Der Vorschlag des Chefvolkswirts des Internationalen Währungsfonds, Olivier Blanchard, das Inflationsziel auf vier Prozent anzuheben, hat eine lebhafte Debatte über die angemessene Höhe der Zielinflationsrate entfacht. Dabei ist keineswegs offensichtlich, dass der durch höhere Inflationsraten größere Spielraum in Bezug auf Leitzinssenkungen in Krisenzeiten auch zu einem volkswirtschaftlichen Mehrwert führt. Insbesondere sind die mit einer höheren Inflationsrate einhergehenden volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten nicht zu vernachlässigen. So ist zum Beispiel die Variabilität der relativen Preise tendenziell umso größer, je höher die Inflationsrate ist. Dadurch wird die Signal-und Lenkungsfunktion relativer Preisänderungen beeinträchtigt, und dies hat negative Folgen für die effiziente Allokation von Ressourcen. Diese Studie untersucht im Rahmen einer empirischen Analyse den Einfluss der Inflation auf die Schwankungen der relativen Preise für den Euroraum. Sie kann einen signifikanten positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Inflation und Variabilität der relativen Preise feststellen. Damit liefert sie empirische Evidenz für einen störenden Einfluss von Inflation auf die relativen Preise und folglich für negative realwirtschaftliche Effekte von Inflation. Die Ergebnisse sprechen für eine Geldpolitik moderater Inflationsraten.

We argue that a “static“ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not conducive to assessing stability of financial systems in euro-candidate countries. Instead, we advocate a dynamic approach to assessing interest rate convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001-January 22, 2009, sample period. Our results show a varied degree of the relationship between domestic and eurozone sovereign bond yields, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. We find some divergence of relative bond yields since the EU accession.

The euro area economy benefits from dynamic growth of exports to the emerging markets. Exports to Asia in particular have exceeded their peak level of spring 2008 as early as at the beginning of this year. Firms reacted by restocking and investing in equipment. The growth hike of the second quarter, however, will not be repeated, as it was favored by special factors. We expect euro area GDP to grow by around 1.6% in 2010 and 2011. The upswing of world trade calms down in the second half of this year and the effects of fiscal consolidation in Europe become increasingly felt.

World trade contracted sharply in late 2008 and early 2009 following the deepening of the financial crisis in September 2008. This paper discusses the main mechanisms behind the global downturn in trade and its impact on euro area exports and competitiveness. It finds that the euro area was hit particularly hard by the contraction in global demand.

This paper analyzes the role of common data problems when identifying structural breaks in small samples. Most notably, we survey small sample properties of the most commonly applied endogenous break tests developed by Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) and Zeileis (2004), Nyblom (1989) and Hansen (1992), and Andrews, Lee, and Ploberger (1996). Power and size properties are derived using Monte Carlo simulations. Results emphasize that mostly the CUSUM type tests are affected by the presence of heteroscedasticity, whereas the individual parameter Nyblom test and AvgLM test are proved to be highly robust. However, each test is significantly affected by leptokurtosis. Contrarily to other tests, where skewness is far more problematic than kurtosis, it has no additional effect for any of the endogenous break tests we analyze. Concerning overall robustness the Nyblom test performs best, while being almost on par to more recently developed tests in terms of power.

Looking at historical cross-country interactions, this book examines the role of the US in the world economy. Illustrating that US shocks tend to have a global nature and that Monetary Union only partially shelters the Euro area from its external environment, the US should fully assume its responsibility, minimizing shock transmission.

The world economy is recovering, largely driven by upswings in most emerging market economies. Although growth in these regions is apparently calming down at present, the euro area will still be benefiting from the momentum of a healthily expanding world trade for much of the remaining year. Rising exports will be the main driver of the recovery in the euro area during the first half of 2010. We expect euro area GDP to grow by around 1.0% in 2010 and 1.6% in 2011, respectively. Due to this increase in external demand, the growth rate of the industrial production index has also gained momentum: during 2010 the industrial production index is expected to grow around 7%, though only at about 3% in 2011.

We argue that monetary policies in euro-candidate countries should also aim at mitigating excessive instability of the key target and instrument variables of monetary policy during turbulent market periods. Our empirical tests show a significant degree of leptokurtosis, thus prevalence of tail-risks, in the conditional volatility series of such variables in the euro-candidate countries. Their central banks will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy to mitigate such extreme risks while steering their economies out of the crisis and through the euroconvergence process. Such policies provide flexibility that is not embedded in the Taylor-type instrument rules, or in the Maastricht convergence criteria.

The world economy will recover during 2010 and 2011 thanks to ultra-low key interest rates in industrial countries and to the strong growth in emerging markets economies. In the euro area, however, the phasing out of expansive fiscal policies and fiscal consolidation will drag down demand; rising exports will be the main driver of the recovery. Internal demand will have a positive (although small) contribution to growth in 2011. We expect euro area GDP to grow around 1.2% and 1.6% during 2010 and 2011, respectively. Due to rising exports, the industrial sector will resume positive growth in the short run but the intensity of the recovery will be moderate and insufficient to compensate the sharp fall of 2009: at the end of 2011, the industrial production index is expected to be still 10% below its pre-crisis levels.