies von den sehr niedrigen Zinsen beflügelt werden. Allerdings bleiben die Exporte angesichts der schwachen internationalen Dynamik in diesem und im nächsten Jahr eher verhalten. Alles in allem dürfte das deutsche Bruttoinlandsprodukt in diesem Jahr um 1,8% und im Jahr 2017 um 1,6% zunehmen.

We investigate the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of German banks and the implications of such holdings for bank risk. We use granular information on all German banks and all sovereign debt exposures in the years 2005–2013. As regards the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of banks, we find that these are larger for weakly capitalized banks, banks that are active on capital markets, and for large banks. Yet, only around two thirds of all German banks hold sovereign bonds. Macroeconomic fundamentals were significant drivers of sovereign bond holdings only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. With the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, German banks reallocated their portfolios toward sovereigns with lower debt ratios and bonds with lower yields. With regard to the implications for bank risk, we find that low-risk government bonds decreased the risk of German banks, especially for savings and cooperative banks. Holdings of high-risk government bonds, in turn, increased the risk of commercial banks during the sovereign debt crisis.

We develop and estimate a general equilibrium search and matching model that accounts for key business cycle properties of macroeconomic aggregates, including labor market variables. In sharp contrast to leading New Keynesian models, we do not impose wage inertia. Instead we derive wage inertia from our specification of how firms and workers negotiate wages. Our model outperforms a variant of the standard New Keynesian Calvo sticky wage model. According to our estimated model, there is a critical interaction between the degree of price stickiness, monetary policy, and the duration of an increase in unemployment benefits.

Short run consequences of Brexit for the euro area economy mainly depend on the effects on confidence in the stability of the European Union and the currency area in particular. Anti-European (or indeed anti-globalization) movements are certainly encouraged by the British vote. More important, however, might be a reverse effect: from the perspective of the British turmoil, the euro area might in the near future appear as a zone of relative stability and calm. Against the background of a sluggish world economy, the euro area economy recently performed reasonably well: dynamics have been slowly increasing since 2013, and the rate of expansion in the first quarter of 2016 was one of the highest of the past couple of years. Looking forward, the drivers of the recovery should continue supporting growth in the second half of 2016 and for much of 2017. Our forecast is that euro area GDP will expand by 1.7% in 2016 and by 1.6% in 2017, with only a minor effect from Brexit. This year, like in 2015, average oil prices will probably be markedly lower than they were a year ago, supporting real incomes of private households and lowering production costs of firms, and monetary policy will still be supportive. Labour markets appear to continue improving slowly. Associated with the improved economic conditions, we expect a slight increase in euro area inflation during 2016, 0.3%, with a more marked increase in 2017, 1,3%.